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This thesis studies the public budgeting politics of Hong Kong from the 
1970s to the 1990s, using the domain of housing and land as a case study. It 
regards that the administrative procedures and institutional practices constituting 
the budgetary process are not only management techniques, but that they embody 
some fundamental values and political objectives ofthe colonial government. The 
public finance of the colonial government was grounded on the value of 
conservatism. Its political objective was to preserve the financial viability ofthe 
colonial state whose economic structure heavily relied on the commercial 
bourgeoisie. 
Grounded on these understandings, this study adopts the historical 
institutional approach and the thesis of 'multi-level, interlinked institutions' to 
derive a general model ofpublic budgeting of the colonial government in order to 
elucidate the concerned budgetary politics. The principal argument of the model 
is that the budgets ofthe colonial government from the 1970s to the 1990s were 
the outcome of the complex interaction of macro-structural context, institutional 
factors and bureaucratic interests. The budgetary process involves two levels of 
institutions, namely the policy making level and the administrative level, with the 
budgetary authority of the latter level being subordinated to the former one. 
Analysis in the policy making level was operationalized by examining their 
revenue management strategies of the policy actors in the housing and land 
domain. The main hypothesis is that there is a strong negative correlation 
between the economic changes of the colony and the effort ofthe policy actors of 
the colonial government in preserving the 'conservative' approach of public 
finance. 
xi 
Analysis in the administrative level was operationalized by examining the 
budget patterns ofvarious administrative departments related to land and housing. 
The main hypothesis is that there is a strong negative correlation between the 
effort o f t h e policy actors to preserve the conservative approach in public finance 
and the feasibility of budget increase (specifically on the "core budget") of these 
departments. 
These correlations establish the prima facie case for the validity of the 
general model ofpubl ic finance described above. For the conservative approach 
of public finance of the policy actors was largely the product of the particular 
economic structure of the colony and was institutionalized in the budgetary 
process and behavior of the policy officials. The outcome of the departmental 
budgets was largely affected by the intensity of oversight of the policy making 
level, which in tum varied with the preservation effort of the policy actor. The 
concrete mechanism ofinteraction and negotiation among concerned officials will 
not be studied here, nor the effect o f the changes in budgetary guidelines over the 
years. The study of these factors, while important in shaping budget patterns, 
requires accessibility of more restricted documents and insider information, both 
ofwhich are beyond the scope of this thesis. 
The preservation effort of the policy actors preliminarily explicates that the 
policy actors had the political objective of maintaining the financial viability of 
the colonial government and that such effort was largely induced by the value of 
conservatism. The budgetary patterns of the departments reflect the interests of 
departmental officials (at the administrative level), who formulate their budgets 
under the constraints o f the institutionalized process and the behavior of officials 
at the policy making level. 
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1.1 SCOPE AND PURPOSE 
Research on public budgeting in Hong Kong is generally underdeveloped. 
Some have only focused on technical and economic dimensions. Some simply 
take the argument of laissez-faire governing style of the colonial government as 
given without verification. (Lo, 1990; Tang, 1988 & 199¾ Rabuska, 1973) The 
underdevelopment of the local budgetary research is partly related to the slow 
development of budgetary theories. The Wager's law is too grand to tell what 
exact forces are affecting budget decisions. Budgetary incrementalism 
overemphasizes the impact of institutional constraints in budget decision while 
the economic approach ignores institutional constraints, the limitation of human 
computation power as well as the administrative autonomy ofbureaucrats. 
The aim of this thesis is to explain the budgetary trends of the Hong Kong 
Government from the 1970s to the 1990s through case study of the housing and 
land domain. The study regards that the public budgeting of the colonial 
government is inherently political in that public budgets are not the result of 
budgetary administrative procedures, but the outcome of budgetary institutional 
practices that embody conservative value of the government bureaucrats. These 
'conservative' institutional practices shape the public budgeting of Hong Kong to 
move on a 'conservative' direction. (Rubin, 1997; Mullard, 1993) Studying 
budgetary politics is important in sensitizing us to how the public money had been 
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used during the colonial period and avoids reducing budgeting to a technical 
matter. 
The study will also integrate the historical institutional approach with the 
thesis of 'multi-level, interlinked institutions', to argue that the budgets of the 
colonial government were the outcome of the complex interaction of macro-
structural contexts, institutional factors and bureaucratic interests. Two levels of 
institutions, namely, the policy-making level and the administrative level, will be 
studied. In the subsequent chapters, I shall show that as a result of the 
institutional dynamics, the fiscal policy adopted and thus public budgets made by 
the officials in the first level institutions were shaped by conservative values and 
institutional practices, while the senior bureaucrats in the second level institutions 
were driven by bureaucratic interests to push up their departmental budget. 
Before I go into details of the study, I shall review some major literature in 
order to better illustrate the approach of my thesis. 
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1.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature review will be divided into two main parts, namely, public 
budgeting researches in Hong Kong and current development ofbudgeting theories. 
1.2.1 PUBLIC BUDGETING RESEARCHES IN HONG KONG 
Public budgeting researches in Hong Kong can be divided into three groups. 
The first group focuses on the budgetary system of the British colonial 
government and its ideological context, such as the description of Miners (1995) 
provides a comprehensive annual government budgetary cycle. Similar 
demonstration can also be found in Cheung (1965) and Haddon-Cave (1980). 
They insist that the British colonial did highly adhere to the principle of 'positive 
non-interventionism'. ^  
More concrete demonstration of budget making principles could be found in 
Rabhuska (1976 & 1979) and Hsia & Chau (1978). They provide background 
information of budgetary system of the colonial government. Some of their 
works begin to take historic-political factors into consideration. For an instance, 
Tang illustrates how macro-political changes shape the so-called economic 
matters, like budgeting for government revenue. (Tang, 1989 & 1996) 
The second group examines the socio-economic impact of particular 
budgetary issues in a particular period of time. Examples are scholarly 
comments of government annual budget in ‘Hong Kong Economic Journal 
Monthly and in Wu's works. (1977; 1978; 1983) In general, all these analysis 
are narrow. Either they concentrate only on the impact of a particular budget 
item towards the socio-economy^ or the philosophy of the financial secretary or 
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the Governor.^ Wu's works deal with the documentary analysis of the public 
finance of Hong Kong from the post-WWII to the 1960s in socio-economic 
perspective. The greatest strength of Wu's works^ lie in his detailed empirical 
analysis in expenditure or revenue aspects of Hong Kong's public finance. He 
also illustrates on the prioritization of economic developments of Hong Kong at 
the expense of the proclaimed taxation principle of equity by the colonial 
government. The major shortcoming of his work is the lack of concrete 
theoretical framework to explain the non-equity operation of the taxation system 
and the public expenses ofthe colonial government. In sum, his works does not 
sufficiently articulate the politics of budgeting and the longitudinal development 
of public budget in Hong Kong. 
The last group mostly refers to the empirical study of public budgeting. It is 
represented by Lo,s work (1990). In general, Lo,s work (1990) is based on 
Aaron Wildavsky's thesis. She assumes that the colonial government adopted an 
incrementalist approach to budgeting without verification. She takes the 
pluralist assumption for granted. Also, she has not considered a number of 
factors, such as 'historic-specificity', budget nature, budget usage style, as well as 
the relationship between budgeting and policy substance. The negligence of 
these factors may fail to conduct a comprehensive analysis. More importantly, 
her findings of incremental government budget pattem may not mean the budget 
pattem of the colonial government is a result of incrementalism. Nevertheless 
her work has provided an insightful framework to consider the linkage between 
factors in macro-environment, meso-organizational level and micro-individual 
level. 
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1.2.2 ON-HAND BUDGETING THEORIES 
(a) On-Hand Budgeting Theories in the Pre-War Era: 
At the end of the 19th century Budgetary theory was represented by Adolph 
Wager's Wagers law. He suggests that 
"public expenditure would grow faster than the national economy. The law 
is really no more than a generalization. Its explanation, justification and 
cause are the pressure of social progress . . • the need of social services 
would increase in industrialization. Presumably Wager believed that the 
need for such services would increase with industrialization." (Udehn, 1996, p. 
195) 
Unfortunately, the law does not state what factors will affect the budget pattem of 
government. (Goldsmith, 1995) Also, it is too vague to explain sectional 
government spending, like housing and education. In the 1940s, V. 0 . Key 
regards that there was a lack of budgetary theories in the pre-war era. By the 
time, most writers on budgeting merely focused on the economic aspect ofpublic 
expenditure. (Key, 1992; Lehan, 1983; Musgrave and Musgrave, 1973; Wildavsky, 
1992; OECD, 1995.) 
(b) Four Main Budgeting Theories in the Post-War Era 
Budgetary theories in the post-war era can generally be divided into three 
main branches. They are (i) budgetary incrementalism, (ii) public choice 
approach and (iii) neo-Marxist approach. I shall review them one by one in this 
section. 
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(i) Budgetary Incrementalism 
Budgetary incrementalism was a famous budgetary theory in the 1960s. 
(Leloup, 1983 & 1988) Mluential scholars in this field are Aaron Wildavsky, 
Lindlblom, Fenno Davies and Sharansky. (Leloup, 1983) For Lindblom, 
"government decision making, successive limited comparison of policies is 
more feasible and rational than comprehensive analysis. Limited, non-
comprehensive, incremental change, representing mutual adjustment of 
participant groups, is portrayed as the most common method of policy 
formulation. Muddling through is not only what is done, it is what should be 
done." (Leloup, 1983,p. 62) 
Wildavsky incorporated Lindblom's ideas to formulate a highly influential 
work from the incrementalist perspective. In his ‘The Politics ofBudgetary 
Process ‘ (1992a), incrementalism refers to both decision making process and the 
patterns of outcomes of the process. (Leloup, 1983, p. 63) This argument is built 
upon the pluralist model and assumes that “no individual maker or set of decision 
makers has sufficient wisdom and knowledge to take a comprehensive view." 
(Brown, 1974, p. 10) Also, it denies the thesis of budget maximization by 
arguing that every segment of budget usage has its defenders. Policy-making, 
including budget-making decision, is only a continuation of the past with minimal 
modification. (Brown, 1974) 
Incrementalism points out that there is no possibility of making a fully rational 
choice. Secondly, it recognizes institutional and political constraints as 
important variables in constraining bureaucrats to pursue utility-maximization 
successfully. (Udehn, 1996) Similar argument can also be found in 
‘Incrementalism and Public Policy，by Hayes Michael. In short, it is essential to 
incorporate institutions as a variable in budgeting theories, so that we can have a 
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better chance to explain changes of budgetary outcomes and avoid the fallacy of 
reductionism (Leloup, 1983) As what Irene Rubin said 
"Wildavsky's model of budgetary decision making could not account for 
entitlement programmes, which, over time, took up an increasing 
proportion of the budget. Nor could incrementalism deal with or explain 
top-down budgeting that bypassed the department and bureaus . . . it could 
not due with cutbacks because they made the definition of the base 
questionable . . . it treated the environment of budgeting as an exogenous 
variable, not part of the budget process. Most important incrementalism 
was based on a theory of human nature. Thus, it was argued that 
incrementalism hold at all times, in all places, and under all conditions. It 
did not allow for variation." (1989, p. 78) [See Rubin (1988, pp. 1-18) for 
details] 
and 
"the incrementalist watched too small a part of the public budgeting 
process, and at times just looked at the outcomes and tried to figure out 
what the processes was that led to the outcomes . . • ” (Rubin, 1990, p. 6) 
(ii) Public Choice Approach / Economic Approach in Bureaucracy 
The public choice approach is an economic approach to politics. (Self, 1993) 
It replaced the sociological theory and social psychology and become the 
dominant approach in social sciences during the late 1970s and the 1980s. 
(Monroe, 1991, pp. 2-3) Its being avoids much complexity in analysis in that 
study population is assumed to be homogeneously 'utility-oriented'. (Almond, 
1991; Monroe, 1991; Self, 1993) 
Major early works were 'The Politics ofBureaucracy'hy Gordon Tullock and 
Anthony Downs's ‘Inside Bureaucracy'. The most popular sighted work is 
William A. Nickanen's 'Bureaucracy and Representative Government' (1971). 
(Udehn, 1996; Schneider, 1989) According to Lynn (1991)5, public choice 
theorists assume: 
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1. "Budget-maximizing behaviour is a prediction derived from a model in 
which bureaucrats are assumed to maximize their utility within a specific 
institutional context." (Lynn, 1991, p. 60) Individuals are rational 
actors. 
2. "utility is a function of income - salary and fringe benefits - and 
perquisites, a variable representing a wide variety of desirable end estates: 
access to emoluments, a favourable reputation, power patronage, and the 
like. Both income and perquisites are postulated as being positive 
functions ofthe bureau's output and of its discretionary budget •.，， 
3. "The utility-maximizing bureaucrat is transformed into a budget-
maximizing bureaucrat by a set of specific institutional factor." 
4. ‘‘The bureau is postulated as a monopoly supplier of a particular output 
and is assumed to exchange a total amount for a total budget from its 
sponsor, a legislative body assumed to be a monopolist .，， 
5. “The availability of information is assumed to be asymmetrical: only the 
bureaucrats has a accurate information on the minimum cost at which a 
given output can be produced ...，， 
Public choice theorists generally argue that budget-maximizing bureaucrat 
would cause over-supply ofpublic service. Hood and Dunsire's 'Bureaumetrics: 
The Quantitative Comparison of British Central Government Agencies' (1981j 
and Cutback Management in Public Bureaucracies' (1989) are the examples. 
Another typically sited example is Niskanen's work (1971). He argues that a 
government department 
“ . . . i s run by a senior official whose job includes deciding the budget for the 
department. The budget thus becomes the private good of that senior civil servants 
in each department who all, despite hierarchical structures have a hand in preparing 
budgetary claims . . . pursuing self-interest may not always lead to budget-
maximization. Indeed civil servants may gain approbation through cutting budgets. 
(Dowding, 1995, p. 61) 
8 
In short, research in this approach derives simple economic models ofpolitical 
institution to predict the bureaucrat's behaviour and to offer economic-based 
explanations to all the patterns probed. (Dowding, 1995) Public choice approach 
offers formal theories in terms of simple hypothesis, consistent rationale of 
explanation and prediction. As what Johnson (1991) said that: 
"the most widely recognized advantage of the rational actor approach possesses 
over rival approaches to social explanation is the great elegance and simplicity 
of theoretical formulation it allows. Building upon a few new simple 
assumptions to generate sophisticated models with very interesting implications 
for our understanding ofhuman action." (Johnson, 1991, p. 105) 
Empirical critique on this approach began to exist in the late 1970s and the 1980s. 
At that time, scholars started to introduce norms, culture and institutions into 
budgetary analysis. However, their analyses were still neo-classical economics 
based. (Monroe, 1991) It consequently made them suffer from the problem of 
weak explanatory power on the changes of bureau behaviour or public budgeting 
over time. In short, their analyses had ignored the possibility of altruistic 
behaviour and the difference in individual goals. (Mansbridge, 1995; Rosenberg, 
1995; Rothstein, 1995) In fact, 
"there is no necessary connection between budget-maximization and self-
interest; hence no very good reason to assume that bureaucrats, even it 
they are self-interests, would generally try to maximize the budget of their 
bureaus." (Udehn, 1996, p. 75). 
Other criticisms on this approach come from institutional economics theorists. 
They emphasize on ‘bounded rationality'^ and the satisfying behaviour of 
individual. (Howard, 1983; March, 1982; Monroe, 1991, p, 3; Simon, 1985 & 
1995) Also, structural constraints, institutional position of bureaus, incomplete 
information, uncertainty and risks should be taken into account in budgetary 
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analysis. (Eckstein, 1991; Forrester, 1989 & 1989a; Howard, 1983, p. 105; Lehan, 
1983; Monroe, 1991; Williamson, 1985) 
In sum, the public choice approach in the strong rational choice tradition does 
not consider institutional factors. Thus, the economic approach is 
methodologically individualist. (Udehn, 1996) Its fallacy lies in the fact that the 
"sociological man is never in an island, but always a party in social relations . . . ” . 
Also, the political men may not be selfish creatures. In addition, institutional 
variables ofgovemment bureaucracy and the social context of a given government 
should be considered in budgetary analysis. 
(iii) Neo-Marxist Approach 
"Neo-Marxist interest centres . . . on the transition within the capitalist mode of 
production form early ‘competitive, capitalism to advanced ‘monopoly， 
capitalism." (Skocpol & Amenta, 1986, p. 134) 
The neo-Marxist basically argues that the state tends to favour the interest of 
the capitalists. Such kind of class interest discrimination reflects in the 
budgetary allocation of collective consumption, (mode of budget usage) This 
inequality may stimulate social unrest or even social movements. The legitimacy 
of the state will be hampered eventually. Then the state will try to ease the 
tension by sacrificing the capitalist interest shortly. However, the state will still 
tend to favour the capitalist interest in the long run or to search a middle way to 
pertain the interest of the state and the capitalist simultaneously. (Castells, 1978 & 
1978; Jessop, 1990; Li, 1995; Lui & Kung, 1985; Skocpol, 1993; Skocpol and 
Amenta, 1985) In other words, the state sometimes enjoys relative autonomy in 
policy making or in some areas of policy making. The extent of relative 
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autonomy of the state should be depended on its extent of reliance towards the 
capitalist. In short, the neo-Marxist approach provides insights on what the 
macro-socio-economic-political structural environment that capitalist countries 
are facing. Borrowing Hall's words, “[neo-Marxist] move towards more 
complete consideration of state-society relations." (Hall, 1986, p. 17) However, 
this approach does not provide the underpinning rationale for why the state tends 
to favour the capitalist. According to Hall (1986), this rationale seems highly 
likely refer to neo-institutionalism and the state seems to be induced by these 
institutions to favour the capitalist. These institutions are emerged from the 
socio-economic and political environment ofagiven state. 
(iv) Integrating Marco-budgeting and Micro-budgeting 
This approach argues that study of national budgeting should harmonize 
macroscopic budgeting and microscopic-budgeting. For Schick, national 
budgetary research should articulate that national budgeting related to different 
levels of government. The different levels of government are interlinked to each 
other. Their budgeting are subjected to the impact of their particular macro-
environment. These understandings concretely uncover the actual operation of 
national budgeting. (Schick, 1986 & 1988 & 1988a) 
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In sum, insights from the review are as follows: 
• from incrementalism: 
the 'polities' of budgeting should emphasis the importance of institutional 
constraints and institutional dynamics should not be assumed away as a ‘black 
box’. 
• from the public choice approach: 
the fallacy of methodological individualism could be avoided by 
understanding individual goals and preferences are shaped by institutions. 
• from the neo-Marxist theory: 
the macro-sociostructural factors should be recognized as a force to 
necessitate the being of interest and behaviour of individuals / groups / 
organizations. 
• from Schick's thesis: 
national budgeting should not be understood as a homogeneous entity, but 
composing of different levels of government. These levels were intricately 
related to each other. 
In other words, budgetary research should pay attention to institutional factors and 
should articulate the thesis of multi-level of government into analysis. Re-
approaching institutions is a viable way to explore the politics of budgeting. It 
was a popular trend in social science in the 1980s, otherwise known as neo-
institutionalism. (Bates, 1988; March and Olsen, 1984 & 1989) 
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1.2.3 NEO-lNSTITUTIONAL APPROACH^ 
There are three main streams of neo-institutionalism, namely economic 
institutionalism (hereafter called Institutional Rational Choice Theory), 
Sociological Institutionalism and Historical Institutionalism. Minor streams 
include Institution Grammar and Multi-layered Approach. I shall review these 
five streams. 
(a) Institutional Rational Choice Theory 
Institutional rational choice theory^ is proposed by Coase and is taken up by 
Williamson and Dougalass North. According to North (1993), institutions are 
rules ofgame (formal and informal rule) which are created by humans to constrain 
or to shape the behaviour of individuals. Institution serves as an incentive 
system ofhuman interactions. 
Delimiting to the discipline of politics, institutional rational choice supporters 
treat polity as a market while political struggles as market transactions. These 
supporters also argue that an efficient political transaction is facilitated by 
appropriate institutional choice(s) and hence the utility maximization of political 
transaction. In short, institutional rational choice theory still roots in the 
tradition of neo-classical economics. They ignores how individual's interests 
and preferences are constituted by institutions. It consequently makes them 
suffer from the fallacies of reductionism and instmmentalism. However, it 
reminds us the importance of the shaping capacity of institutions and the 
limitation ofhuman computation capacity. 
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(b) Sociological Institutionalism 
Sociological institutionalism characterizes by John Meyer's works.^ (Powell 
and DiMaggio, 1991) For the sociological institutionalists, institutions "are 
dependent on larger macro-level variable such as society and culture." (Koelble, 
1995，p. 232) The macro-level variable is termed as wider environment. The 
wider environment is an evolving set of rationalized patterns or cultural schemes. 
It will finally structure the individual's behaviour in a given environment. (Meyer, 
1994) Individuals are not self-interested utility-maximizers in a pre-institutional 
and pre-cultural sense. Rather, individuals are embedded in a dense web of 
social, economic and political relations beyond their control and cognition 
whereby their actions are determined and are created by social and cultural factors. 
(Koelble, 1995; Rothstein, 1996) Moreover, sociological institutionalists highly 
emphasize the inheritance and persistence nature of institutions. These 
institutions will consequently structure the behaviour of people living within a 
given organization. Methodologically, they emphasize longitudinal analysis in 
institutional researches. 
In short, sociological institutionalists highlight the importance of social 
context in understanding individuars actions and its emphasis of longitudinal 
analysis help us to explicate the historic-specificity and inter-temporal dynamics 
ofinstitutional changes. (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991, p. 10) However, they fall 
short in explaining why agents in the same institutional settings adopt different 
kinds of action and the role of influential individuals in shaping the norms and 
culture ofthe organization. (DiMaggio, 1988; Dunleavy, 1986 & 1991; Forrester, 
1989 & 1989a; Rothstein, 1996) 
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(c) Historical Institutionalism: 
Historical institutionalists interest in the dynamics of interest, ideas, 
institutions and macro structures. One of their typical research fields is the 
analysis of policy-making and politics of a given state. Peter Hall represents this 
research domain. (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992). Following the emphasis of this 
dissertation, I shall also focus on this research domain to introduce this stream. 
Before that, its main characteristics are discussed. 
The main characteristics ofhistorical institutionalism are as follows: 
1. There should be no distinction between structure and institutions for historical 
institutionalists. (Cammack, 1992) They generally define institutions in 
Peter Hall's version and which is: 
"the formal or informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions 
embedded in an organizational structure of the polity or political economy. 
They can range from the rules of constitutional order or the standard 
operating procedures of a bureaucracy to the conventions governing trade 
union behaviour or bank-firm relations. In general historical 
institutionalists associate institutions with organizations and the rules or 
conventions promulgated by formal organizations." (Hall and Taylor, 1996, p. 
938) 
2. Institutions can not be assumed simply as something that is intentionally 
derived in facilitating the purpose ofutility maximization. 
3. Institutions can only be identified from a particular history of a given state for 
which were added up from a particular historical set-up and socio-economic 
developments of the state. (Koelble, 1995) 
4. ltastitutions can only induce preferences and could only shape the behaviour of 
individuals / groups / organizations, rather than determining them. (Hall, 1986) 
Thus, the individuals / groups / organizations only acquires with bounded 
rationality and limited computational capacity. 
5. Institutions are not a causal force, but are located at a causal chain that 
accommodated and mediated other forces, notably the socio-economic change 
and diffusion of ideas / values and fmally necessitating the being of a social 
phenomenon. OHall and Taylor, 1996) 
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It is to say that uptum and downturn of the socioeconomic developments and / 
or burgeoning and dissipating of the ideas and values induce related 
individuals or groups to react on. Their responses will always be widely 
advocated by their belonged organizations. These advocating behaviour will 
most likely bring their responses from occasional reaction(s) into widely 
respected rules / institutions of their organizations. These rules / institutions 
may take forms of ideas or in the form of formal written rules and principles. 
The wide acceptance of the institutions induces related individuals / groups / 
organizations to follow them. These widely accepted institutions shape their 
behaviour in the related area(s) of decision making eventually. (Halls and 
Taylor, 1996) In short, adjusting institutions is generally the last resort in 
catering for the socio-economic fluctuations. (Cammack, 1992; Hall, 1986; 
Thompson, 1987; Thelen and Steinmo, 1992) 
Focusing on the area of policymaking and politics, the relational character of 
neo-institutionalism implicitly tells us that the behaviour of policy-making 
individuals or group(s) in government institutions of a given state is shaped by 
institutions. The policy-making individuals can only acquire relative autonomy 
of policy decision making. These institutions are added up from the particular 
socio-economic setup in a given historical setting of a given state. (Thelen and 
Steinmo, 1992; Thompson, 1987) 
The being of these institutions can somehow be illuminated by the concept of 
contingency necessity^^ in a sense that catering tactics of a given policy making 
group in various social phenomena will contingently necessitate the establishment 
of institutions. It is because these responses will very likely be advocated by the 
policy making group. Their advocation will make the tactics be widely accepted 
by the state and finally transform into institutions. These institutions may even 
be institutionalized into formal statements in shaping how the policy making 
group in handling the related policy. (Hall and Taylor, 1996) 
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Regarding these institutions are widely accepted by the state in general, 
deviating from them will generally steer up strong resistance from the state. 
Thus, the policy making group will highly probably follow these institutions even 
sometimes their embedded context is unfavourable for it to uphold those 
established institutions, notably economic downturns and financial crisis. The 
institutions upholding behaviour can be summarized as 'mle following 
behaviour'. 
The rule following behaviour then make them to have limited arenas of 
maneuver when the state is suffering from some kinds of problems, like financial 
crisis. As a result, the policy making group will tend to adjust the non-
institutions constrained areas to tackle the concerned problems rather than 
adjusting the established institutions. Adjusting the established institutions is 
usually the last resort to solve the problems. (Hall & Taylor, 1996) The 
resistance of adjusting the established institutions suggests that the administration 
rationale of the policy making group is to avoid trouble or opposition. Such kind 
of administration rationale can be interpreted as rationality of trouble avoidance. 
(Weaver, 1990) 
(iv) Others - Grammar of Institutions 
This stream does not argue whether institutions should be embodied both 
formal rules and informal rules. Rather, it only uses a board term institutional 
statementii. Under this approach, institution grammar and syntax are derived to 
analyze the statement to see whether these individuals in a group also share the 
same understanding of these statements empirically. Qualitative research 
method is suggested to capture what and how institutional statements are used. 
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The general syntax contains four components: attributes, denotic, aim and 
conditions. (Crawford and Ostrom, 1995) 
In short, this approach reminds us the importance of social context in 
institutional analysis. Its main weaknesses are overemphasizing on linguistic 
analysis and ignoring the contingency of social phenomenon. 
(iv) Others: Multi-Level, Interlinked Institutional Approach 
Referring to Kuan (1993), institutions are rules, regulations, principles and 
operation procedures that could shape the behaviour of people. Also, not all the 
rules are institutions, but those are respected and are followed by the general public. 
A given macro-socioeconomic and / or political phenomenon should compose of a 
number of levels. Different levels of the phenomenon are affected by different 
institutional settings. The institutions among different levels of the phenomenon are 
intricately interlinked to each other. Some of these institutions are more prominent 
than the others while some are affiliated to the others. 
As what Kuan has argued, the political order of Hong Kong at least composes 
of two levels of institutions. The first level should be the relationship between the 
sovereign state and Hong Kong while the second level should be various domestic 
powers and the colonial government. The second level is affiliated to the first one. 
Concrete content of these institutions, how these institutions are matter in a given 
macro-phenomenon, the relation of the different institutions between different levels 
of a given phenomenon can be identified from the particular socio-economy and the 
political context of Hong Kong. 
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1.3 CONCEPTUALIZATION 
With the above understandings of budgetary theories, a general model that 
incorporats the historical institutional approach and the thesis of multi-level 
interlinked institutions is derived in order to explore the budgetary politics of the 
colony. I shall introduce the model. 
1.3.1 PREMISES OF THE EXPLANATORY MODEL 
1. Public budgeting in the colonial government involves two interlinked levels 
of institutions, namely the policy making level and the administrative level. 
Hereafter they are respectively called the first level institutions and the second 
level institutions. 
2. For the first level institutions, the macro-structure is the economic context, 
which gives rise to the economic and fiscal policies that constitute the 
institutional setting ofbudgeting. The actors of the first level institutions are 
the senior bureaucrats, mostly administrative officers, of the policy branches. 
3. For the second level institutions, the macro-structure is the policy directions 
of the first level institutions, which gives rise to formal budgetary guidelines 
for administrative departments. The actors of the second level institutions 
are the senior bureaucrats, mostly departmental grade officers, of the 
respective departments. 
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1.3.2 RATIONALE OF THE MODEL 
(a) First Level Institutions 
The ‘conservative’ approach in public finance was first initiated by the policy 
making group (hereafter called policy actors) of the colonial government and 
established as historical institutions that were followed by the policy-makers for a 
prolonged period of time. The initiation action of the policy actors is inherently 
driven by the administrative rationale of trouble avoiding and is enabled by its 
relative autonomy in the administration of public budget. 
In what follows, I shall introduce the rationale of the first level institutions by 
means ofFigure A. 
FlGURE A： CHART FOR THE FlRST LEVEL INSTITUTIONS - THE POLICY MAKING LEVEL 
Institutions Setting: Actor(s): 
Economic & Fiscal Policy in The Conservative 
Economic _ ^ SpiHtofConservat.sm ^ _ ^ Policymaking _ ^ Approach 
Context • Low & Simple Tax Regime Group or simpIy i„ p„K,:« 
of % - r " ' ^ " " ^ ^ " " thePol^cyActors Fi^neeo^^he 
U o n g i ^ o n g • Budget Guideline Ratios(subject to o f t h ? C o l o n i a l 
manipulation by the actor in Colonial „ 
responding to the economic changes) Government L r O v e m m e n i 
t A ~ ~ 4 ~ ~ ^ f ~ ~ 
Block One Block Two Biock Three Block Four 
The actors of the first level institutions are the policy actors of the colonial 
government (Block Three). Operationally, they include the Governor and the 
policy secretaries or since the 1980s the Star Chamber. The budgets and the 
financial guidelines of Hong Kong were made by them. 
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The inherent or entrenched economic and fiscal policies of the colonial 
government constitute the institutional setting for the policy actors. It comprises 
low tax rate, high fiscal reserves and the positive non-interventionist approach to 
the economy. (Block Two) 
The institutional practices emerged from the broader economic context of the 
colony. Chan (1991) and Chiu (1994) show us that natural resources 
insufficiency of Hong Kong and the self-sufficient public finance principle of the 
British colonial government necessitated the financial dependency of the colonial 
government over the ‘hongs’ and, later on the Chinese merchants at the very 
beginning of the colonial history. This dependency consequently induced the 
colonial government to derive conservative budget principles or tactics to cope 
with its financial needs. These tactics were advocated and were formally 
institutionalized into rules by the colonial government. (Historical origin will 
further be elaborated in section 2.3) 
These conservative budget-making rules were followed by the policy actors 
from the 1970s to the 1990s. In the 1990s, they were articulated as the ‘Seven 
Principles' or the ‘Seven Virtues' of taxation system for the colonial government. 
The adherence to the conservative rules led to the persistence of the conservative 
budgetary policy. (Block Four) 
The rule following behaviour of the policy actors led them to follow and to 
preserve these conservative public finance budget principles even when the 
economic context was unfavourable, i.e. during periods of financial stringency. 
The rule-following behaviour was enabled by the relative autonomy of the actors 
in administering the public budgets. It was also motivated by the desire for 
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trouble avoidance. Trouble avoidance refers to the avoidance of potential or 
actual opposition of the vested interests, especially the merchant groups who were 
the beneficiaries of the conservative public budget policy. Also, it refers to the 
motivation of the policy actors to avoid the additional administration cost to 
change the ongoing public finance policies, such as having to appeal to the public 
to accept the alternation of the ongoing public budget operation. 
The rule following behaviour of the policy actors subjected to the colonial 
government to financial stringency whenever the colony was in economic 
downturns. Hence the limited arenas of the taxation regime that were not 
defined by conservative public finance principles provided rooms for 
manipulation. These arenas are the non-recurrent revenue and expenses of 
administrative departments. (Expenses of administrative departments will be 
elaborated in the paragraphs for the second level institutions.) 
Like many Anglo-American countries, the manipulation of the taxation 
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regime operates through reinstitutionalization and / or privatization (hereafter 
called 'two ions'). The trouble avoidance behaviour the policy actors would 
induce them to pursue the ‘two ions' in a obfuscated mode, such as making 
relevant information difficult to be accessed by possible opponents. As a result, 
the policy actors could get these 'two ions' through with lesser actual or potential 
oppositions. Due to the colonial setting, the policy actors could also manipulate 
the amount ofland-dale due to their monopolized ownership ofland. 
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The strategic response of the policy actors during financial stringency 
implicates that the policy makers are actors in reproducing the economic context 
and conservative fiscal policy of the colonial government. 
(b) Second Level Institutions 
The main thesis of the second level institutions is that the different patterns of 
budgetary changes of different administrative agency types are partly caused by the 
strategy of the policy actors when dealing with economic upturns and downturns, 
namely through manipulating land supply and indirect tax. 
In what follows, I shall introduce then rationale of the second level institutions 
by means ofFigure B. 
Figure B Chart for the Second Level Institutions - The Administrative Level 
Con text: Institutional Setting: A ctors: 
Budget Decision / i. Formal Budgetary The Senior Different 
Direction from the ~ > Rules and ^ ~ ^ Bureaucrats ofthe ~ • Budget Patterns 
FirstLevel Procedures Administrative of 
& 2 Inter Departments Different 
Different Functional • Departmental 产 Agency Types 
Roles of the Budsetarv Land & Housmg 
Administrative o^i„t^„ / Domain 
Departments Relations 
~ r ^ ~ ~ ？ ~ ~ ？ 
^ Block One Block Two Block Three Block Four 
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The actors in the second level institutions are the senior bureaucrats of the 
‘land and housing' administrative departments (i.e. the bureaucrats in the director 
grade or above) (Block Two). These administrative actors are also oriented toward 
trouble avoidance. They did so by pushing up (or maximizing) the department 
budget segment that would benefit their own department most, i.e. expenditure that 
spent directly by their departments as running cost. They did so for security 
purpose, notably to allow for accidental over-spending." In Dunleavy's term 
(1991), this budget segment is called the ‘Core Budget’ (hereafter called the CB) 
while the remaining segment of departmental budget is called the ‘Non-core Budget’ 
(hereafter called the Non-CB). 
Given the hierarchical relationship between policy branches and administrative 
departments, these administrative actors were bounded by the budgetary decisions 
and directions of the policy actors and their designated administration role in 
operating their department budget. (Block One) The administrative level was 
institutionally made to implement the policy decisions of the first level institutions'. 
(Schneider and Tacoby, 1996) In this context, these administrative actors were not 
freely to push up the department CB as they were made to follow specific budget 
making procedures and rules in preparing the department budget^^ These rules and 
procedures were derived by the policy actors who could adjust them according to 
how they adjusted their public finance. The administrative actors were also 
subjected to ‘inter-departmental budgetary relations' in that the amount of budget 
usage of a department depended on the service request from other departments. 
These budgetary rules and procedures are the first type of institutions while the inter-
departmental budgetary relations are the second type of institutions. (Block Three) 
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In the actual operation of the colonial government, the policy actors increases its 
budget oversight unto the administrative departments in times of financial stringency, 
while ‘inter-department budgetary relations' for some departments is very low. As 
a result, administrative actors had sufficient relative autonomy to push up the CB. 
Adopting the argument of the bureau-shaping model by Dunleavy (1991), 
departments with low inter-departmental budgetary relations are those of high CB 
portion out of the total department budget. In general the lower the constraining 
effect of the inter-departmental institutions, the greater the relative budgeting 
autonomy for the senior bureaucrats of these departments to manipulate their 
department budget would be and hence the feasibility to push up CB. 
Since the land and housing departments of the colonial government are not 
homogeneous in nature, they should be subjected to different budget constraining 
intensity of the ‘inter-departmental budgetary institutions'. As a result, different 
types of administrative departments would have different CB growth patterns once 
the policy actors did not increase its oversight unto them. The period of weak 
financial oversight from the policy actors on the second level institutions is known as 
the non-hostile budget making period (hereafter called non-hostile period). 
25 
Adopting Dunleavy's 'bureau-shaping model', the projected CB pattem of different 
types of administrative departments / or agency types in the ‘non-hostile period’ are 
summarized in Table 1.1. 
Table 1.1 Budget Patterns for Different Types of Administrative Departments 
Agency Functional Roles & CB Portion Inter- Prescribed 
Type Departmental Budget 
Budgetary Patterns 
Relation 
Delivety • made responsible for producing goods and services directly to Low progressive 
society CB growth 
• high CB portion because its budget is mainly spent on the 
production cost of the goods and services concerned 
Regulatory • made responsible for supervising the behaviour of individuals, low progressive 
firms by rules, standards or licensing CB growth 
• high CB portion because its budget is mainly spent on 
personal emoluments 
Transfer • made responsible for passing moneys to individuals, firms or high Constant 
organizations. 
• low CB portion because the majority portion of its budget has 
been transferred and the demand on personal emolument is very 
low 
Taxing • made responsible for administering and collecting of lowest progressive 
government expenses and revenue. CB growth 
• high CB portion for most of the budget has been used for the 
handling of the government revenue and expenditure. 
Trading • made responsible for providing services to public or private N/A fluctuated 
sector directly pattem 
• free from the impact of first level institutions since it is 
operating in commercial principles 
• budget pattem depends on its specific situation 
Servicing • made responsible for providing services to other government N/A fluctuated 
bureaus pattem 
• CB portion depends on the demand from the government 
departments 
• budget patterns depends on the demand from its client-bureau 
Source: Dunleavy(1986; 1989; 1991) 
Note: N/A: Non-applicable 
Once the policy actors increases its financial oversight towards the second level 
institutions during financial stringency, the relative CB push-up autonomy of the 
senior bureaucrats in the second level institutions would be substantially discounted. 
As a result, the downward CB development in the second level institutions came into 
being. The increase in oversight from the policy actors of the first level institutions 
over the second level institutions is known as the hostile budget making period 
Oiereafter called hostile period). 
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However, variations will be found amongst different agency types. Agencies that 
were made responsible for monitoring the use of money would be subjected to a 
smaller impact of downward CB development pressure as they played a highly 
important role in government revenue collection. Some agency types may even be 
exempted from the CB downward pressure, like the Trading agency, the Servicing 
agencies and the Transfer agencies. The partially privatized nature of the trading 
agency make it not to be subjected to the budget constraining pressure of the two 
types of institutions, but the impact of its market environment. With an 
understanding of different bureaucracy sectors and different agencies may be 
subjected to different intensity of CB push-up hostility, the wide spectrum of client 
departments of the servicing agency blur the CB downward growth of the servicing 
agency. The exception in transfer agency is driven by the low CB portion of 
transfer agency itself in that its low CB portion have made the rooms that are left for 




1.4.1 WORKING DEFINITION(S) 
(a) Reinstitutionalization 
Reinstitutionalization in Hong Kong refers to the running down of the activities 
of one or more established government departments and to the reallocation of 
resources to alternative agencies to take up the concerned activities so as to save 
the government expenses in the activities in the long run. (Dunleavy, 1991) 
(b) Privatization 
Privatization in Hong Kong refers to the gradual diminishing of the colonial 
government public services provisions by shifting the responsibility to the 
private sector. The government could maintain certain control by providing 
the policy directions, planning and supervision. 
(c) Sectors and Types of Agency of Hong Kong Government 
Categorization of the types of agency and sectors in the Hong Kong bureaucracy 
is based on 'The Estimates \ It provides detailed job description of each 
Hong Kong government department. As the department performs more than 
one type of function(s), it will be categorized by its more dominant function. 
Some public agencies also need to be embodied as part of the government. (Ho, 
1972, pp. 18-19) HA and the LDC are notable examples in the land and 
housing domain. 
(d) Calculation of Budget 
Budget calculation of different administrative departments is based on the two 
financial documents of the colonial government, namely ‘The Estimates ’ and 
‘The Annual Report ofthe Director of Accounting Services and the Account of 
Hong Kong，. They provide detailed expenditure breakdown and related 
information for all governmental agencies or departments. The expenditure 
items of 'Pensions' and 'Miscellaneous' will be left out in the calculation 
because they cannot be categorized effectively within the classification of 
budget types of the model. The item Tensions' is an account item that applies 
to all types of agency, so leaving it out will not cause any bias towards the 
research. The item of 'Miscellaneous' is a very small portion among the total 
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amount of Hong Kong Government expenditure and has little effect on the 
present study. 
(e) Types of Budget 
CB refers to the expenditures spent by agencies for their own operation. 
(Dunleavy, 1991) In this study, the CB is the summation of the following 
expenditure items: (1) 'personal emoluments', (2) 'personal related expenses', 
(3) 'departmental expenses', (4) ‘other charges', (5) ‘plant, equipment and 
works' and (6) 'recoverable salaries and allowances'. Non-CB refers to the 
total expenditure of a bureau minus the amount of CB. 
To caution against double accounting and miscalculation many fees and 
receipts will not be treated as government expenditure. Payments from the 
private sector to the government on a quid pro quo basis represent consumption 
expenditure of the private sector. Also, various ‘funds，，like trading fund and 
development fund will be added back as part of government expenditure. (Ho, 
1972,pp. 18-19) 
1.4.2 OPERATIONALIZATION OF THE RESEARCH 
(a) Study Period 
The study period is from the 1970s to the 1990s. This period witnessed 
profound political and economic development of Hong Kong: changes in 
colonial government structure, the development of a representative government, 
as well as the adjustment of collective consumption provision mode�6 
Therefore, it should help to demonstrate whether the two operational foci ofthis 
study had really happened in the past two decades 
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(b) Study Domain 
The study domain of this study is ‘land & housing,. It is operationalized as 
crown land sales, indirect tax, fees & chargesi7 for the first level institutions 
and expenses in the provision of public housing and urban renewal for the 
second level institutions. Selected administrative departments for the analysis 
of the second level institutions are summarized in Table 1.2. 
TABLE 1.2 SELECTED ADMINISTRATIVE DEPARTMENTS 
FOR THE SECOND LEVEL iNSTFTUTIONS ANALYSIS 
Agency Type Selected Agency Type Selected 
Departments Departments 
Delivery Agency LD TaxingAgency FB 
IRD 
Regulatory Agency^ TDD R&V 
PD TR 
AD 
Delivery/ Trading HA & HD Transfer / Regulatory PELB & WB 
Agency* Agency** TB 
HB 
TradingAgency LDC ServicingAgency HGD 
Notes: 
# The HA and the HD is grouped as 'delivery / trading' agency because it is a partially privatized 
public corporation. Since that the HA and the HD is supposed to possess both characteristics ofthe 
delivery agency and trading agency. 
* The PELB & WB, the TB and the HB have been contextually found to possess both the 
characteristics of ‘transfer，and ‘regulatory’ agencies. However, the PELB & WB, and the TB had 
been made to acquire a stronger planning role since the mid-1980s. Thus, they were subjected to a 
relative lower CB downward pressure by the time. (See section 2.4 for details.) 
** The TDD and the PD had also been made to have a stronger planning role since the mid-1980s than 
the BD. Thus, the TDD and the PD were subjected to a relative lower CB downward pressure than 
the BD by the time. (See section 2.4 for details.) 
Land and housing is selected as the study domain due to the prominent 
weighting amongst the total government revenue. As shown in Table 1.3, it 
contributed for no less than 20.3% of total government revenue from 1971/72 to 
1995/96. 
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Table 1.4 Weighting of Revenue Generated from Lands and Housing 
from 1970/71 to 1995/96 ^ 
Financial Land& Total Relative % Financial Land& Total Relative 
Year Housing Revenue (a/b) Year Housing Revenue % 
(a) ofthe (a) ofthe (a/b) 
Year (b) Year (b) 
HK $ Million HK $ Million 
1971/1972 1014.2 3541.3 28.6 1983/1984 6662.7 30339.7 22.0 
1972/1973 1806.3 4936.3 36.6 1984/1985 8041.5 36342.5 22.1 
1973/1974 1360.1 5240.8 26.0 1985/1986 7572.7 41214.0 18.4 
1974/1975 1346.7 5875.3 22.9 1986/1987 3994.4 43869.6 9.1 
1975/1976 1502.8 6519.5 23.1 1987/1988 4354.6 55641.4 7.8 
1976/1977 1734.1 7943.5 21.8 1988/1989 7452.6 65780.7 11.3 
1977/1978 3227.4 10232.3 31.5 1989/1990 9549.5 74365.2 12.8 
1978/1979 3848.3 12557.0 30.6 1990/1991 5061.7 89523.8 5.7 
1979/1980 5567.2 16796.1 33.1 1991/1992 6127.6 114699.9 5.3 
1980/1981 14139.8 30290.3 46.7 1992/1993 7298.3 135310.9 5.4 
1981/1982 14405.1 34312.9 42.0 1993/1994 8130.5 166602.2 4.9 
1982/1983 9467.1 31097.6 30.4 1994/1995 8500.5 174998.4 4.9 
1995/1996 9492.1 180045.1 5.3 
Average Relative % (a/b)from 1971/72 to 1995/96 = 20.3 
Sources: 
1. Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong Government. 1981, 1990, & 1996. Hong Kong Annual 
Digest ofStatistics. Hong Kong: Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong Government. 
2. Treasury of Hong Kong Government. 1970-1996. Accounts of Hong Kong and Annual Report of 
Accountant General. Hong Kong: Treasury ofHong Kong Government. 
Notes: 
1. Data of land and housing here refers to the summation of Land Transaction, Rates, Properties and 
Investments, Property Tax and Stamp Duty ofProperty Transaction. 
2. Stamp Duty of Property Transaction is an estimated value of 55% of the total stamp duty of Hong Kong 
Government in reference to a MPhil thesis 'Public Finance in Hong Kong'hy Wu Chung-lin. 
3. "Following the implementation of Annex III of the Joint Declaration, the ambit of this revenue head has 
been revised to include only land transactions completed before the coming into force ofJoint Declaration, 
i.e. before 27 May 1985, or land transactions conferring a benefit that expires on or before 30 June 1997 
and are completed on or after 27 May 1985 will be credited direct to the 'Suspense Account, ofthe Capital 
Work Reserve Fund in the first instance pending sharing with the future of Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region Government and the Hong Kong Government will be credited to the ‘Works 
Account' of the Capital Works Reserve Fund." (Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong 
Government, 1996, p. 157) 
4. Data for Financial Year 1970/71 to 1979/80 were complied from 'The Hong Kong Annual Digest of 
Statistics 1981，. Hong Kong: Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong Government. 
5. Data for Financial Year 1980/81 were complied from ‘The Hong Kong Annual Digest ofStatistics 1990.， 
Hong Kong: Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong Government. 
6. Data for Financial Year 1991/92 to 1995/96 were complied from 'The Hong Kong Annual Digest of 
Statistics 1996’. Hong Kong: Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong Government. 
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Selecting the land and housing as the case study is also motivated by its 
perceived importance among the general public. The perceived importance is 
reflected in: 
(i) the predominant role of land and housing in the stock market of Hong 
Kong; one quarter of the stock value is contributed by property investment. 
(Kam, 1992, 191-193 & 195) 
(ii) the serious of social conflicts in the provision of public and private 
housing in the past twenty years. As said by Cheung and Louie (1991), 
public housing problems form the second largest group of social conflict 
in the 1980s. In the 1990s, the escalating property price has generated 
much financial burden to the general public. It finally made private 
housing become a social conflict arena. (Hong Kong Economic Daily, 
1994; Won, 1994) 
1.4.3 INDICATORS AND HYPOTHESES 
Constrained by the unavailability of confidential information, limited time 
and resources, the concrete mechanism of interaction and negotiation among 
concerned officials, and the effect of the changes in budgetary guidelines 
over the years will nol be examined. The study of these factors, while 
important in understanding the forces shaping budget patterns, requires 
researches, which are beyond the scope of the present study. Instead, the 
thesis seeks to establish a prima facie case for the validity of the institutional 
dynamics by proving the following correlations: 
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(a) there is a negative correlation between the economic changes 
(operationalized as the change in GDP) and the effort of the policy 
actors to preserve the conservative approach to public finance. The 
preservation effort is manifested in its attempt to increase revenue 
through arenas outside the established institutions, such as indirect 
tax, fees and charges, land-sale, etc. 
(b) In the case of housing and land, there is a negative correlation 
between the effort of the policy actors in the first level institutions to 
preserve the conservative approach in public finance and the 
budgetary increase (specifically in the CB) of the various 
administrative departments in the second level institutions. 
Under this confined foci, indicators that the policy actors upheld the 
economic and fiscal policies even when the colonial government was in 
financial stringency are: 
(a) manipulating the amount of crown land-sale in accordance with the 
economic changes of Hong Kong, (operationalized as GDP uptums and 
downturns) 
(b) manipulating the arenas of its taxation system that are not directly 
related to the institutionalized economic and fiscal policies 
(operationalized as the arenas of indirect tax and fees & charges) in 
responding to the economic changes of Hong Kong, (operationalized as 
GDP uptums and downturns) 
Indicators for the different CB budget development of different agency 
types in the non-hostile and hostile periods refer to the CB development of 
different agency types. 
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With the above indicators, the policy actors are hypothesized to 
maintain its non-tax revenue and tax revenue in the following ways: 
1. Supplied the Crown land non-steadily: 
i. land supply would be increased substantially when the colony 
was undergoing economic uptums so as to maximize 
government revenue 
ii. land supply would be unduly low when the colony was 
undergoing economic downturns so as to lower the loss from 
unsatisfactory land sale performance. 
2. Increased the role of indirect tax and fees & charges in government 
extraction role rather than pushing up the tax rate of Hong Kong even 
when tax burden inequality are found. 
Budget patterns of the selected land and housing departments during the 
study period are hypothesized as follows: 
1. The Delivery, the Delivery/Trading, the Regulatory and the Taxing 
agencies would have a greater CB growth in the non-hostile periods than 
in the hostile periods. 
2. The CB downturn pressure of the Delivery / Trading agency would be 
more intense than the Delivery and the Regulatory agencies in the non-
hostile periods. 
3. The Taxing agencies would undergo a lower CB downward 
development in the non-hostile periods relative to the Delivery, 
Regulatory and Delivery / Trading agencies. 
4. The Transfer / Regulatory agencies would have a relatively constant CB 
budget growth in the non-hostile periods than in the hostile periods. 
5. The PELB & WB and TB would be subjected to lighter CB downward 
pressure than the HB in the hostile periods. 
6. The Servicing agency would have fluctuated-CB patterns in the whole 
study period in respond to the service demand from its client 
departments. 
7. The Trading agency would have fluctuated-CB patterns in the whole 
study period in respond to its particular market situation. 
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1 . 4 . 4 METHODOLOGY 
(a) Research Design & Source(s) of Data 
Data collection will be made through review of government documents, 
academic research, research from private research company and newspaper, etc. 
The works of historians will be used to probe out the historic-setting or the 
background of the study. 
Documentary analysis is supplemented by a few in-depth interviews. (Brewer 
and Hunter, 1989, p. 177 & 184-185) Profiles of the interviewees are 
provided in Appendix I. The interviewees are located by ‘snowball, method. 
(b) Method(s) of Analysis 
Historical-documentary analysis is the method of study in this research. To 
avoid the problem of selection bias of historical monograph, as suggested by 
Lustick (1996), various historic works will be crosschecked before adopted. If 
inconsistency is found between different works, the most convincing one will 
be chosen. Generally, the longer and richer the volume of information, the 
higher its validity will be. 
The in-depth interviews, they will be conducted in ‘structured open-response 
mode,，so that the information on the interviewee's life world can be gathered. 
It serves a crosschecking function and avoids the imposition of some theoretical 
driven judgment upon the interviewees. (King, 1994) Thus, an interview 
guide will be distributed to all the interviews so as to ensure their reliability. 
All interviews will be recorded by audio-tape and transcribed. The transcribed 
interview data will undergo a systematic process of analysis. Procedures are 
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as fo l lows : {1) rcikl tl iroiigh all t ra i i scr ip t ions ; (2) c lus tc r tlic iop ics 
d e m o n s t r a t e d b \ thc i n l b r m a n t s : (3) l ind lhc nu)Sl dcsc r ip l ivc w o r d i n g s a n J 
tu rn ing into ca l cgor i c s : (4) l lnal ly, a s s e m b l e lhc in lc rv icw dala lurn thcm into 
ca tegor ics . (C rc swc l l , l W 4 , pp. 154-155) I-inally, tlic da la will se rve as a 
sou rce o f m o n o g r a p h in dep ic t i ng lhc h i s tor ic -se l l ing ancl il will a l so bc uscd to 
s u p p l e m e n t thc documenla r> ana lys i s on budgc l usage in lhc t w o ins t i lu l ional 
levels . T h e s c o p e s of lhc in t e rv iews inc lude ra t ional i ty ol" g o v e r n m e n t 
bureaucra t s , their re la t ive a u t o n o m y on budge t usage , ins t i tu t ional m e c h a n i s m 
and the conc re t e p roce s se s o f budgc l d r a f t i ng o f lhc co lon ia l g o v e r n m e n t and 
the in t e r -depa r tmen t b u d g e l a n re la t ions . ( S a m p l e o f q u e s t i o n n a i r e s arc a t tached 
in A p p e n d i c e s II-IV.) 
、“、 
1.5 ORGANIZATION OF THE RESEARCH 
Following this introductory chapter, chapter two will be a general historical 
background study. Chapter three will illustrate the negative correlation 
between the economic changes and the budget control effort of the policy actors 
and hence the particular budgetary direction of the colonial government in the 
past two decades. 
Chapter four, the negative correlation between the budget control effort of the 
policy actors and the CB increase feasibility of different types of agency / 
administrative departments of the colonial government will be studied. 
Chapter five, implications of the findings in terms of the extent of applicability 
of the general model in understanding the public budgeting of Hong Kong will 




1 It means that the government "exercise certain controls over the enfranchised public utility 
undertakings in the private sector to ensure that they enjoy no more than a quasi-
competitive retum on capital.. •，’ (Haddon-Cave, 1980, pp. xii-xiii) 
2 Articles which focus on particular budget items are: Chan (1981 & 1984), Yeung (1983), 
Yuen (1993), Yum (1988) and Tang (1988a; 1988b; 1988c; 1992; 1994; 1996; 1989; 1991; 
1991a; 1991b; 1991c). 
3 Articles which focus on philosophy of the government are: Lam (1994), Tang (1984; 1987; 
1990; 1990a; 1995; 1995a), Tang(1984; 1996; 1996a; 1996b; 1996c). 
4 Wu's works include Wu (1977; 1978; 1983). 
5 We can also refer to 'Government by the Market: The Politics of Public Choice.，by Peter 
Self(1993). 
6 "Bounded rationality's emphasis on process - not outcome - makes it analogous to the legal 
concept of procedural due process, which asks whether the procedure that led to the result 
was fair, rather than whether the outcome itself is fair. This stands in contrast to the 
traditional concept of rationality, which stresses rational outcomes - i.e., outcomes 
occurring not necessarily from a rational process, which was they has resulted from the 
process.” (Monroe, 1991, p. 5) 
7 Relative to the neo-institutionalism, there is an old one. (Apter, 1991; Atkinson, 1996; 
Peters, 1996) There are two main differences between them. First, unlike the old 
institutionalism, neo-institutionalism does not regard institutions as a determinant factor in 
molding, ordering human motives and behaviour, but as an intervening variable in 
mediating and shaping the administrative behaviour and government policy. Second, 
neo-institutionalism does not simply focus on the formal aspect of institution in explaining 
administrative behaviour, but also informal one, like norms and culture. (Rothstein, 1996; 
Searing, 1991) 
8 Further readings on institutional rational choice theory are: Bush (1993 & 1995), 
Groenwegen, Frans and Ad (1995), Hom (1995), Knight (1992), Udehn (1985), Noll & 
Weingast (1991); North (1990; 1990a; 1993 and 1995), Ostrom (1990), Sened (1991), 
Shepsle (1989), Tang (1992), Weingast (1996) etc. 
9 There are many other sociological institutionalists works, like Zucker (1983, 1987, 1988 
and 1988a), Meyer (1978, 1992, 1992b, 1992c, 1994, 1994a, 1994b); Meyer and Rowan 
(1992 & 1992a); Meyer and Scott (1992 & 1992a); Meyer, Boli & Gwerge (1994); Scott 
(1992 & 1994), Scott and Meyer (1991) etc. 
1° "The concept [contingent necessity] implies the following arguments: 
(a) . . • an adequate explanations for an actual event must show how different causal chains 
interacted make it necessary; 
(b) even though the actual event it the over-determined result of interaction of different 
chains, no single theory exists (or could be developed) which explain why this 
interaction had to occur nor why its outcome was necessary; 
(c) since the necessity of an actual event is indeterminable (contingent) relative to any one 
theoretical schema, explanations for it must be historical (or genealogical) 
(d) this does not mean that explanations involve merely chronological enumeration. If 
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discrete events which fails to refer to their origin in real cause mechanisms and 
tendencies; and 
( e ) the adequacy of an explanations for an 'contingency necessary' empirical events depends 
on the level of abstraction and the degree of complexity at which is specified - the less 
abstract and more complex the event, the more determinate it is and the more detailed 
must be any specification of causal mechanism, initial conditions and so forth." (Jessop, 
1990, pp. 73-75) 
11 According to Crawford and Ostrom (1995),"institutional statement refers to a shared 
linguistic constraint or opportunity that prescribes, permits or advises actions or 
outcomes for actors (both individual and corporate). Institutional statements are spoken, 
written and tacitly understood in a form intelligible in an empirical setting. In 
theoretical analysis, institutional statement will also be interpretation and abstractions of 
empirical constraints and opportunities" (p. 583) 
12 Reinstitiutionalization in Hong Kong referred to the run-down of the activities of one 
or more established government departments and to reallocate the resources to 
alternative agencies to take up the concerned activities so as to save the government 
expenses in the activities in the long run. (Dunleavy, 1991) 
13 Privatization in the context of Hong Kong only refers to 'delegation by grants'. (Savas, 
1989/90) It means that the Hong Kong Government arranges an agency or agencies, 
they may either be a newly formed or an established one, to do the work and provides a 
subsidy instead of carrying out the service by the established agency concern. The 
privatized or commercialized mode of operation of these new agencies save much money 
for the Government in sense of lesser government subsidy, however, she can still retain 
the responsibility to oversee it. (Savas, 1989/90) 
14 Researches which demonstrate the capacity of government department in exaggerating 
budget are 'Public Budgeting in Hong Kong，by Lo Cheng Sik-sze and ‘Value of Money: 
The Hong Kong Budgetary Process. ‘ by Alvin Rubhuska. 
15 A type of institutions, namely the 'bureau-society relations' is insignificant in the Hong 
Kong in that the refugee behaviour of the early Hong Kongese and the highly centralized, 
hierarchical and non-democratic colonial government bureaucracy paralyzed the 
developing of Hong Kong civil society and hence the prominence of the 'bureau-society 
relations'. (Copper and Lui, 1990) 
16 Li (1996) and Scott & Bums (1988) argue that the colonial government had undergone a 
structural and functional expansion of government organs and the number of employees 
respectively. At the same time, the provision of social services also underwent 
tremendous expansion. In the midst of the 1980s, Hong Kong suffered from turmoil 
caused by sovereignty transfer and constitutional change, leading to the introduction of 
'public sector reform, and privatization of government agencies, etc. (Cheung and Louie 
1991;Li, 1994& 1996) 
17 The adoption ofthe complete segment of indirect tax and fees & charge rather than their 
particular land and housing segment is caused by the non-provision of their respective 
revenue breakdown in the colonial government accounting documents. 
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CHAPTER T w o : THE BACKGROUND 
This chapter outlines the public finance systems and its administrative institutions 
in Hong Kong during the colonial period. It consists of four sections. The first 
section outlines the characteristics of the public finance system, followed by the 
context of the two institutional levels. The third section presents the composition 
and the positioning of the actors in the two institutional levels while the last section 
tries to identify the roots of the institutions in the two institutional levels. 
2.1 CHARACTERISTICS OF THE COLOMAL PUBLIC FlVANCE SYSTEM & 
MACRO-ECONOMIC CONTEXT FOR THE PUBLIC FlVANCE SYSTEM 
2.1.1 Revenue Aspect of the Public Finance System 
(a) Composing of Tax and Non-Tax Revenue 
The tax segment composed of direct tax and indirect tax. The direct tax 
included ‘profits tax^^', 'property tax^^', 'interest tax�。,，'salaries tax^^' and 
‘estate duty^^'. (Hsia and Chau, 1978, p. 151; Wu, 1977，pp. 21-64) Indirect 
tax included some miscellaneous tax items, like 'entertainment tax��，and ‘bets 
and sweeps tax^^'. (Wu, 1977; Tang, 1992) 
Non-tax revenue mainly came from the sales of crown land. Other items such 
as ‘import and excise duties^^', 'rates^^', ‘stamp duty^^', ‘licenses, franchises 
and fees28，，as well as 'ownership of property^^' also belonged to indirect tax. 
(Wu, 1977; Tang, 1992) 
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(b) Low Revenue Extraction Role of the Direct Tax 
The low proportion of direct tax in the total government revenue was reflected 
in the fact that: 
(i) direct tax had never constituted more than 60% of the total government 
revenue from the post-war period to the 1960s. (Table 2.2.1) 
TABLE 2.1,1 RELATWE WEIGHTEVG OF DlRECT TAX & INDIRECT TAX 
, ; / 1947/48-1992/93 
Financial Year Direct Tax : Indirect Tax Financial Year Direct Tax : Indirect Tax 
1947/48 14.5%: 85.5% 1970/71 44.1%:55.9% 
1948/49 31.5%:68.5% 1971/72 43.7%: 56.3% 
1949/50 23.8%: 76.2% 1972/73 38.5%:61.5% 
1950/51 26.7%: 73.3% 1973/74 53.4%: 46.6% 
1951/52 27.1%: 72.9% 1974/75 61.6%:38.4% 
1952/53 40.9%: 59.1% 1975/76 56.4%: 43.6% 
1953/54 39.9%:60.1% 1976/77 56.0%: 44.0% 
1954/55 38.0%: 62.0% 1977/78 54.4%: 45.6% 
1955/56 32.5%: 62.5% 1978/79 58.7%:41.3% 
1956/57 32.3%: 67.7% 1979/80 59.0%:41.0% 
1957/58 32.6%: 67.4% 1980/81 63.9%: 36.1% 
1958/59 32.7%: 67.3% 1981/82 68.9%:31.1% 
1959/60 30.1%:69.9% 1982/83 60.4%: 39.6% 
1960/61 29.8%: 70.2% 1983/84 60.4%: 39.6% 
1961/62 32.6%: 67.4% 1984/85 62.0%: 38.0% 
1962/63 32.7%: 67.3% 1985/86 60.5%: 39.5% 
1963/64 34.0%: 66.0% 1986/87 59.6%: 40.4% 
1964/65 34.6%: 65.4% 1987/88 60.4%: 39.6% 
1965/66 35.9%:64.1% 1988/89 61.7%:38.3% 
1966/67 36.9%:63.1% 1989/90 62.4%: 37.6% 
1967/68 38.1%:61.9% 1990/91 59.8%: 40.2% 
1968/69 37.9%:62.1% 1991/92 58.5%:41.5% 
1969/70 38.9%:61.1% 1992/93 60.8% : 39.2% 
Source: Tang, 1992b,p. 47 
(ii) Direct tax increase has been rare since WWII. There were only three such 
increase incidents happened in the past two decades. The first happened 
after the 1973 oil crisis as it was made to contribute for more than 55% of 
the total government revenue. The second happened in the mid-1980s as 
the colony was undergoing another economic recession and direct tax was 
increased to 68.9% of the total government revenue. (Tang, 1992b) The 
last one happened after the issuing of Sino-British Joint Declaration, in 
which the colonial government was made to contribute half of the land sale 
revenue to the HKSAR government. 
41 
2.1.2 Expenditure Aspect of the Public Finance System 
The main characteristics in the expenditure domain of the public finance system are: 
(a) Decline in the Rate of Growth of Public Expenditure Since the Mid-1980s 
There is a decline in the growth of the public expenditure from 1970/71to 
1982/83，the average growth rate of government expenditure was 23.4% while 
from 1983/84 to 1995/96 it was only 14.1% respectively. (Table 2.1.2A) 
TABLE2.L2A GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE GROWTH RATE 
FROM 1970/71 TO 1995/96 
Financial Amount Annual Growth Financial Year Annual Growth Amount 
Year HK$ Million Rate (%) Rate (%) HK$ Million 
1970/1971 2452.2 - 1983/1984 35346.3 +9.5 
1971/1972 2901.4 +18.3 1984/1985 36086.9 +2.1 
1972/1973 4299.6 +48.2 1985/1986 40845.1 +7.6 
1973/1974 5169.2 +20.2 1986/1987 42703.7 +4.6 
1974/1975 6255.2 +21.0 1987/1988 48375.1 +13.3 
1975/1976 6032.2 -3.5 1988/1989 56592.1 +17.0 
1976/1977 6590.9 +9.3 1989/1990 71366.5 +26.1 
1977/1978 8996.9 +36.5 1990/1991 85556.7 +19.9 
1978/1979 11090.1 +23.3 1991/1992 92191.4 +7.8 
1979/1980 13872.3 +25.1 1992/1993 113332.0 +22.9 
1980/1981 23593.5 +70.1 1993/1994 147438.1 +30.1 
1981/1982 30807.7 +30.6 1994/1995 164155.3 +11.3 
1982/1983 32267.7 +4.7 1995/1996 183158.0 +11.6 
AverageAnnual Growth Rate 23.4 AverageAnnual Growth Rate 14.1 
1970/71 to 1982/83 1983/84 to 1995/96 
Sources: 
Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong Government. (1981, 1990, 1991 & 1996) 
Notes: 
1. Data from Financial Year 1970/71 to 1979/80 was complied from ‘The Hong Kong Annual Digest of 
Statistics 1981. ‘ Hong Kong: Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong Government. 
2. Data from Financial Year 1980/81 was complied from 'The Hong Kong Annual Digest of Statistics 
/990. ’ Hong Kong: Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong Government. 
3. Data from Financial Year 1981/82 to 1990/91 was complied from ‘The Hong Kong Annual Digest of 
Statistics 1991 ’. Hong Kong: Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong Government. 
4. Data from Financial Year 1991/92 to 1995/96 was complied from ‘The Hong Kong Annual Digest of 
Statistics 1996. Hong Kong: Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong Government. 
(b) Large Expenses on Social Services Provision 
Table 2.1.2B shows that the social services provision in the colony, including 
the provision of including housing, education, social welfare and medical 
health, has continued to consume 35% of the total government expenditure 
since 1975/76. 
42 
TABLE 2.1.2B WEIGHTING OF SOCIAL SERVICES EXPENDITURE VS 
TOTAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE FROM 1970/71 TO 1995/96 
Financial Social Services Total Relative Financial Social Total Relative 
Year Expenditure Expenditure % Year Services Expenditure % 
(a) of the Year (a/b) Expenditure of the Year (a/b) 
(b) (a) (b) 
HK $ Million HK$Million 
1970/1971 480.1 2454.2 +19.6 1983/1984 12831.4 35346.3 +36.3 
1971/1972 592.3 2901.4 +20.4 1984/1985 13268.5 36086.9 +36.8 
1972/1973 719.3 4299.6 +16.7 1985/1986 13762.1 40485.1 +34.0 
1973/1974 1001.5 5169.2 +19.4 1986/1987 14767.6 42703.7 +31.0 
1974/1975 1192.9 6255.2 +19.1 1987/1988 13484.7 48375.1 +27.9 
1975/1976 1816.0 6032.2 +30.1 1988/1989 18912.4 56592.1 +33.4 
1976/1977 1850.2 6590.9 +28.1 1989/1990 21554.4 74366.5 +29.0 
1977/1978 3082.1 11090.1 +27.8 1990/1991 23574.5 85556.7 +27.6 
1978/1979 4076.9 13872.3 +29.4 1991/1992 28353.2 92191.4 +30.8 
1979/1980 5045.6 13872.3 +36.4 1992/1993 39164.7 113332.0 +34.6 
1980/1981 7270.4 23593.4 +30.8 1993/1994 44484.1 147438.1 +30.2 
1981/1982 9624.2 30807.7 +31.2 1994/1995 56259.1 164155.3 +34.3 
1982/1983 11718.3 33060.2 +35.4 1995/1996 67989.9 183158.0 +37.0 
Sources: 
1. Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong Government. 1981, 1990, & 1996. Hong Kong Annual Digest of 
Statistics. Hong Kong: Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong Government. 
2. Hong Kong Treasury, Hong Kong Government. 1980/81 to 1995/96. Accounting ofHong Kong 1980/81 and the 
Director ofAccount Services. Hong Kong: Hong Kong Treasury, Hong Kong Government. 
Notes: 
1. Social Services Expenditure here refers to the government expenditure of 'Subventions' and University Grants 
committees on both recurrent account and capital account, 'Public works Programme for New Towns and 
Housing', 'Transfer to Development Loan Fund for Housing Authority', 'Transfer to Home Ownership Fund，，as 
well as 'Transfer of Student Loan Fund，. 
2. "The Capital Works Fund was established on 20 January 1982 by Resolution ofthe Legislative Council for the 
purpose of financing the Public Works Programme and the acquisition of land." (Census and Statistics 
Department, Hong Kong Government, 1991, p. 120) Thus, item which do not belongs to the category of 'social 
services' was deducted away. 
3. "The Home Ownership Fund was dissolved on 1 April 1990 and the balance of$2795.6 million as on that date was 
transferred to the Hong Kong Housing Authority to became of the Government's Investment in the Authority." 
(Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong Government, 1991, p. 120) Thus, the social services of the 
'Capital bivestment Fund will be added to the calculation from 1990/91 to 1995/96. 
4. "The Capital Investment Fund and the Loan Fund were established on 1 April 1990 by Resolution of the 
Legislative Council. These funds assumed the functions of the former Development Loan Fund, the Mass Transit 
Fund and the Student Loan Fund." (Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong Government, 1991, p. 120) 
Thus, the 'Loan Fund’ and 'Capital bivestment Fund，of Social Services are added on calculation. 
5. Expenditure of 'Public Works Programme (New Towns and Housing)' for 1980/81 to 1995/96 were complied 
from 'Accounts ofHong Kong and Annual Report of the Director ofAccounting Services., 
6. Data for Financial Year 1970/71 to 1979/80 were complied from ‘The Hong Kong Annual Digest ofStatistics 
1981, p. 98. Hong Kong: Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong Government. 
7. Data for Financial Year 1980/81 were complied from ‘The Hong Kong Annual Digest ofStatistics 1990, p. 121 
Hong Kong: Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong Government. 
8. Data for Financial Year 1991/92 to 1995/96 were complied from 'The Hong Kong Annual Digest of Statistics 
1996, p. 157. Hong Kong: Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong Government. 
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(c) Operating Financial Activities by Wide Variety of 'Accounts' & ‘Fund， 
(i) General Revenue Account: 
General Revenue Account acted as the main funding device for the colonial 
government. (Hong Kong Government, Census and Statistics Department, 
1991) The General Revenue Account of expenditure was divided into 
'recurrent account' and ‘capital account'. 
The 'recurrent account' accounted for the operating or running cost of the 
government, like the salary of civil servant, the personal related expenses 
(training) and the daily departmental expenses. Expenditure for the social 
services provision (except housing) was made through the item of 
'subvention'. 
The 'Capital Account' accounted for the non-daily operating cost of the 
government, such as plant and equipment establishment. (Census and 
Statistics Department, Hong Kong Government, 1991) 
(i) Funds: 
According to Interviewee C, the operation of ‘fund’ is similar to 
infrastructure development fund of Singapore. Operationally, it included 
the 'Capital Works Reserve FuncP，，'Capital Investment Fund^^' and 
‘Loan FuncP , , 'Exchange Fund^^' and ‘Lands Fund^^'. Appropriation of 
these funds was generally made through the Transfer to Fund, from the 
'General Revenue Account, during the annual government budget exercise. 
(Chu, 1997c; Tang, 1992b) 
Expenses for social services provision was generally made through various 
'funds', except the provision of public housing. The reinstitutionalization 
of the HA led to the termination of the 'Development Loan Fund，. As a 
result, the HA had been made to operate in a self-financed mode. The 
residual part of the ‘Development Loan Fund, was transferred to the HA 
and became a part of the government investment in the HA. (Chu, 1997c) 
(d) Conservative Operation of the Public Finance System 
Conservative operation of the public finance is manifested in the rare 
initiations ofbudget deficits since post-war period as the colonial government 
only initiated six deficit budgets from 1947/48 till the end ofthe colonial rule. 
(Sung, 1989) 
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In the last two decades, budget deficits only happened in 1974/75 for HK$380 
million, 1982/83 for HK$3500 million, 1983/84 for HK$2993 million, as well 
as 1984/85 for HK$1563 million. (Hong Kong Government, Various 
Years(b)- 1986) 
(e) The Dominance of Policy Actors in Public Budget-Making 
The dominance of the policy actors is manifested in the annual budget exercise 
of the colonial government as the senior bureaucrats of various administrative 
departments (heads of department) made their departmental budgets according 
to the timetable and the circular or guidelines derived by the 'Star Chamber'. 
(Table 2.1.2C) Policy branches were responsible for monitoring and 
supervising the progress of the timetable and the adherence of the circular or 
guidelines in the actual operation of the budget-making exercise. However, 
the policy branches were also subjected to the same set of requirements when 
making their budgets. Among the policy branches, the FB was the main 
coordinator. 
TABLE 2.1.2C KEY STAGES OF THE ANNUAL BUDGET CYCLE OF 
THE COLONIAL GOVERNMENT 
Stage Schedules Remarks 
1. Heads of Department were requested to submit a • Usually happened in July 
report to the FB and lead the FB to acquire ‘ 
sufficient information in advising the Star Chamber 
in deciding expense priority for the colonial 
govemment.' 
2. Setting government expenses priority of a given -
financial year based in the expenses requested by 
various government departments and the forecasted 
government revenue of the financial year. 
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3. Release timetable, circular or guidelines to -
various policy branches and departments following 
priority of public spending derived by the Star 
Chamber. 
4. Departments would submit their draft estimate to Policy branch: 
their respective policy branch. The policy • distributed appropriate forms to 
branches would judge if the needs of particular their supervising departments to 
departments were larger or not under the fill in; 
constraints of the Finance Branch portioned of the • might have discussion with its 
year. supervising departments 
individually in order to come to 
department budget proposal 
before submitting to the Finance 
Branch. 
5. After that, the policy branches would submit the • Budget planning for the Works 
amended departmental draft estimate to the Finance departments, like the LD and 
Branch, the Engineering Department, 
needed to be additionally passed 
the examination of Land 
Development Planning 
Committee before the 
introduction of the Sino-British 
Joint Declaration in which 
policy formulation of the 
amount of land was going to 
develop or to dispose would be 
decided by it and finally passed 
to the ExCo and finally to the 
LegCo for legislation. The 
Committee consists exclusively 
of government official members 
with the Chief Secretaty as the 
chairman. (Lau, 1985, p. 10) 
• After the introduction of the 
Declaration, the role was 
transported to the Land 
Commission. It was jointly 
conducted by both the British 
colonial government and the 
PRC. 
6. Star chamber, chaired by the Chief Secretary, • Usually happened in December 
would have meetings to examine the various 
budget proposals of different policy branches to 
see if they werejustified or not so as to finalize the 
budget proposal and send it to the LegCo. 
7. Presenting the budget proposal to the public • Usually happened in February 
8. Adjuring the budget debate in LegCo and • The Finance Committee was 
presenting the budget proposal to the Finance responsible for scrutinizing public 
Committee2 for further examination expenditure. 
• Special meetings were held in 
March to examine the draft budget 
• Regular meetings were held from 
October to July to examine the 
occasional changes (additional 
appropriation or appropriation 
affairs of new policies) of the 
estimates. 
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• Government officials needed to take 
the likely reactions of the committee 
into account once proposing any 
kind of appropriation. It was 
especially true when the meetings of 
the Finance Committee to open to 
the public from 1985 onwards. 
9. Finish the examination in the Committee, the • The Debate was open to criticism 
proposal would be resubmitted to the LegCo for a from the councilors and the 
Second Reading Debate decisions would be finalized by the 
Financial Secretary 
10. Third Reading of the budget proposal in form of an -
Appropriation Bill came and the bill became law 
11. Public money would release through the Treasury -
12. Government departments could request for • Once the money was used for a 
additional appropriation in the midst of a financial completely fresh item or project, 
year after the approval of the Finance Committee The respected policy branch of the 
and LegCo. requesting departments would need 
to report to the FB. It would 
conduct similar steps of examination 
as those in the annual budget 
exercise before having any 
� recommendation of 'supplementary 
appropriation'. 
13. • Departments had the autonomy to portion and -
allocate their appropriated money among its 
different divisions 
• And they might use their appropriated money 
among its different divisions and they might 
use their autonomy of funding reallocation 
within departments to tackle the problem in 
case when certain departments needed 
additional funding for a particular item offer 
the introduction of public sector reform. 
Sources: 
Chu (1997), Chu (1997c), Miners (1995), Hong Kong Government (Various Years(a) - 1974), Hong Kong 
Government (Various Years(a) - 1986), Hong Kong Government (Various Years(b) - 1987), Lee (1986). 
Notes: 
1. The theme ofthe report in stage one included (i) actual expenditure in the current year, (ii) their forecast of 
expenditure in the coming years, (iii) distinguishing the amount of expenditure that are used for maintaining 
their current service provision and (iv) the expenditure that are used for new items. 
2. The Finance Committee serves as an interim institutional mechanism ofgovemment appropriation scrutiny 
and its power is derived from article 183 ofthe colonial regulation, Standing Order 60 and Section eight of 
Public Finance Ordinance that it has an absolute veto over all items ofthe Government. (Miners, 1995, p. 
137; Hong Kong Government, Various Years(b)) According to Interviewee C, the Committee take care of 
board questions ofpublic finance, like the balance of expenditure different policy areas, strategic decision 
of resources allocation in response to the changing size of population or economic re-structuration,. From 
October 1994 onwards, the Committee was chaired by non-official member, in which the ex-officio 
members, the Chief Secreta^ and the Financial Secretary remained as committee members only until the 
dissolution of the LegCo in 1995. (Hong Kong Government, Various Years(b)) 
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2.2 M A C R O ECONOMIC CONTEXTS FOR THE T W O INSTITUTIONAL 
LEVELS FROM THE 1970S TO THE 1990S. 
2.2.1 FINANCIALLY NON-Stringent & Stringent Periods for the First Level 
Institutions 
The financially non-stringent periods can be located through the growth 
patterns of government revenue. Referring to Table 2.2.1A, 
TABLE 2.2.1A DEVELOPMENT OF XOTAL GOVERNMENT REVENUE 
FROM 1973/74 TO 1994/95 
~Financ ia l Total Revenue o f ~ A n n u a l % Financial Total Revenue~Annual % 
Year the Year (a) Change Year oftheYear (b) Change 
(a/b) (a/b) 
HK $ Million HK $ Million 
1973/1974 5240.8 6.0 1984/1985 36342.5 19.0 
1974/1975 5875.3 12.0 1985/1986 41214.0 13.0 
1975/1976 6519.5 10.0 1986/1987 43869.6 6.0 
1976/1977 7943.5 21.0 1987/1988 55641.4 26.0 
1977/1978 10232.3 28.0 1988/1989 65780.7 18.0 
1978/1979 12557.0 22.0 1989/1990 74365.2 13.0 
丨 1 9 7 9 / 1 9 8 0 1 6 7 9 6 . 1 3 3 . 0 1990/1991 89523.8 2 0 . 0 
1980/1981 30290.3 80.0 1991/1992 114699.9 28.0 
1981/1982 34312.9 11.0 1992/1993 135310.9 17.0 
1993/1994 166602.2 23.0 
1982/1983 31097.6 -9.0 1994/1995 174998.4 5.0 
1983/1984 30339.7 -2.0 
AnnualAverage Growth Rate 26.5 AnnualAverage Growth Rate 13.4 
from 1973/74 to 1981/82 from 1982/83 to 1994/95 
Sources: 
1. Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong Government. 1981, 1990, & 1996. Hong Kong Annual 
Digest ofStatistics. Hong Kong: Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong Government. 
2. Treasury of Hong Kong Government. 1970-1996. Accounts of Hong Kong and Annual Report of 
Accountant General. Hong Kong: Treasury ofHong Kong Government. 
Notes: 
1. Data for Financial Year 1970/71 to 1979/80 were complied from 'The Hong Kong Annual Digest of 
Statistics 1981. Hong Kong: Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong Government. 
2. Data for Financial Year 1980/81 were complied from ‘ The Hong Kong Annual Digest ofStatistics 1990. 
Hong Kong: Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong Government. 
3. Data for Financial Year 1991/92 to 1995/96 were complied from 'The Hong Kong Annual Digest of 
___;^]f£[£|££^££_^££fJj2j2g^ggg^^gggys and Statistics Department, Hong Kong Government. 
Two general periods can be identified. 1973/74-1980/81 is a financially 
non-stringent budget-making period while 1981/82-1994/95 is a 
financially stringent budget-making period for the first level institutions. 
This is because (1) after 1981/82, the annual average growth rate of 
government revenue had never been risen back to the level in 1981/82; and 
(2) the average government growth rate of the later period (13.4%) is much 
lower than the former one (26.5%). 
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Driven by a common sense of economic development works like a 
cycle, short-term financially stringent period would be happened among the 
general financially stringent period. Also, short-term financially non-
stringency would be happened in the period of general financial stringency. 
These two variations can be identified through the economic development 
of the colony as summarized in Tables 2.2.1B and 2.2.1C. 
TABLE 2.2.1B ECONOMIC CONTEXT OF THE 
GENERAL FlNANCLVLLY NON-STRINGENT PERIOD (1973/74 - 1981/82) 
Sub-Periods Upturn / Justifications Stringency 
Downturn or Not 
(Y/N) 
1973/74 Uptum Prosperous economic development of the colony in terms of: N 
-1974/75 • quick rehabilitation of the economy after the 1967 riots 
• government revenue increased by 12 times from the 
‘ 1950s tothe 1970s 
• export rate expanded by 7 times from the 1950s to the 
1970s 
• 12.5% of real GDP growth in 1973 
1975/76 Downturn Subjected to the global economic recession with justifications Y 
-1976/77 of： 
• budget in 1975/76 was ended with a deficit conclusion 
of$2268 million 
1977/78 Uptum Starting to bottom-out from the recession impact of the N 
-1981/82 colony with indications of : 
• investment of property market was increasing active in 
1977 
• high level ofbuilding activities in 1978 
• impressive export performance in terms of GDP growth 
which was higher than original estimation 
• GDP grew by 11% 
• the global economic downturn in 1980 led to a slow-
down of land and property markets, except the 
commercial land demand for which was fierce at that 
time. 
Sources: 
1. Sources for the period of 1973/74-1974/75 are: Hong Kong Government (Various Years (b) - 1973; Various 
Years (b) - 1973; Various Years (b) - 1976) and Hong Kong Government (1993). ’ 
2. Source for the period of 1975/76-1976/77 are: Hong Kong Government (Various Years (b) - 1976) 
3. Sources for the period of 1977/78-1981/82 are: Hong Kong Government (Various Years (b) - 1978; Various 
Years (b) - 1979, Various Years -1980 ； Various Years (b) - 1982) and Hong Kong Government (1980). 
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TABLE2.2.1B ECONOMIC CONTEXT OF 
THE GENERAL FINANCIALLY SXRmGENT PERIOD FROM 1982/83 TO 1994/95 
Sub- Upturn / Justifications Stringent 
periods Downturn or Not 
(Y/N) 
1982/83 Downturn Burgeoning financial stringency & the economy fell into misery with Y 
-1983/84 indications of: 
• windfall of government revenue as a result of global economic 
recession and political uncertainty driven by 1997 issue 
• GDP in 1982 was only a quarter of the recorded in each of the 
previous five years 
• landsales had been dropped by 25%, which consequently led to 
two budget deficit of HK3.5 billion and HK$ 3 billion in 
1982/83 and 1983/84 respectively. 
1984/85 Uptum Ease off of confidence crisis and resumption of economic prosperity N 
-1987/88 after the introduction of the Sino-British Joint Declaration: 
• strong recovery of property market 
• domestic exports grew by 16% and GDP grew by 8.7% in 
1986 
• rapid growth of domestic export continued in 1987: attained 
23.2%fexport growth and 13.6% ofGDP growth in 1987 
• property market was very prosperous in terms of high take-up 
rate of commercial and residential property and a very high 
auction land price in 1986 and 1987 
• economic growth of the economy came to consolidate, but still 
attained 7.5% of GDP growth in real terms. 
• Suspense account effect in sense of half of crown land sale 
revenue was saved up of the government of HKSAR 
discounted part of the effect of economic uptum 
1988/89 Downturn Slowing down of the economic growth ofHong Kong for which was Y 
-1993/94 contributed by 
• the downplaying of he manufacturing industries (GDP in the 
1990s consequently never attained to the level in the 1980s) 
• June 4也 incident in the second half of 1989 
• Gulfcrisis in late 1990 
• Sino-British Dispute of issues of British Nationality Package 
and the PADS 
• Sino-British Dispute over Patten's constitutional reform from 
1992 onwards 
1994/95 Downturn Moderate Slow down of the colony which was caused by: Y 
• sharp slowdown in domestic and private sector building 
activity 
• significant downturn of the residential property market 
• the short term and half hearted anti-speculations measures for 
the property market led the economic downturn of the colony 
only in a limited extent in sense of there are only 5 points 
decrease of the affordability index of home purchasers^^ that 
complied by the R&V relative to the 40 points increase from 
1992 to 1994.36 
Sources: 
1. Sources for the period of 1982/83-1983/84 are Hong Kong Government (Various Years (a) - 1984; Various 
Years (a) — 1985; Various Years(a) - 1986; Various Years(a) - 1987); Hong Kong Govemment '(Various 
Years (b) - 1983) and Tang (1995c). 
2. Sources for the period of 1984/85-1987/88 are from: Hong Kong Government (Various Years (a) - 1986); 
Hong Kong Government (Various Years (b) - 1986; Various Years (b) - 1987; Various Years (b) - 1988; 
Various Years (b) - 1989; Various Years (b) - 1990); Xu (1990). ’ 
3. Sources for period of 1988/89-1993/94 are from: Cradock (1994, p. 238-239); Hong Kong Government 
(Various Years(b) - 1990; Various Years(b) - 1991; Various Years(b) - 1992; Various Years (b) - 1993. 
Various Years (b) - 1994; Various Years(b) - 1995); King (1995); Law (1992); Lui (1997); Shui On Group 
(1991b); Tai Kung Po (1993); Wen Wei Po (1992) and Xiao (1993). 
4. Sources for the 1994/95 are from: Chu (1997e); Hong Kong Government (Various Years (b) - 1995. 
Various Years (b) - 1996) and Lai (1994). ’ 
50 
2.2.2 Non-Hostile & Hostile Periods for the Second Level Institutions 
Jn general the colonial history shows that the policy actors in the first 
level institutions would tighten government expenses whenever the colonial 
government was in financial stringency. Consequently, it brought a hostile 
budget-making environment to the second level institutions. Prior to the 
tightening of government expenses by the policy actors, the second level 
institutions can said to be in a non-hostile budget-making environment as the 
budget proposals of various administrative department were in the same 
public finance direction of the colonial government. Since housing 
provision is a significant integral part of social service provision of the 
colonial government, the being of the hostile and the non-hostile periods of 
the second level institutions are manifested in the expansion and contraction 
of social service provision from the 1970s to the first half of the 1980s and 
from the second half of mid-1980s to the 1990s respectively. (Li, 1995) 
T o i l lustrate , in the 1970s , the co lon ia l g o v e r n m e n t t ack led the 
esca la t ing d e m a n d o f social se rv ice p r o v i s i o n by i n t roduc ing va r ious la rge-
sca le social se rv ice p r o g r a m m e s , such as the pub l i c rental h o u s i n g 
cons t ruc t ion , n e w t o w n d e v e l o p m e n t , c o m p u l s o r y educa t ion , etc. In t hose 
days , the budge t p r o p o s a l s cou ld easi ly be a p p r o v e d if they w e r e in t hose 
e x p a n d i n g a reas o f social services . ( H o n g K o n g G o v e r n m e n t , V a r i o u s 
Years (b ) ; - 1 9 8 1 ; Scot t , 1989) In t u m . a genera l non-hos t i l e b u d g e t - m a k i n g 
e n v i r o n m e n t w a s c rea ted . 
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During the financially stringency in the 1980s and the 1990s, the 
successive budget-tightening actions of the policy actors had consequently 
made the second level institutions situated in a continuously hostile budget-
making period. The first action was the budget deficit response towards 
the economic downturns of the colony in the three budget-deficit financial 
year in the early 1980s. This was followed by the introduction of a 
financial management reform after 1983/84. As what had been said by 
Lee (1996) that, 
"the Finance Branch began to allow flexibility and incentives for 
departments to make operational decisions in the mid-1980s, including 
(a) the adoption of a medium forecast in public expenditure, and (b) 
greater freedom for departments to redeploy savings and rather 
plouging them back to the General Revenue . . . In 1987-88, the 
Finance Branch also began to review the traditional budgetary 
approach by conducting an ‘attack the base-line exercise with a view to 
encouraging managers to get more from the resources than they 
consumed. Preliminary experiments were also attempted to apply 
some business management objectives to departments like the Registrar 
General Department, Water Supplies Department, Electrical and 
Mechanical Services Department, Legal Department and Lands and 
Building Department." (1996, p. 39) 
The method of 'encouraging managers to get more from the resources 
than they consumed' and ‘the application of business management objectives' 
formally subjected the second level institutions to increase in financial 
oversight. 
With an understanding of the economy would not keep uptum or 
downturn continuously and short-term financially stringent periods would 
happened among the general financially non-stringent period, short-term 
hostile budget making periods should also be found among the general non-
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hostile period of the second level institutions. Since the policy actors would 
tighten government expenses when the colonial government was in financial 
stringency and consequently produced a tight budget making environment to 
the second level institutions, the time frame of the general non-hostile / hostile 
period and the short term non-hostile / hostile periods of the second level 
institutions would therefore be resemblance to the general financially non-
stringent / stringent and the short term financially non-stringent / stringent 
periods ofthe first level institutions respectively. 
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2.3 COMPOSITION & CHARACramSTICS OF THE ACTORS JN THE 
T w o INSTITUTIONAL LEVELS 
2.3.1 Actors in the First Level Institutions and the Second Level Institutions 
In general the actors in the first level institutions refer to the policy actors 
of the colonial government. Referring to chapter VII of the colonial 
regulation37, the policy actors concretely composed of the govemor^^ and the 
policy secretariats^^ (the Accountant General / Treasury, the Chief Secretary, 
the Financial Secretary and the Governor). The final-say of public finance 
of Hong Kong was vested in Governor's hand after financial independence 
was granted from the mother country in 1958. The policy actors operated 
themselves itself as the Star Chamber in the domain of public finance. 
(Hong Kong Government, Finance Branch, 1997) The apex position ofthe 
Star Chamber in public finance is indicated by its authority over the Finance 
Branch in determining the priority of the government expenses. (Hong Kong 
Government, Various Years (a) — 1976) 
Actors in the second level institutions refer to senior bureaucrats of the 
selected land and housing administrative departments. (See section 1.4) 
They are generally in positions of directorate grade. 
2.3.2 Superior Position of the Policy Actors / the Star Chamber over the 
Administrative Departments in Public Finance 
The superiority of the policy actors over the senior bureaucrats in the 
second level institutions in public finance is first manifested in its leading 
role in various stages of public budget making. 
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The leading role of the policy actors is first manifested in the passive 
role of the administrative departments in stage in the early stage of the 
annual budget exercise (stage 3). (Table 2.1.2C in section 2.1) These 
administrative departments were made to follow all the budget-making 
timetable, guidelines^^ or executive circulars, as well as procedures that 
were derived according to the expense priority^^ set by the Star Chamber. 
Policy branches only were served as mediators between the Star Chamber 
and the administrative departments. Although the FB was the main 
coordinator in the budget exercise, it only served a supporting role in the 
priority setting exercise, such as providing forecasted government revenue 
level to the Star Chamber.^^ (Chu, 1997) 
The dominant role of the policy actors is also manifested in the stage of 
departmental budget proposal scrutiny. (Stage 4 in Table 2.2.1C) The 
process, according to Interviewee C, made the budget proposals of the 
administrative departments (Stage 4) need to be conform to the policy 
directions initiated by the policy actors as the departmental senior 
bureaucrats do not want their proposals rejected or drastically revised. 
Moreover, the dominant role of the policy actors is also manifested in the 
annual exercise as the group had the final say in all the budget request from 
the administrative departments. 
The dominant role of the Star Chamber in the colonial period was also 
facilitated by its high administrative autonomy from various social groups. 
Politically, the Star Chamber is autonomous from the Executive Council and 
55 
Legislative Council as the Executive councilors only served as advisers on 
government policies while the Legislative councilors could not propose any 
motions to raise public expenditure without the governor's consent under the 
executive-led framework of the colonial government. (Lam & Lee, 1994; 
Lee 1994) Moreover, the relative autonomy is facilitated by the immaturity 
« 
of the local policy parties for their burgeoning did not came into being till 
the inception of electoral components in the mid-1980s. 
As a matter of fact, the superiority of the policy actors over the senior 
bureaucrats in the second level institutions in public finance is a reflection of 
executive-administrative division of labour. It is in the sense that the 
policy actors were institutionalized in the apex of the colonial government 
bureaucracy while administrative departments were made to implement the 
policy directions of the policy actors. The policy implementation roles of 
the administrative departments are reflected on their designated functional 
roles among the government bureaucracy through the enactment of legal 
ordinances. Their functional roles and their abided ordinances are 
summarized in Table 2.3.2 
.:.:.:;’.:':.•:.:. ；•： .:.¾:.:.:.::. ：:.::::.:.:.::.;,..:.:.;:..:]. ."^^ ^^ |^^ ^^*^|!*^^^^^^^^^ !^^^ ^^^^!^^ ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^PPBfpipPBmiPHPPHHI| 
TABLE 23.2 FUNCTIONAL ROLE(S) OF THE SELECTED ADMINISTRATWE 
DEPARTMENTS m THE SECOND LEVEL INSTITUTIONS 
Selected Abided Ordinance(s) Functional Roles 
Departments 
IRD Ordinances of • Tax Collection (Direct and Indirect Tax) - nearly 60% of the 
Betting Duty total Government revenue. Revenue from these sources was 
Business Registration collectively called internal revenue. (Hong Kong government, 
EstateDuty VariousYears(b)- 1993,p.51.) 
Hotel Accommodation Tax • Supervision by the Commissioner of Inland Revenue 
Inland Revenue 
Stamp Duty 
Tax Reserves Certificate 
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R&V Derived the authority (rates • "The Rating and Valuation Department is responsible for 
charging) from the Crown assessing and collecting rates which are levied on landed 
Leases Ordinance property at a fixed percentage of its ratable value. The 
revenue raised helps finance the various public services 
provided by Urban Council and Regional Council, as well as 
providing a stable and reliable revenue stream to the 
Government" (Hong Kong Government, Various Years(b)-
1993,p. 52) 
• "In 1946 and 1947, the Department took an additional task 
connected with stamp duty in the urban areas and rent control 
respectively. Over time, it has become solely responsible for 
the administration of rent control matters as well as estate duty 
and stamp duty work for the whole territory." (Hong Kong 
Government, R & V，1997，p. 2) 
• "Since 1995, the Department has taken over the rates billing 
and accounting functions from the Treasury which remains 
responsible for the actual collection of the rates." (Hong Kong 
Government, R & V，1997, p. 2) 
• Also referring to section 2.1 
AD Audit Ordinance • Serving as the external auditor for the accounts of the 
Government under the supervision of the Director of Audit so, 
it is delegated with the authority to access the records of 
governmental departments and it is independent from any 
bureaus or persons 
• Responsible for supervising or to check the usage of public 
money and to see whether it was used according to the principle 
of 'value of money' 
• Submitting an annual report to the Public Accounts Committee 
for further and closer examination oflosses reported 
• Authority of the AD was distorted with the presence of a time-
lag between its annual report submission and the operation of 
the annual budget exercise of the colonial government 
LD 1. Crown Leases Ordinance^^ Headed by Director of Lands 
2. Crown Land Resumption • Administering Crown Land Leasing, 
Ordinance (i) Crown Lease Enforcement - Lease Renewal^^ adjustment 
of land rents, returning of non-renewable land lease and 
responsible to tum the land back to the government when the 
lease expired. (Wu, 1983 & Hong Kong Government, 19??, p. 
5) 
• Land Disposal. There were three ways of land disposal for the 
government. (Wu, 1983 & Hong Kong Government, 19??) 
(i) Public Auction: sold the leases to the highest value bidder. 
Most the land in the colony is disposed of this way. 
(ii) Tendering45: Leases of Petrol Filling Stations, Kerosene 
Stores in housing estates, profit-making schools, cinemas, 
multi-storey car parks and land have sea frontage will be sold 
by tender. (Wu, 1984, p. 4) 
(iii) Private Treaty Grant: "Grants by Private are made by the 
Governor in respect of land to be used for certain public 
utilities and of educational, medical, religious and other 
charitable purposes, and certain low cost housing projects, 
subject to each case to a special recommendation from the 
Government department concerned. Private Treaty Grants at 
concessionaire rates is also made to industrialists and other 
employers in respect to comprehensive workers housing 
schemes. The premium charged may be nil in the case of 
non-profit making welfare projects, and may be one-third 
market value of housing schemes. (Hong Kong Government 
19??, p. 3) 
• Lands resumption, surveying, valuation and resumption 
compensation under the delegated authority from the Crown 
Land Resumption Ordinance^^ (Chu, 1997d; Hong Kong 
Government, 19??, p. 5 Hong Kong Government, Various(b) 
• Managing the availability and suitability of resumed land for 
the development plans by coordinating with the Planning 
Dept., TDD, HA and the HS, etc. 
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BD47 Buildings Ordinance^^ Headed by Director ofBuildings 
• Approving all construction projects according to the 
Buildings Ordinance. 
• Controlling and Checking the standards of all the building 
developments in Hong Kong (standard of construction and 
the material uses) in order to ensure compliance with 
statutory standards of safety, health and environment in 
private buildings and building works. 
PD 1. Hong Kong Planning Established in 1990 to take full responsibility of planning which 
Standards and Guidelines^^ was previously shared by the TDD and Town Planning Office. 
2. Territorial Development (Town Planning Office’ which became the Planning Department in 
Strategy (TDS)^° January 1989.) (Hong Kong Government, Various Years(b) - 1991, 
3.Port Development Strategy P" 208; Lai, 1993, p. 185; Hong Kong Government, Planning 
(PDS)5i Department, 1997a) 
4. Sub-Regional Development • Formulating, monitoring and reviewing urban and rural 
Strategies52 planning policies and proposals 
5.TownPlanningOrdinance53& • Dealing with all matters relating to Ianduse planning at 
Statutory pians^^ territorial。，sub-regionar' and district levels^ 
6. Departmental Plans^^ • Executing the Town Planning Board in the preparation of 
statutory plans and making decisions on applications for 
planning permission under these individuals planning areas that 
out ofthe TDS and PDS. 
• "Review of Town Planning Ordinance, the Territorial 
Development Strategy, the non-metropolitan Development 
Strategies and the Hong Kong Planning Standards." (Hong 
Kong Government, Various Years(b) - 1991, p. 208) 
• "Follow-up Work on the Metroplan, the Rural Planning and 
Improvement Strategy , the Study of the Use of Underground 
Space, and the Port and Airport Development Strategy. (Hong 
Kong Government, Various Years(b) - 1991, p. 208) 
• Serving as a coordinator between the LDC and other 
government departments. 
• The District Planning Office of the Planning Department 
worked closely with the Development Office of the TDD to 
prepare statutory plans in new towns. 
TDD — Formed in 1986 (prior 1986, its name was the New Territories 
Development Department) which was set up in 1973 to implement 
the New Town Programme, the main objective of which at that time 
was to provide land in the New Territories for public housing 
programme. Since 1986, TDD has also extended its responsibility 
to cover the new major developments in the urban area. 
Main Roles (currently): 
• Responsible for lowest tier of planning - action planning, under 
the planning framework derived by the PD 
1. Development ofNew Towns and Rural Townships & 
2. New Major Urban Development Areas. 
• Secondary Role: 
1. Coordinating various government department and utility 
companies to ensure that all the essential infrastructure and 
facilities are in place at the intake of population for each 
development package 
2. Overseeing engineering design an construction works on 
land formation and infrastructure on the development areas 
HGD --- • Mainly responsible for highway development projects 
HA & HD Housing Ordinance(s) • Responsible for initiating and managing public housing 
projects which is largely financed through 'Development Loan 
Fund, 
• Its land for public housing project and the rate of construction 
and the direction of housing provision are determined by the 
TDD, the Financial Secretary and the HB 
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LDC LDC Ordinance • Urban renewal but operating in prudent commercial principle 
• Prior 1987, the urban renewal was responsible by the 
Government itself. 
• Its activities have to be approved by the secretary of Lands and 
Works, the Town Planning Board and the Govemor in Council 
Sources: 
1. Information for IRD were complied from the (1) ‘Homepage of Inland Revenue Department ‘ by Hong Kong 
Government, Inland Revenue Department (1996); (2) ‘Hong Kong Year Book 1993' by Hong Kong Government 
(Various Years (b) - 1993) 
2. Information ofR&V were complied from (1) Interview Report Six: Rating and Valuation Department of the Hong 
Kong Government. (Chu, 1997e); (2) ‘Hong Kong Year Book 1993 ‘ by Hong Kong Government (Various Years (b ) -
1993) & (3) 'Homepage of the Rating and Valuation Department.' by Hong Kong Government, Rating and Valuation 
Department(1997). 
3. Information of LD were complied from (1) Interview Report Five: Lands Department of the Hong Kong Government. 
(Chu, 1997d); (2) ‘A Simple Guide to Crown Land Transactions： by Hong Kong Government (19??); (3) ‘A High 
Land Price Policy in Hong Kong? A Preliminary Study： by C. L. Wu (1983); (4) Hong Kong Year Book by Hong 
Kong Government, Various Years(b); (5) The Land Tenure System in Hong Kong and Its Implications on Valuation -
[Continued] by Thomas Ho (1985), p. 8; (6) "Development Appraisal ofLandin HongKong'hy Ling-hin Li (1997). 
4. Information of BD were complied from (1) ‘Hong Kong Year Book’ by Hong Kong Government, Various Years(b); 
(2) ‘Land Use Planning in Hong Kong. ‘ by Roger Bristow (1984) (3) The Land Tenure System in Hong Kong andIts 
Implications on Valuation - [Continued] by Thomas Ho (1985); (4) "Development Appraisal of Land in HongKong' 
by Ling-hin Li(1997),p. 17. 
5. Information of PD were complied from the (1) 'Homepage of the Planning Department ’ by Hong Kong Government, 
Planning Department (1997); (2) ‘Land-Use Planning In Hong Kotig, by Roger Bristow (1984); (3) 'Hong Kong Year 
Book 1991 ‘ by Hong Kong Government (Various Years(b)- 1991); 4. ‘Urban Renewal and the Land Development 
Corporation.' By Lai Wai-chung (1993); (4) ‘Pamphlet: Planning with Vision: An Exhibition about Town Planning 
and Development in Hong Kong. ‘ by Hong Kong Government, Planning Department (1997a); (5)'Pamphlet: Hong 
Kong - City with Vision: Metro Area and Restmcturation., by Hong Kong Government, Planning Department. 
(1997b);(6) ‘Pamphlet: Hong Kong - City of Vision: South East Kowloon Development. ‘ by Hong Kong Government, 
Planning Department, (1997c); (7) ‘Pamphlet: City of Vision - Airport Core Programme - Meeting the Challenge of 
the 21st Century.，by Hong Kong Government, Planning Department, (1997d) 
6. Information for TDD were complied from (1) ‘Homepage of the Territorial Development Department，by Hong Kong 
Government, Territorial Development Department (1997); (2) "Interview Report: Construction Review and Outlook 
1987-88'hy The Research Department, Shui On Co. Ltd. (1988e). 
7. Information of Highway Department was complied from 'Hong Kong Year Book 1987' by Hong Kong Government 
(Various Years (b)- 1987) 
8. Information for HA & HD were complied from (l)'The Government and Politics ofHong Kong’ by Miners (1995) 
and (2) ‘Hong Kong Year Book' by the Hong Kong Government (Various Years) and (3) 'Housing' by Lau (1994) 
9. Information for LDC were complied from the Annual year ofthe LDC (1988-1996) 
2.4 lNSTITUTIONAL-SETTEVG BV THE FmST LEVEL INSTITUTIONS AND 
THE SECOND LEVEL INSTITUTIONS 
2.4.1. Institutional-Setting of the First Level Institutions 
(a) Content of the Institutional-Setting 
There is high resemblance in the public finance principles of various 
Financial Secretaries, from Haddon-Cave's in the 1970s to Donald Tsang in 
1990s. 59 Their public finance principles are respectively summarized in 
Table2.4.1Aand2.4.1B. 
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TABLE 2.4.1A SlX REQUIREMENTS OF TAX SYSTEM BY HADDON-CAVE 
a. The tax system should help generate sufficient recurrent revenue to finance a major proportion of a given 
level oftotal expenditure and to maintain fiscal reserves at a satisfactory level; 
b. The tax system is a neutral as possible as regards the internal cost/price structure, the supply ofhuman effort 
and private investment decisions; 
c. The laws governing the tax system are adopted from time to time to make them compatible with changing 
commercial policies 
d. Each and every levy is simple and easy (and therefore inexpensive) to administer for both the Government 
and the taxpayer, and does not encourage evasion. 
e. The tax system is equitable are between different classes of taxpayers or potential taxpayers and between 
different income groups; and 
f. Exceptionally, the tax system is capable ofbeing used to achieve non-fiscal objectives when necessaty. 
Sources: (1) Hong Kong Government (Various(a) - 1978) ； (2) Tang (1996a) 
TABLE 2.4.1B SEVEN PRINCIPLES / SEVEN VflRTUES FOR THE COLONIAL 
GOVERNMENT TAXATION SYSTEM BY DONALD TSANG M 1995/96 BUDGET 
a. Retain a low, simple and predictable tax regime; 
b. Raise sufficient revenue to meet known spending commitments; 
c. Maintain a rigorous 'user pays' system for setting fees and charges so as to keep tax rates low; 
d. Keep adequate fiscal reserves to provide a cushion against future uncertainties; 
e. Combat tax avoidance and evasion; 
f. Provide concession where most needed; and finally, 
g. Minimize the inflationary impact. 
Source: Tang (1996a) 
What can be generalized from the principles is that the institutional practice 
of public finance consists of low and simple tax regime and adequate fiscal 
reserve. Budget guidelines were made according to the policy direction of 
the colonial government. Three adjustments of the budget guidelines are 
found in the past two decades. (1975/76, 1982/83 and 1986/87) (Tang, 1996) 
(b) Historical Root of the Institutional-Setting 
In the course ofcolonial history, two factors pathed the colonial government 
to rely on the Hong Kong capitalist to maintain sufficient government 
revenue, namely, insufficient natural resources endowment and the 
governing principle of not generating financial burden to the mother country. 
The financial dependency rendered the colonial government weak in their 
bargaining power with the capitalist in public finance arrangement. It 
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consequently pushed the colonial government to derive various conservative 
budget principles to fit into the request of the capitalist. 
The origin of conservative public finance principles can be traced back to 
the tax conflicts of the colonial government and the local capitalist in the 
i9th century, (who were mostly British and European businessmen, 
otherwise known as 'hongs merchant'^^) (Chiu, 1994; Chow, Chan and 
Kuk, 1992; Hong Kong Government, 1977; Rabhuska, 1976; Rear, 1972; 
Tsang, 1995; Yu and Lau, 1994; Zhou, 1992) At that time, the colony was 
in a financial deadlock as it had to finance for large-scale public works, 
devalue silver and the contributed military expense of the mother country. 
It aroused great reaction from the capitalist. The capitalist then threatened 
the government to reduce government expenditure, and demanded for 
having elected representative in the Legislative Council afterward so as to 
put lease on the state's power to tax and spend. (Chiu, 1994) Eventually, 
the capitalist won over the colonial government and the colonial government 
made concession to the capitalist in the form of institutionalizing 
conservative budget principles, namely balanced budget and gradual 
increase of government expenditure into the British colonial government 
framework. (Chiu, 1994; Lau, 1997) The sacrifice of the British 
government became "a firm commitment to a conservative financial policy, 
aiming at minimizing the burdens of government on the bourgeoisie.，，(Chiu, 
1994, p. 27) 
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2.4.2 Institutional-Setting for the Second Level Institutions 
(a) Content of the Institutional-Setting 
The institutional setting of the second level institutions is defined by its 
inherent subordinated position and their functional role in the government 
bureaucracy. Their subordinated position and their role in policy 
implementation subsumed them under the budgetary decisions of the policy 
actors. (See Section Table 2.2C) These roles were also affected by their 
inter-departmental budget relations. 
(b) Historical Root of the Institutional-Setting 
The colonial history of Hong Kong shaped the bureaucratic institutions, 
which were modeled after the British colonial system. In tum, the 
administrative level of the colonial government was institutionally made 
responsible for policy implementation, and was situated in a subordinated 
position. (Miners, 1995) 
Furthermore, bureau-societal relations were underdeveloped as a result of 
colonialism. It was partly the result of selective co-optation of pressure 
groups into the government consultation system. For instance, the 
People's Council ofPublic Housing had been selectively excluded from the 
housing and land consultation system. (Chu, 1997a). The development of 
civil society and hence the bureau-society institutions were paralyzed. 
This enabled the policy actors to maintain an upper hand in the policy 




'Corporate Profits tax' is tax which charged on corporate profit derived Hong Kong and 
the standard rate is 15%, where dividends were not subjected to tax. (Wu, 1977, p. 21) 
"Under the Inland Revenue Ordinance, profits tax shall be charged to the following 
circumstances: a. the persons carries on a trade, profession or business in Hong Kong; 
and b. there are profits from such trade, profession or business and such profits arise in or 
derived from Hong Kong. We [both the colonial government and the government of the 
HKSAR] adopt a territorial space principle. Only income that has a source in Hong Kong 
is taxable here. Income sourced elsewhere, notwithstanding that it is no tax on capital 
gains or dividends. Not do we have an interest tax . . . The current [up to 1997] standard 
corporate profits tax rate is 16.5%. The standard profits tax rate for an incorporated 
business is 15%.” (Finance Bureau, HKSAR., 1997, pp. 1-2) Also, “profits tax is our 
[here refers to both the colonial government and the government of the HKSAR] largest 
source of revenue source . . . It contributed on average some 25% of total Government 
revenue each year over the past decade. Our profits tax receipts for 1996/97 were about 
$50 billion, or 24% of total Government revenue for the financial year. A single 
percentage point change in the standard corporate profits tax rate would result in a 
revenue gain/loss of $1.8 billion in 1998/99 and $10.8 billion cumulatively over the 
medium term forecast period up to 2001-02." (Finance Bureau, HKSAR, 1997, p. 2) 
19 "Property tax was charged on the owner of land and / or buildings at the standard rate 
(15%) and 80% of the ratable value of the land and buildings . . . exceptions: 1) 
Properties whose rents were restricted by references to those payable before World War II 
were charged at half of the standard rate. 2) Owner-occupied houses for residential 
purposes were exempt (but mortgage interest was not deductible) 3) If any property was 
unoccupied for one or more entire months, no tax was charged for such a period. 4) 
Corporations were exempted form the tax for any land and / or buildings they owned, as 
the income was taxed under the corporation profits tax." (Wu, 1977, p. 23) 
2° “Interest tax was charged at source at the standard rate, but was exempt 1) where the 
interest rate did not exceed 3.5% per annum, or 2) where the interest was paid to bank or 
corporation in Hong Kong." (Wu, 1977, p. 23) 
21 • 
"Salaries tax was charged on salaries, wages and pension arising in or derived from Hong 
Kong . . . Housing supplied free by the employer was valued at 7.5% ofthe income ofthe 
employee, while holiday passages granted by the employer were not treated as income. 
But the total salaries tax charged on a person could not exceed an amount equal to 15% 
on the whole ofhis income chargeable to salaries tax before deducting allowances." (Wu, 
1977, pp. 24-25) , 
“"Estate Duty was levied on all property passing on death . . . The main exemption was: 1) 
Property situated outside in Hong Kong. 2) Gifts inter vivid made three years or more 
before death, or in the case of gifts to charity, one year or more before death; and gifts on 
consideration of marriage. 3) Estate not exceeding $200000." (Wu, 1977, pp. 26-27) 
23 "Entertainment tax was charged on admission to live entertainment, e.g. football matches 
and performance in nightclubs, and on admissions to cinemas and to horse racing." (Wu, 
1977, p. 105) 
24 "The bets and sweeps tax was levied on totalization bets and cash sweep tickets for horse 
racing." (Wu, 1977, p. 105) 
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^ r __ _^  
There is no general tariff in Hong Kong throughout the colonial governing. Excise 
duties are imposed on some commodities, such as liquor, tobacco, hydrocarbon oils and 
proprietary medicine, toilet preparation, cosmetics. These excise duties are subjected 
to adjustment from each financial year and financial year. Its implication is beyond the 
scope of this thesis. 
26 "Rates were introduced as early as 1845 three years after Hong Kong was ceded to the 
British. The proceeds were then earmarked the upkeep of a police force. Even today 
the revenue form this source is still intended to cover the cost of police, water, street 
lighting, fire prevention and similar urban services." (Hsia and Chau, 1978, p. 159) In 
short, rates now simply serves as one source of government revenue and is an important 
source of revenue of two municipal councils. And “Rates are charged on the ratable 
value of any ‘tenement，(i.e. any land building or part of a building) held as a separate 
tenancy. The ratable value, which is determined by the Commissioner of rating and 
Valuation annually or at longer intervals, means the rent at which any tenement may be 
expected to let on the assumption that the tenant pays to the rates and the landlord pays 
the Crown rent and the costs of repair and insurance. When a new building is put up, 
the Commissioner makes an 'interim valuation' of the tenements involved, and these are 
then entered into the existing ‘valuation list’，i.e. the list of all tenements chargeable to 
rates. Similarly when a building is structurally altered or pulled down, an interim 
valuation is carried out and amendments to the valuation list are made accordingly. 
Exemption from rates include places of public worship, government property, agricultural 
land, and several urban areas in the New Territories." (Wu, 1977, p. 78) 
27 , 
"Stamp duties are levied on a wide variety of documents, such as agreements, assignment, 
bills of exchange, contract notes, import and export declarations, insurance policies, 
shares and marketable securities, etc." (Wu, 1977, p. 90) 
28 
Such segment oftax mainly come from First Registration tax，business registration fee and 
various fees of public services provision. (Wu, 1977, p. 105) 
29 • 
It mainly come from crown land sales. Before the reorganization of the Housing 
Authority, resettlement housing rent, low cost housing rent and Housing Authority rent 
also served as a portion of this segment of government revenue. 
30 “The Capital Works Reserve Fund finances the Public Works Programme, land 
acquisitions, capital subventions, major systems / equipment and computers. When the 
Sino-British Joint Declaration came into effect on 37 May 1985, the fund was 
restructured to enable the premium income from land transactions to be accounted for in 
accordance with the arrangements in Annex III ofthe Joint Declaration. The income of 
the fund is derived mainly from land premium." (Census and Statistics Department, Hong 
Kong Government, 1991, p. 117) It comprises of works account for the finance of 
public works programme, suspense account for the premium income of land transaction 
and reserve account. (Tang, 1996b) 
31 "The Capital Investment Fund is used to finance the Government's investment in public 
bodies where are no part of the Government structure itself, such as equity injections in 
the Mass Transit Railway Corporation and capital investment in the Hong Kong Housing 
Authority. Its income is derived mainly from interest and dividends investment and 
repayments." (Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong Government, 1991, p. 117) 
32 "The Loan Fund is used to finance schemes of Government Loans, such as housing loans 
and student loans. The main sources of this income are loan repayments and interest." 
(Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong Government, 1991, p. 117) 
I 
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33 Exchange Fund was established in December 6，1935. Once issuing bank notes, 
authorized bank need save identical amount of foreign currency into the Exchange Fund 
so as to get the Certificate ofIndebtedness before issuing and Hong Kong currency. The 
Certificate of Indebtedness is interest-free, but the Exchange Fund can use those save-in 
foreign currency to eam interest which can be used to stabilize the exchange rate of Hong 
Kong dollars. (Tang, 1992b) 
34 The operation of these funds will not be analyzed in detail as it is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation. 
35 The affordability index of home purchasers is complied to measure the effect of changing 
prices, mortgage rates and household income on the ability of purchasers to afford a 
mortgage. The index is derived by means of dividing the monthly mortgage repayment 
by the median household income for the same quarter. The model mortgage repayment 
is based on a 20-year mortgage on 70% of the purchase for a 50.0 square metre flat. The 
interest rate adopted in the model mortgage is the weighted arithmetic mean of Heng 
Sang's mortgage rates for domestic properties effected during their quarter. The 
purchase price is estimated by applying the average price (adjusted by reference to the 
price indices) for a class A domestic unit which is based on an analysis made of 
transactions scrutinized by R&V for stamp duty purposes. The median household 
income is de-seasonalized to take account of the seasonal fluctuation, e.g. bonus and 
double salaty payments around the Lunar New Year. (Chu, 1997e) 
36 
In fact, the flat price did slow down for 25% to 35% after the introduction of speculation 
curbing policy. However, the property price had increased by 200% from 1991 to 1994. 
Also, the average price of a small and medium-sized flats has risen for 10 times from 
about HK$600 per square foot in 1984 to HK$ 6000 per square foot in 1994. (Lai, 1994) 
More importantly, the government had declared the speculation issue to be pacified and 
hence terminated all speculation curbing measures two days (Aug. 24 1996) after the 
developers were found like to ally to pull down the crown land price. In other words, 
the colonial government seems to have traded off the interest of the public so as to 
maintain a better level ofland sale revenue and in retum the interest ofthe developers. 
37 “The regulations dated back to 1837, and serve as ‘directions to Governor for general 
guidance given by the Crown through the Secretaty of State for the Colonies,, especially 
in financial and administrative matters . . . The colonial regulations specified expenditure 
of approved funds, clarified how and when variations in the approved estimates could be 
allowed, and instructed local officials on the submission and auditing ofpublic accounts ” 
(Rabushka, 1979, p. 34) 
38 
The Governor, with the enactment of the Letters Patent and the Royal Instructions, had 
been made to hold responsible for all formal terms of power ofthe colonial government. 
He was the head, the commander-in-chief of the colony. (Duncanson, 1988; Harris, 1983. 
Miners, 1995; Perry & Tang, 1991). ‘ 
39 
The Secretariat(s) ofvarious dimensions of policies had been institutionally made to play 
the policy co-ordination role and they were the main advisers for the Govemor. (Harris, 
1983) Empirically, the secretariats did not only act as administrators but also the policy 
making officials of the colonial government. (Cheung, 1990; Harris, 1978; Lam & Lee 
1993 & 1994) 
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4° According to Interviewee C, the guidelines include: (1) those which were technical in 
nature (accounting and calculation of different expenditure item, and budget guideline); 
(2) those which were budgetary in nature (estimated recurrent guideline, as well as (3) the 
portion ofpublic money that could be used in each policy branch. (Chu, 1997) 
41 Such a priority setting mechanism seems very likely operate for a very long time but 
which has not been stated clearly constitutionally. As said by Interviewee B, "the 
colonial government would already have policy commitment collection exercise before 
the annual budget-making exercise. The colonial government would first observe 
whether policy branches or departments had any change of their policy priority or some 
new policy ideas. If the answer is positive, suggestions will be submitted to the top 
senior of civil servants for detail examination. Approved project would be granted with 
higher priority of implementation during the annual budget exercise. However, the final 
say was still vested in the hand of the Star Chamber of the colonial government. (Chu, 
1997) 
42 Finance Branch's government revenue would be taken as a reference in determining these 
priorities. Prior 1987, economic forecast was responsible by the Economic Analysis 
Unit, which was established the autumn of 1972. Central Statistical Department had 
been re-established in 1968 to conduct annual economic review and forecast. The end 
products were 'Monthly Digest of Statistics，and "Annual Estimates of the Gross 
Domestic Product' and annual publication of the ‘Economic Background to the Budget'. 
(Hong Kong Government, Various Years(a) _ 1974; Hong Kong Government, Various 
Years(a) - 1976) From 1987 onwards, after experiencing three deficit years and 
realizing the falling capital revenue in the coming days for the colony, the colonial 
government introduced a 'Five-year Medium Range Forecast of expenditure and revenue'. 
It was made through a series of computer based models to derive forecast for Government 
finances for five years ahead. (Hong Kong Government, Various Years(a) - 1986) The 
forecasts consolidated the financial position of the colonial government in terms of its 
'General Revenue Account' and all its 'fund', except the Lotteries Fund. The forecast 
was made to provide estimations of government expenditure changes and revenue 
projections. (Hong Kong Government, Various Years(b) - 1987) 
43 “In Hong Kong, the potential of the development of a piece of new land is governed by 
the positive and restrictive covenants in the lease. Planning requirements, Buildings 
Ordinance provisions, fire hazard prevention, traffic regulations and provision of 
infrastructuraI facilities adjoining the land, are all stipulated in the lease in great detail . . . 
If a lease is restricted, a cash premium is required to be paid to the Crown for 
modification of the lease before the land can be redeveloped to the maximum potential 
and value. The amount of premium would be the full difference between the open 
market value of the land with, and without, the restriction to be modified. Usual 
restriction covenants in Crown leases are: (a) User- specifying, for example, residential 
use only or industrials use only, (b) Height - specifying the maximum height above 
Planning Department allowed. (c) Type of Building - for example, restricting 
development to 'detached, or semi-detached residences', (d) Control of Development -
‘Rate and Range, clause or ‘Design, deposition and height, clause, (e) Offensive-
trades' clause. “ (Ho, 1985, p. 8) 
44 "A number of 75 years non renewable leases issued during the last century expired and 
due to expire in the near future. It is the practice to grant new releases in respect of 
these lots subject to the payment of a premium, reassessment of the Crown rent and to 
certain conditions regarding development." (Hong Kong Government, 19??, p. 5) 
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45 "The general policy is that a public tender is called for if (a) the user is strictly defined 
and the sale of is unlikely to attract general interest; and (b) the government wishes to 
examine in advance detailed proposals for the development of particular lot with an usual 
user restriction, to ensure that the best form of development is obtained and that the 
development meets with all government requirements . . . An important type of tender is 
the ‘Letter A' and ‘Letter B' tender system in the New Territories. When the 
government requires land for development, it gives the lessee an opportunity to 
voluntarily surrender his holding in exchange for the right to be granted Crown Land in 
future." (Wu, 1984, pp. 4-5) Regarding the Letter A and Letter B had issued in bulk 
which outweigh the land supply of the government potentially and so which had been 
stopped to issue in 10 the march, 1983. (Wu, 1984, p. 6) 
46 "The Crown Lands Resumption Ordinance gives powers of compulsory purchase of 
leased land for public purpose. The normal practice where land is required for such a 
purpose is for the Superintendent of Crown Lands & Survey to make a cash offer to the 
lessee in respect ofthe site. Failing agreement, the land is resumed under the Ordinance 
and the Land Tribunal will decide the amount of compensation to be paid." (Hong Kong 
Government, 19??，p. 5) 
47 In 1993, Building Ordinance Office was separated from the Lands and Buildings 
Department. As a result Buildings Department was established. (Hong Kong 
Government, Various Years(b) - 1994) 
48 "This Ordinance [Building Ordinance (Chapter 123)], with its many regulations, covers a 
very wide field, ranging from the internal and extemal design, height, and building 
density to the structural requirements of a building. The Building (Planning) Regulation 
within this Ordinance limit the sizes of buildings in various circumstances, ensure 
reasonable amounts of light and air, provide for adequate means of access, and escape 
from fire." (Ho, 1986, pp. 8-9) The section relevant for the land domain is: “Section 
16(1) ofthe Ordinance specifies the grounds upon which the Building Authority [now the 
BD] may refuse to approve plans submitted to him . . . 'the canying ofthe building works 
shown thereon would contravene the provision of this Ordinance or of any other 
enactment, or would contravene any approved or draft plan prepared under the Town 
Planning Ordinance; the carrying out ofbuilding works thereon would result in a building 
differing in height, design, type or intended use from buildings in the immediate 
neighbour or previously existing on the same site; in the case of building works to be 
carried out on a site which in his opinion ought to be provided with streets having 
adequate connection to a public street, he is not satisfied that such streets or will be 
provided . . . In Section 3(1) states that no balconies shall be permitted to project over a 
street, unless exempted by the Building Authority [now the BD]. By a Circular Letter to 
all authorized architects, the Authority has stated out no such exemptions will be granted 
in respect of any plans submitted after 31 March 1974; Section 42, the Building Authority 
may grant modifications of the requirements of the Ordinance, upon payment of 
prescribed fees, such modifications will be granted in special circumstances that have to 
be specified." (Roberts, 1975, pp. 20-21) 
49 "This [Hong Kong Planning Standards and Guidelines] is a policy statement which sets 
out the criteria for determining the scale, location, site, requirements of various land use 
and facilities. It is used in the formulation of development strategies, preparation of 
town plans, drawing up planning briefs and scrutiny of development proposals." (Hong 
Kong Government, Planning Department, 1997) 
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50 “[TDS] provides a broad planning framework for preparation of sub-regional and district 
plans as well as integrating public policies on major land and infrastructure 
development." (Hong Kong Government, Planning Department, 1997) 
51 It is a plan which integrated the development of new port facilities, new international 
airport and related infrastructure urban development. (Hong Kong Government, Planning 
Department, 1997) 
52 "Within the framework of the TDS, sub-regional development strategies are prepared to 
translate the territorial goal into more specific planning objectives for the five sub-regions 
ofHong Kong . . . Each sub-regional development strategy normally comprises a series of 
plans and statements which provide a framework for more detailed district planning and 
work programmes. The NWNT and SWNT development strategies completed in the 
1980s for the sub-regions in the New Territories and now under review. The outcome of 
the reviews for NWNY and SWNT will be available in the late 1996. The review for 
the NENT is expected in the mid-1996. At this stage, a review for the SENT is 
considered unnecessaty. The ‘Metroplan Selected Strategy' was approved by the 
Governor in Council in September 1991 to provide a planning framework for developing 
and upgrading the Metro Sub-region, which includes Hong Kong Island, Kowloon, Tsuen 
Wan and Kwai Tsing. On the basis of the Metroplan, development statements have been 
prepared to provide a planning framework to translate the broad Metroplan concepts into 
specific district planning objectives and plans of action. To date, development 
statements for West Kowloon, Southeast Kowloon and Tsuen Wan-Kwai Tsing have 
been completed. The Development Statements of Hong Kong Island West and Central 
and East Kowloon are expected to be available by the end of 1996." (Hong Kong 
Government, Planning Department, 1997) 
53 “The Town Planning Ordinance (^o.20 of 1939), as amended from 1974 . . . It provides 
two principles planning mechanism: the preparation of statutory plans, and the approval 
of development differing from those statutory plans within certain specified limits. The 
Ordinance provides for the appointment of a Town Planning Board which is responsible 
for the systematic preparation of draft plans for the future layout of such existing and 
potential urban areas as the Governor may direct as weak as for the types of building 
suitable for erection therein." (Bristow, 1984, pp. 151-152) "The [Town Planning] 
Ordinance provides the establishment of the Board, which may prepare and publish draft 
plans for the layout of any area. These draft plans may show or make provision for: ‘(a) 
streets and railways and or the main communications; (b) zones and districts set apart for 
use of residential, commercial, industrial or other specified uses; (c) reserves for 
Government, institutions or community purposes; (d) parks, recreation grounds and 
similar open spaces; (e) zones and districts set apart for undetermined uses, and any 
matter whatsoever may be shown or provided for or specified in or in respect ofthe plans 
by means of such diagrams, illustrations, notes and descriptive matter shall be part ofthe 
plans." (Roberts, 1975, p. 37) 
54 “They [Statutory Plans] are prepared and published by the Town Planning Board under 
the provision ofthe Town Planning Ordinance. There are two types of statutory plans: 
'Outline Zoning Plans (OZPs) show the proposed land uses and major road system of 
individual planning scheme areas • . . 'Development Permission Areas (DPA) Plans' are 
prepared after the enactment of the Town Planning (Amendment) 1991 for areas not 
previously by OZPs. The purpose of DPA plans is to provide interim planning control 
and development guidance for selected areas pending the preparations of OZPs." (Hong 
Kong Government, Planning Department, 1997) 
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55 "They [Departmental Plans] are administrative plans used mainly within the government. 
They generally comprise outline development plans (ODP) and layout plans and are 
prepared within the framework of the TDS, sub-regional development strategies and the 
statutory plans." (Hong Kong Government, Planning Department, 1997) 
56 Territorial Planning - Strategic Planning Guidance was largely derived from the Hong 
Kong Outline Plans and it was written in 1983. Its central theme is to allow growth in 
the urban areas, but accelerate growth in the new towns. 
57 Sub-regional Planning - "the only method of sub-regional planning normally existing in 
Hong Kong was the non-statutory planning guilds prepared for certain areas in the New 
Territories . . .，，(Bristow, 1984, p. 176) Layout Plans - "are detailed departmental 
plans . . . for small areas usually contained within the large-scale outline development 
plans . Often they are described with the physical implementation of actual 
development scheme." (Bristow, 1984, p. 191) 
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District Plans were 'outline zoning plans' that indicated the proposed predominant land-
use pattem and the major road framework of the area to a small scale. (Bristow, 1984) 
59 The colony was suffering serious financial stringency in the early 1980s, the Financial 
Secretary, John Bremridge did not place the discussion of budgetaty principles as a core 
part ofhis budgets and the principles had only been placed at the appendix. (Tang, 1994) 
In the early 1990s, the Financial Secretary, Macleod，had placed the budgetary principles 
back to the main body of the budget and which are similar to those ofthe Haddon Cave. 
(Au Yeung and Ho, 1992; Tang, 1994) 
60 "Further information of 'hongs' and European & Britain merchants, one can refer to ‘The 
Taipans: Hong Kong Merchant Princes： by Colin N. Crisswell (1991) and ‘Europe in 
China: the History ofHong Kong.，from the beginning to the 1882., by E. J. Eitel (1968). 
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C^HAPTER THREE: 
ANALYSIS OF FlRST LEVEL INSTITUTIONS 
The effort of the colonial government to preserve the conservative approach to 
public finance is manifested in the trend of land supply and the taxation policy. 
Concrete details of the hypothesis are as follows: 
(1) The policy actors would supply the crown land non_steadily by 
i. increasing the land supply substantially in the general financially 
non-stringent period (1973/74-1981/82) and the identified 
financially stringent periods of 1973/74-1974/75, 1977/78-1980/81 
and 1984/85- 1988/89. 
ii. supplying the crown land in an unduly low amount in the general 
financially stringent period (1982/83-1994/95) and the identified 
financially stringent periods of 1975/76-1976/77, 1981/82- 1983/84, 
1989/90-1993/94 and 1994/95. 
(2) Increasing the role of indirect tax and fees & charges in government 
extraction process rather than pushing up the tax rate Hong Kong even 
when tax burden inequality were found. 
In what follows, I shall demonstrate the validity of the above two hypotheses 
chronologically. The manipulation of crown land leasing of the colonial 
government will go first (Section 3.1), followed by the demonstration of 
manipulation on the taxation system, fees and charges, indirect tax (Section 3.2). 
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3.1 CROWN LAND LEASING MANIPULATION 
The manipulation of crown land leasing can be shown in the official depiction 
(Section 3.1.1) and actual patterns of land sale (Section 3.1.2). 
3.1.1 OFFICIAL DEPICTION BY THE POLICY ACTORS 
Official depiction of the policy actors is typically represented by the ‘1983/84 
Budget Speech，by Mr. J. H. Bremridge. Related paragraphs are as below: 
“My own prize for misplaced zeal goes to those who seek an end to 
what they call Government's high land price policy. Apart from 
the minor fact that there has never been such a policy, to suggest that 
it exists at this particular point in time when the budget is in serious 
deficit because of barely above formation costs involves a degree of 
capacity worthy of inclusion in the Guinness Book of Records . . . It 
was the improved supply of Government land to the market resulting 
from deliberate planning that was a major factor in ending the 
escalation of property prices, the baleful effects of which were 
increasingly obvious. I am no supporter of high prices for anything 
-only fair prices as normally determined by the market and not 
arbitrarily by bureaucrats." (Hong Kong Government, Various 
Years-1983, p. 4) 
Mr. Bremridge's depiction of the government stance on crown land supply, 
like improving the supply of government land as deliberate planning to end 
the escalating property prices, indirectly shows that the policy actors had 
manipulated the land supply when the land and housing market was 
overheated. 
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Similar official position an be found in Mr. Donald Tsang,s ‘1995/96 
Budget Speech,. Related paragraphs are as below: 
"We were urged to abandon an alleged high land price policy to 
increase the supply of land, and indeed to create a land bank so that 
we could respond more quickly to imbalances in supply and demand. 
This is precisely what these reclamation are intended to achieve. 
But let me assure Members that the wilder criticisms we hear are 
very wide of the mark. We have no intention whatsoever of 
reducing our magnificent harbour to a mere trickle, as some of the 
imaginative articles in our newspapers have suggested . . .” (Hong 
Kong Government, 1995,pp. 12-13) 
Mr. Tsang had clearly pointed out that the colonial government had 
tackled the increasing land demand by reclamation. Reclaiming the sea 
to provide more land is, in fact, another preliminary demonstration of 
active land sale manipulation of the policy actors. 
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3.1.2 Temporal Land Sales Patterns 
The higher annual average growth rate of land sale in period of 1973/74-
1981/82 (31.4%) than the period of 1982/3-1994/95 (11.5%) preliminarily 
shows that the policy actors had increased the land sale during the period of 
general non-stringency and reduced the land sale amount in the period of 
general stringency. (Table 3.1.2) 
TABLE 3.1.2 DISPOSAL OF CROWN LAND* FROM 1973/74 TO 1994/95 
Financial Square Annual Financial Square Annual 
Year Metre Land Sale Year Metre Land Sale 
Growth Rate (%) Growth Rate (%) 
1973/1974 166661 1982/1983 539116 -5.9 
1974/1975 279874 +67.9 1983/1984 114560 -78.8 
1975/1976 198264 -29.2 1984/1985 230271 +101.0 
1976/1977 114701 -42.1 1985/1986 191484 -16.8 
1977/1978 215163 +84.6 1986/1987 179050 -6.5 
1978/1979 386210 +79.5 1987/1988 478535 +167.3 
1979/1980 738772 +91.3 1988/1989 262763 -45.1 
1980/1981 1402113 +89.8 1989/1990 159189 -39.4 
1981/1982 573183 -59.1 1990/1991 271042 +70.7 
1991/1992 229166 -15.5 
1992/1993 207943 -9.4 
1993/1994 168481 -19.0 
1994/1995 247489 +46.9 
AverageAnnual 31.4% AverageAnnual 11.5% 
Land Sale Growth Rate Land Sale Growth Rate 
1970/71 to 1981/82 1982/83 to 1994/95 
Notes: 
* Land Supply here only includes both the urban and the New Territories of Hong Kong (by tender and 
auction) 
Sources: 
1. Data from Financial Year 1972/73 to 1980/81 was complied from 'A High Land Price Policy in Hong 
Kong? A Preliminary Study'Yiong Kong: Department ofEconomics, University ofHong Kong. 
2. Data from Financial Year 1981/82 to 1989/90 was complied from 'The Hong Kong Annual Digest of 
Statistics 1991 ‘ Hong Kong: Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong Government. 
3. Data from Financial Year 1990/91 to 1994/95 was complied from 'The Hong Kong Annual Digest of 
Statistics 7PP6'Hong Kong: Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong Government. 
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Similar patterns can be found in other identified periods of financial 
stringency and non-financial stringency of the colonial government: 
(a) the successive increase in land sale growth rate in 1973/74 (25%) and 
1974/75 (67.9%) preliminary shows that the policy actors had 
increased the land supply in the financially non-stringent period of 
1973/74-1974/75. 
(b) the successive decrease in land sale growth rate in 1975/76 (29.2%) 
and 1976/77 (42.1%) preliminary shows the policy actors had 
decreased the land supply in the financially non-stringent period of 
1975/76-1976/77. 
(c) the successive increase of land sale growth rate in 1977/78 (84.6%), 
1978/79 (79.5%), 1979/80 (91.3%) and 1980/81 (89.8%) preliminary 
shows the policy actors had increased the land supply in the 
financially non-stringent period of 1977/78-1980/81. 
(d) the successive decrease of land sale growth rate in 1981/82 (59.1%), 
1982/83 (5.9%) and 1983/84 (78.8%) preliminary shows the policy 
actors reduced the land supply in the financially non-stringent period 
ofl981/82-1983/84. 
Although the pattem of land sales in the financially non-stringent 
period of 1984/85-1988/89 did not successively grow positively, the 
pattem of land supply is still supportive of Hypothesis 1. This is 
because the postponement in land disposal examination by the Land 
Commission.6i in 1985 made the policy actors hold up most land sale 
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schedule. It led to the negative growth of land sale in 1985/86 and 
1986/87 and the substantial increase ofland disposal in 1988/89 (167.3%). 
(Hong Kong Government, Various Years(b), - 1987) 
As to the financially stringent period of 1989/90-1993/94, there is 
negative growth of land supply in the annual average growth rate. For 
the financially stringent period of 1994/95, there was a lower rate of land 
leasing in general than all identified periods of financial stringency 
although the overall land supply of this sub-segment had grown by 46%. 
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3.2 MANIPULATION ON THE OPERATION OF COLONIAL TAXATION SYSTEM 
In general the validity of Hypothesis 2 is manifested in the preservation 
efforts of the low tax regime even when tax burden inequity were perceived 
by the policy actors. Operationally, these efforts refer to: 
(i) the adherence to the low tax regime and the unjustified reasoning of 
upholding it; (Section 3.2.1) 
(ii) the manipulation of the content of tax reform by the policy actors; 
(Section 3.2.2) 
(iii) the increasing in government revenue extraction through indirect tax, 
fees & charges and funds recovery in themes of financial stringency. 
(Section 3.2.3) 
I shall explain these three operational preservation efforts. 
3.2.1 Adherence of Low Tax Regime 
The consistent application of the partially progressive taxation system in 
the past few decades had institutionally made tax-rate for income from capital 
investment was lower than those from salary, bonus, subsidies and pension, 
hence imposing a heavier tax burden unto the middle income group. The 
upholding of the low tax regime undermined the interest of the middle 
income group. (Tang, 1988b; Tang, 1992; Wu, 1977) 
The policy actors had argued that keeping low corporate profit tax would 
encourage investment and hence enhance the long-term progress of the 
manufacturing or even property investment. However, low labour cost and 
the absence of trade unions seemed very likely to be the more important 
considerations for investments in manufacturing industries either in case of 
foreign and local manufacturing industries. (Wong, 1977) The increasing 
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numbers of outward-processing industries in China from the mid-1980s serve 
as a clear indication. (Chen, Nyaw and Wong, 1991, p. 567; Federation of 
Hong Kong Industries, Industries and Research Division, 1990, p. 32) 
Moreover, economic and political stability, expansion of trade and pertaining 
growth of purchasing power seemed to be the more important considerations 
for property investment and servicing industries. 
For foreign corporations especially the British firms, low profit tax rate 
would not serve as a strong incentive for investment. This is because, as 
stated by the Third Inland Revenue Ordinance Review Committee, these 
foreign corporations could enjoy tax credit from their mother countries and 
their profits eamed from Hong Kong were not taxed until remitting back to 
their mother countries. Examples are the UK and the US corporations. 
(Finance Bureau of HKSAR, 1997; Hong Kong Government, Various 
Years(a) — 1978; Tang, 1988a; Tang, 1988c; Wu, 1977) 
One may still argue that the policy actors did push up corporate profit tax 
for a few times in the past few decades. However, they are all short term 
response to the financial stringency and the tax rate would be lowered after 
the financial stringency of the colonial government was eased. 
Consequently, the line of low tax regime of the colonial government was still 
preserved. Evidences for these short-term increases of corporate profit tax 
are as follows: 
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(a) In 1976/77, the Financial Secretary increased the standard rate by 0.5% 
in response to the 1973 oil crisis. However, he lifted it away once the 
crisis was eased in 1981/82. (Hong Kong Government, Various Years(a) 
-1981) 
(b) In, 1983/84, the Financial Secretary increased the standard tax rate by 
+2% and he reduced it back to +15% (excluding the surcharge rate of 
+1.5%) (Hong Kong Government, Various Years(a) - 1988; Hong 
Kong Government, Various Years(a) - 1989; Hong Kong Government, 
Various Years(a) - 1990; Tang, 1990a) 
(c) In 1992/93, the Financial Secretary increased the corporate profit tax by 
+1%. However, he reduced it back to the level of 15% not until 
1994/95. (Hong Kong Government, Various Years(a) - 1992; Hong 
Kong Government, Various Years(a) - 1994; Tang, 1992a) 
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3.2.2 Manipulation of the Content of Tax Reforms by the PoUcy Actors 
The policy actors manipulating the tax reform content by strategically setting 
the core components of low tax regime, such as partial progressive tax system 
and low corporate profit tax, not to be reviewed by the Inland Revenue 
Ordinance Review Committee. As a result, the low tax regime of the 
colonial government was shielded from actual evaluation and was preserved 
successfully. Concrete evidences can be found in every tax reforms in the 
last few decades as they are as follows: 
(a) the review committee was only allowed to evaluate the technical and 
administration aspects of the taxation system, rather than articulating 
the taxation principle and weaknesses of the colonial tax structure in 
the first three reviews after the post-war days. (Tang, 1988c; Tang, 
1992a). These reforms happened in 1952, 1966 and 1986 
respectively. 
(b) Similar incident happened in 1992/93. By the time, the Financial 
Secretary, Hamish Macleod, showed his objection to the LegCo 
councilor, especially the democratic camp, to conduct comprehensive 
tax reform on the grounds that such reform was a time-consuming 
process and would undermine investment incentive. Responding to 
the pressure from the democratic camp, Macleod stated that the 
colony needed to have tax reform, but only to widen the tax base by 
considering the introduction of wholesale sales tax. The issue of 
unequal tax burden was left untouched. (Tang, 1992a) 
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3.2.3 The Importance of Indirect Tax, Fees & Charges and Fund Recovery in 
Government Revenue Extraction 
Elevating the role of indirect tax, fees & charges, as well as fund 
recovery in government revenue extraction were the preservation effort made 
by the policy actors in order to tackle financial stringency without abandoning 
the low tax regime or increasing the corporate profit tax. For instance, 
i. the Financial Secretary, John Bremridge, increased the indirect tax by 25 
millions in 1982/83 and 5 millions in 1983/84 to tackle the financially 
stringency of the colonial government. By the time, as what has been 
depicted in chapter two, the government revenue was seriously 
hampered by the economic downturn in the early 1980s. 
ii. the Financial Secretary, Piers Jacob, substantially increased the indirect 
tax so as to finance 150 millions deficit in 1990/91. The budget deficit 
was caused by the huge expenses of the PADS. (Tang, 1990a; Tang, 
1991) 
There were also measures of institutionalization and the introduction of 
new price strategy on the fees and charges an funds recovery operation during 
the general financial stringency since the 1980s. This is manifested in the 
derivation of more concrete service taxonomy and pricing strategies in the 
Public Sector Reform in 1989 (Tables 3.2.3A) when compared with the 1970s 
(Table 3.2.3B). 
TABLE 3.2 .3A CHOICE OF PUBLIC SECTOR EXECUTWE AGENCY AND PRICE STRATEGY 
Type PolicyRequire Examples Suggested Notes 
of Arm's Pricing of Service Agency Executive 
Services Length? Strategy Agency 
Cofe No Free Law and Order Traditional Appropriate for traditional, often 
Services Department strategic, public services provided at 
not charge to the consumer. 
Partial or Issuing visas Vehicle Trading Fund Major areas within departments 
Full Cost registration where partial or full cost recovery is 
Recovery sought through fees and charges. 
This will normally require a separate 
management / accounting identity 
for which the trading fund approach 
offers many advantages. 
Yes Free or Consumer Protection Non- There are many examples where a 
Partial Cost Departmental greater degree of freedom from 
Recovery Public Body government is required for purposes 
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of independence (e.g. Consumer 
Council) or to change management 
processes, (e.g., Hospital Authority. 
These bodies are all different forms 
ofNDPBs. 
Full Urban Renewal Corporation Where commercial viability is 
Cost sought, a corporation is appropriate. 
Recovery The Land Development corporation 
is an example that allows 
commercial joint ventures with the 
private sector to be set up. 
Support No Full Data Processing Trading fiind Support services should, where 
Services Cost Department practicable are provided on a full 
Recovery cost recovery basis, so those 
managers of core services can be 
fully accountable for the resources 
they consumed. 
Yes Full Property Services Corporation The extent to which support services 
are given a degree of freedom the 
government requires determination 
in each case. 
Commercia No Partial or Publications Tunnel Trading Fund Relatively small pockets of 
/ Services Full operations Department commercial activity that warrant a 
separate management / accounting 
identity but may not justify the cost 
disruption of moving into a fully 
arm's length organization. 
Yes Partial or Public Corporation Trading services will, by their 
Full Transport nature, be revenue eaming, and so 
will normally benefit from a 
separate accounting and 
management structure. Whilst 
overall ownership is retained by the 
government, the corporation 
approach facilitates access to private 
sector resources, e.g. the KCRC and 
MTRC. 
_Somxe^TangXL991) 
TABLE 3 . 2 . 3 B CONSOLmATION OF THE SDC CATEGORIES 
OF FEES & CHARGES BV THE LATE 1 9 7 0 S 
a. Royalty-loaded fees are payments for permission to engage in certain activities and trade, viz.; licenses 
required for various regulated activities and trades (e.g. bank licenses). The level offees imposed is not 
directly related to any costs that may be incurred in their regulation. 
b. Tax-loaded fees and charge are levied for services rendered or permission given. They are not set above 
the level necessary to recover the flill costs specifically for the purpose ofraising revenue. 
c. Cost related charges fall into three groups: 
1. those which do not cover the ftill cost (including the cost of capital) of the services provided, 
because this is a case on being bome by General Revenue; , 
2. those which are designed to cover the fiill cost (including the cost of capital) of the services 
provided. These charges may, from time to time, be set at a level above that necessary to recover 
full cost to deter usage for policy reasons; and 
3. those that are not set for the public utility-type undertakings operated by the Government and 
which are designed to cover the full costs of corporation and to eam a required retum on capital 
employed. 
Sources: (Tang, 1991a,) " " ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ " ^ ^ ^ • ^ ™ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ " " ^ " ^ ™ ^ " ^ " " ^ " ^ ^ ^ " ™ 
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In the 1989 Public Sector Reform programme, the policy actors did not 
stop at spelling out the categorization and pricing of government service. 
The policy actors were able to delineate the main pricing direction and the 
corresponding operation mode of different kinds of government services. 
Such a clear categorization and concrete pricing strategies of government 
services were hardly present in the 1970s. 
Although the colonial government had never publicly spelt out the 
financial contribution of the institutionalization of government services 
categorization and corresponding pricing strategies, they had provided a 
formalized means to extract revenue from fees and charge and fund recovery. 
Also, it helped the policy actors to unload the financial commitment towards 
various kinds of service provision. Concrete examples of increasing revenue 
from fees & charges are increase of school fees of tertiary education^^, 
revision of fees & charges in social welfare provision^^ as well as the 
application ofuser pay principle in medical service provision. Examples on 
domain offond recovery include the privatization ofpublic housing provision 
and urban renewal by restructuring the HA into a self-financed public 
corporation while the role of urban renewal was privatized by establishing the 
Land Development Corporation (LDC). The privatization of public housing 
provision and urban renewal made the colonial government cease its expenses 
on the ‘Development Loan Fund, and the 'Transfer to Fund, respectively. 
(Background information for these two funds are in Section 2.1.2) 
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There were also corresponding adjustments ofbudget guidelines ratios to 
increase the proportion of revenues from the items of fees and charge and 
fund recovery. Both the upper limit of non-recurrent revenue usage and the 
lower limit of recurrent revenue usage were cancelled in financing the 
government expenditure since 1986/87. (Table 3.2.3C) 
TABLE 3.2.3C BUDGETARY GUIDELINE RATIOS OF HONG KONG 
Guideline Ratios Before 1975/76 - 1982/83 -~~1986/87 -
1975/76 1981/82 1985/86 1994/95 
Recurrent Revenues At Least - 88% 77% -
Total Expenditure 
Recurrent Expenditure Not More 70% 80% 85% -
Recurrent Revenue Than 
Surplus in Recurrent A/C At Least 75% 60% 33% -
Non-Recurrent Expenditure 
Recurrent Expenditure Not More - 70% 65% 50% 
Total Expenditure Than 





61 Although the Land Commission had never delimited the land supply in 50 ha each year, 
but exceeding it, it does not means its establishment did not pose financial stringency 
unto the colonial government as its effect should be manifested on the disposable 
government land sale revenue. Thus, it is reasonable to assume the Commission also 
accepts the to generate good land-sale revenue. If not, the PRC need not press the 
British colonial to establish the Land Commission and Land Fund so as to suspense keep 
up halfofthe land sale revenue for the HKSAR. (Wu, 1983, p. 9) 
62 "In the 1985/86 Director if Audit Report emphasized that ‘The Deputy Financial Secretary 
had added his support to the need to develop a rationale for the level of school fees that 
should be charged, based either on a proposition of cost on the ability of the public to 
pay.， In 1991, the Director of Education introduced the policy of increasing the 
tertiary education school fee. Under the policy decision, the school fee was increased 
substantially that the colonial government was able to capture +12.1% and +18% of 
school fees in 1993/94 and 1997/98 respectively". (Tang, 1991, p. 30) 
63 Detail of revision of fees & charges in social welfare provision can be found in the White 
Paper titled ‘Social Welfare into the 1990s and Beyond’. (Hong Kong Government, 1991) 
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
ANALYSIS OF SECOND LEVEL INSTITUTIONS 
This chapter analyzes the budget patterns of various departments of the second 
level institutions. The departments are classified into different agency types 
according to their administration functions using the scheme of classification derived 
by Dunleavy (1991). The different patterns of budgetary changes in the identified 
non-hostile and hostile periods are the result of the public finance tactics ofthe policy 
actors in dealing with economic upturns and downturns, namely through 
manipulating land supply and indirect tax. The hypotheses on the CB patterns of 
the different agency types are summarized in Table 4. 
TABLE 4 PROJECTED C B PATTERNS FOR THE STUDY DEPARTMENTS 
m THE SECOND LEVEL INSTITUTIONS 
Agency Types Hypotheses Projected CB Patterns 
Referred 
• Delivery la • Greater CB growth in the general non-hostile period (1973/74-
• Re^latory 1981/82) than in the general hostile period (1982/83-1994/95) 
• Delivery/Trading, lb • Downward CB development in the identified hostile periods 
(1973/74-1975/76, 1977/78-1980/81 and 1984/85-1987/88) 
relative to the corresponding identified non-hostile periods 
(1975/76-1976/77, 1982/83-1983/84 and 1988/89-1993/94 and 
1994/95) 
• Delivery / Trading 2 • Greater CB downward development than delivery and 
regulatory agencies in the general hostile period 
• Taxing 3 • Lesser CB downward development than the delivery, the 
regulatory and the delivery / trading agencies in the general 
hostile period although it is also subjected the downward CB 
pressure as did by the agency types that related to Hypothesis 
la and lb. 
• Transfer / Regulatoo' 4 • t hePELB&WB,TBandHBwoulda l sohavea re l a t ivemore 
constant CB growth in the general non-hostile period than in 
the general hostile period 
5 • the PELB & WB and TB would subject to lighter CB 
downward pressure in the general hostile period than the HB as 
they were more prominent in the planning of infrastructure 
development of the colony 
• Servicing 6 • Fluctuated CB patterns in the whole study period in responding 
to service demand from its serving departments 
• Trading 7 • Fluctuated CB patterns in the whole period in responding to its 
particular market situation 
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In addition to examining whether the selected departments have the projected 
budget pattem development, there would be two additional verifications so as to 
increase the reliability of the findings. They are: 
(1) to examine whether the CB patterns of the selected departments had 
corresponding budget contention by using their respective annual 
reports and interview data. 
(2) to examine whether the CB patterns of the selected departments 
resemble the departments of the same agency type according to 
Dunleavy's department classification in Chu (1995). 
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section examines hypotheses 
that are related to the delivery agency, the regulatory agency and the delivery / trading 
agency. (Section 4.1) The second one examines hypothesis that is related to the 
taxing agency. (Section 4.2) The third section examines hypotheses that are related 
to the remaining three agency types, namely the transfer / regulatory agency, the 
servicing agency and the trading agency. (Section 4.3) 
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4.1 BUDGET PATTERN(S) FOR THE DELIVERY AGENCY, THE 
REGULATORY AGENCY AND THE DELrVERY/TRADEVG AGENCY 
4.1.1 Budget Patterns of the Delivery Agency - LD 
In the case of LD, hypothesis la is verified in that its annual average CB 
growth rate in the general hostile period (11.0%) is lower than the one in the 
general non-hostile period (20.7%) as shown in Table 4.1.1A. 
TABLE 4.1.1A ANNUAL CB GROWTH RATE OF THE LD 
FROM 1973/74 TO 1994/95 
Financial Years HK$ '000 Annual CB Financial Years HK$ '000 Annual CB 
Growth % Growth % 
1 9 7 3 / 7 4 - - 1 9 8 2 / 8 3 1 3 4 5 8 1 2 5 . 4 
1 9 7 4 / 7 5 2 5 7 1 0 - 1 9 8 3 / 8 4 1 3 2 9 7 5 - 1 . 2 
1 9 7 5 / 7 6 2 7 5 5 7 7 . 2 1 9 8 4 / 8 5 1 6 0 5 7 4 2 0 . 7 
1 9 7 6 / 7 7 3 5 1 8 1 2 7 . 7 1 9 8 5 / 8 6 2 0 4 2 1 1 2 7 . 2 
1 9 7 7 / 7 8 4 1 9 4 4 2 2 . 1 1 9 8 6 / 8 7 2 2 2 3 2 3 8 . 9 
1 9 7 8 / 7 9 4 6 3 4 2 1 0 . 6 1 9 8 7 / 8 8 2 7 5 9 7 1 2 4 1 
1 9 7 9 / 8 0 6 2 8 0 8 3 5 . 5 1 9 8 8 / 8 9 2 4 2 5 4 2 - 1 2 1 
1 9 8 0 / 8 1 8 9 3 2 3 4 2 . 2 1 9 8 9 / 9 0 2 6 6 8 8 6 1 0 0 
1 9 8 1 / 8 2 1 0 7 3 0 2 2 0 . 1 1 9 9 0 / 9 1 2 8 2 7 0 8 5 . 9 
1 9 9 1 / 9 2 3 0 0 4 1 4 6 . 3 
1 9 9 2 / 9 3 3 5 5 8 9 9 1 8 . 5 
1 9 9 3 / 9 4 3 7 2 9 5 2 4 . 8 
1 9 9 4 / 9 5 3 8 9 3 4 3 4 . 4 
Average CB Growth Rate 20.7 Average CB Growth Rate 11.0 
/rt the General Non-Hostile Period in the General Hostile Period 
1973/74 to 1981/82 1982/83 to 1994/95 
Source: 
'^nnual Report ofthe Account General'hy Hong Kong Government, Treasury Branch. (Various Years(c).) 
Notes: 
1. LD was established in 1974/75. Formerly, it was a division of the Public Works Department. In 
1973/74’ LD was known as Crown Lands and Survey Office. From 1982/83, it was renamed as Lands 
Department. In 1986/87, the LD was integrated with the Building Department. However, the LD and 
the Building Department was made to operate independently from 1993/94 onwards, 
2. With understanding the LD itself approximately accounts for 85% of personal emoluments, 95% of 
departmental expanses and 97% capital expenses for the budget of Buildings and Lands Department 
before 1986/87 and after 1992/93, the CB and non-CB of the LD in the two periods were adjusted 
accordingly. 
3. LD are found to have no Non-CB in the study period, except in 1982/83 (HK$225,710) and in 1983/84 
(HK$ 564290). 
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TABLE 4.1.1B AVERAGE ANNUAL CB GROWTH RATE OF THE LD 
I^THE D)ENTIFDED NON-HOSTILE AND HOSTILE PERIODS 
Non-hostile Periods Annual Average CB Hostile Periods Annual Average CB 
Growth Rate (%) Growth Rate (%) 
1 9 7 5 / 7 6 - 1 9 7 6 / 7 7 * 1 7 . 5 
1 9 7 7 / 7 8 - 1 9 8 1 / 8 2 2 7 . 6 1 9 8 2 / 8 3 - 1 9 8 3 / 8 4 1 7 . 1 
1 9 8 4 / 8 5 - 1 9 8 7 / 8 8 3 3 . 2 1 9 8 8 / 8 9 - 1 9 9 3 / 9 4 1 2 . 7 
1 9 9 4 / 9 5 9 ^ 
Source: The above data are adapted from Table 4.1.1A. 
Notes: 
* The first non-hostile period is started from 1975/76 rather than 1973/74. This is because the LD was not 
established till 1974/75. 
The validity ofHypothesis lb is manifested in the higher annual average 
CB growth of the LD in the identified non-hostile periods than its identified 
hostile periods. As shown in Table 4.1.1B, the annual average CB growth 
rate ofLD: 
(a) in 1982/83-1983/84 (17.1%) was smaller than it was in 1977/78-1981/82 
(27.6%); 
(b) in 1988/89-1993/94 (12.7%) was smaller than it was in 1984/85-1987/88 
(33.2%); 
(c) in 1994/95 (9.9%) was smaller than it was in 1988/89-1993/94 (12.7%). 
The validity of Hypotheses la and lb of LD is buttressed by the 
resemblance of CB pattem between the LD and the typical delivery agency, 
for instance, the Department of Health that was identified by Chu (1995) as 
its CB growth in the general hostile period is also lower in the general hostile 
period. The average annual CB growth rate of the Department of Health in 
the general hostile period was lower than it was in the general non-hostile 
period by 7.5%. (Table 4.1.1C) 
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TABLE 4 , l d C ANNUAL CB GROWTH RATE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
� v : : : - � ‘ . FROM 1973/74 TO 1993/94 
Financial Years HK$ '000 Annual C B ~ F i n a n c i a l Years HK$ '000 Annual CB 
Growth % Growth % 
1975/76 323154 - 1982/83 1439900 36.9 
1976/77 392389 21.4 1983/84 1648248 14.5 
1977/78 437888 11.6 1984/85 1887854 14.5 
1978/79 501032 14.4 1985/86 2187500 15.9 
1979/80 604674 20.7 1986/87 2572781 17.6 
1980/81 809852 33.9 1987/88 2894311 12.5 
1981/82 1055730 30.4 1988/89 3395581 17.3 
1989/90 834801 -75.4 
1990/91 1065351 27.6 
1991/92 1236387 16.1 
1992/93 1390387 25.6 
1993/94 1574016 13.2 
Average CB Growth Rate jg^g Average CB Growth Rate //.< 
in the General Non-Hostile Period in the General Hostile Period 
1973/74 to 1981/82 1982/83 to 1993/94 
Sources: 
1. ‘Annual Report of the Account General ‘ by Hong Kong Government, Treasury Branch. (Various 
Years(c).); 
^^^^^^2^^2i^j^2^^^2^^^^j^j2^^^^^^j |^^ 2^^^^^^^2^^2^j^j |^j^^j^^^^^2^^^[jjjii^i22^^^^^^^^^* 
Hypotheses la and lb is also verified by the budget contention ofLD as 
it is shown in the ease of approval of LD's budget proposal before and after 
the introduction of Public Sector Reform in the late 1980s. Prior the 
introduction of the Reform, almost all budget proposals of the LD would be 
approved by the policy actors when the LD emphasized the importance of its 
expenses on land-sale revenue. However, after the introduction of the 
Reform, disapproval ofbudget proposals were found: 
(a) the appropriation proposal of Westem Railway budget proposal had 
been cut down from HK$92 million to HK$29 million; 
(b) the appropriation of additional personal emolument expansion was 
made to operate as a temporary measure as the LD was required to cut 
it back after completing its land resumption projects; 
(c) the LD was reinstitutionalized and privatized during the general 
hostile period by establishing the LDC to take over the land 
resumption and reproduction in the urban. 
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4.1.2 Budget Patterns of the Regulatory Agencies - TDD & PD 
4.1.2.1 TDD 
In the case of TDD, hypothesis la is verified in that its annual average 
CB growth rate in the general hostile period (19.1%) is lower than the one in 
the general non-hostile period (5.4%) as shown in Table 4.1 .lA. 
TABLE 4.1.2.1A ANNUAL CB GROWTH RATE OF THE TDD 
F R O M 1 9 7 3 / 7 4 T O 1 9 9 4 / 9 5 
~ F i n a n c i a l H K $ '000 A n n u a l C B Financia l H K $ ' 0 0 0 ~ ~ A n n u a l C B 
Years G r o w t h % Y e a r s G r o w t h % 
1 9 7 3 / 7 4 3 2 3 7 9 - 1 9 8 2 / 8 3 5 1 8 9 0 - 6 4 . 5 
1 9 7 4 / 7 5 3 9 2 6 2 2 1 . 3 1 9 8 3 / 8 4 5 9 6 5 2 1 5 . 0 
1 9 7 5 / 7 6 3 6 0 8 3 - 8 . 1 1 9 8 4 / 8 5 6 8 6 6 7 1 5 . 1 
1 9 7 6 / 7 7 4 2 4 5 7 1 7 . 7 1 9 8 5 / 8 6 7 7 3 5 8 1 2 . 7 
1 9 7 7 / 7 8 5 3 6 6 3 2 6 . 4 1 9 8 6 / 8 7 1 0 5 1 0 0 3 5 . 6 
1 9 7 8 / 7 9 6 8 1 8 3 2 7 . 1 1 9 8 7 / 8 8 1 1 2 2 1 5 6 . 8 
1 9 7 9 / 8 0 8 3 2 8 5 2 2 . 1 1 9 8 8 / 8 9 1 2 1 0 0 6 7 . 8 
1 9 8 0 / 8 1 1 0 7 2 2 5 2 8 . 7 1 9 8 9 / 9 0 1 3 1 6 1 8 8 . 8 
1 9 8 1 / 8 2 1 4 6 3 3 2 3 6 . 5 1 9 9 0 / 9 1 1 2 4 0 2 3 - 5 . 8 
1 9 9 1 / 9 2 1 3 7 6 6 0 1 1 . 0 
1 9 9 2 / 9 3 1 6 3 0 7 8 1 8 . 5 
1 9 9 3 / 9 4 1 8 1 3 5 6 1 3 . 1 
1 9 9 4 / 9 5 1 7 3 8 8 5 - 4 . 1 
Average CB Growth Rate 19.1 Average CB Growth Rate 5.4 
in the General Non-Hostile Period in the General Hostile Period 
1973/74 to 1981/82 1982/83 to 1994/95 
Source: 
'Annual Report ofthe Account GeneraVhy Hong Kong Government, Treasury Branch. (Various Years(c).) 
Notes 
1. Non-CB for this agency in 1973/74 is HK$ 7.2 million; 1974/75 is 6.9 million; 1975/76 is HK$ 7.5 million; 
1976/77 is HK$ 0.1 million; 1977/78 is HK$ 1.1 million; 1978/79 is HK$ 1.2 million; 1979/80 is HK$ 1.2 
million; 1980/81 us HK$ 1.3 million; 1981/82 is HK$ 1.9 million; 1982/83 is HK$ 0.2 million. 
A _ Z E l g O h e ^ n n i n g role of the TDD was shared by the newly established PD from 1989/90 
...：.t;s^:l-v-''^:^:^.¾';'¾¾¾¾:':';' ¾¾:H^ A^fy-:t'.::.;'•:.;:^^^^^?^!?^l^!|^^ ^^P^!^^^^^^^^^^^!?!|^^ 5??^f5^?^^^^^^^!^ H^^f^|^^ ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^®®®imiP®®BBiBI®HBPBBpmBHBB(iPPBIip 
T A B L E 4.1.2.1B A V E R A G E A N N U A L CB G R O W T H R A T E O F TDD 
EV THE n>ENTIFIED N O N - H O S T B L E A N D H O S T I L E P E R I O D S 
Non-hosti le Periods Average Annual CB Hostile Periods Average Annual CB 
Growth Rate (%) Growth Rate (%) 
1973/74-1974/75 21.3 1975/76-1976/77 4.8 
1977/78-1981/82 28.2 1982/83-1983/84 -24.8 
1984/85-1987/88 21.1 1988/89-1993/94 8.9 
1994/95 ^ 
_^2^^22;J[|^gJ^2XL^gig_g;!g_g^ggjgj_@m Table 4.1.2.1A. 
The validity ofHypothesis lb in TDD is manifested in the higher armual 
average CB growth of the TDD in the identified non-hostile periods than in 
the identified hostile periods. As shown in Table 4.1.2.1B, the annual 
average CB growth rate ofTDD: 
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(a) in 1975/76-1976-77 (4.8%) was smaller than it was in 1973/74-
1974/75 (21.3%); 
(b) in 1982/83-1983/84 (17.1%) was smaller than it was in 1977/78-
1980/81 (-24.8%); 
(c) in 1988/89-1993/94 (8.9%) was smaller than it was in 1984/85-
1987/88 (21.1%) 
(d) in 1994/95 (-4.1%) was smaller than it was in 1988/89-1993/94 
(8.9%). 
By examining the annual reports of the TDD, increasing importance of the 
TDD in the administration of the Territorial Development Strategy, 
Metroplan64 and the PADS since 1986 seemed very likely to provide a 
relatively favourable budget environment, and consequently a less intense 
downward CB pressure in the general hostile period. 
The validity of la and lb in TDD is further buttressed by the similarity 
of budget pattem of the TDD and the typical regulatory agency, Marine 
Department, as they also experienced downward annual CB average growth 
in the general hostile period. (Table 4.1.2.1C) 
TABLE 4 J . 2 , l C ANNUAL CB GROWTH RATE OF THE MAREVE DEPARTMENT 
FROM 1974/75 TO 1993/94 
Financial Years H K $ '000 Annual CB Financial Years H K $ '000 Annual CB 
Growth % Growth % 
1 9 7 4 / 7 5 4 5 7 3 3 - 1 9 8 2 / 8 3 1 5 7 8 4 6 2 0 3 
1 9 7 5 / 7 6 4 5 3 8 8 -0.1 1 9 8 3 / 8 4 1 5 2 9 1 3 - 3 0 
1 9 7 6 / 7 7 4 7 9 4 5 5 . 6 1 9 8 4 / 8 5 1 4 7 3 0 0 - 3 7 
1 9 7 7 / 7 8 5 5 2 4 8 1 5 . 2 1 9 8 5 / 8 6 1 6 4 4 5 2 1 1 6 
1 9 7 8 / 7 9 6 4 3 5 9 1 6 . 5 1 9 8 6 / 8 7 1 9 2 9 5 6 1 8 1 
1 9 7 9 / 8 0 7 3 9 5 8 1 4 . 9 1 9 8 7 / 8 8 2 3 6 4 3 2 2 2 5 
1 9 8 0 / 8 1 9 9 4 3 2 3 4 . 4 1 9 8 8 / 8 9 2 2 0 2 5 1 - 6 8 
1 9 8 1 / 8 2 1 3 1 2 6 3 3 2 . 0 1 9 8 9 / 9 0 2 7 6 7 0 2 2 5 . 6 
1 9 9 0 / 9 1 3 4 9 8 7 3 2 6 . 4 
1 9 9 1 / 9 2 3 6 2 5 3 4 3 . 6 
1 9 9 2 / 9 3 4 0 7 7 9 4 1 2 . 5 
1 9 9 3 / 9 4 4 6 3 6 1 5 12.0 
Average CB Growth Rate in the 14.8 Average CB Growth Rate u.5 
General Non-Hostile Period in the General Hostile Period 
• n 4 to 1981/82 from 1982/83 to 1993/94 




Hypothesis lb is not applicable to the PD for it was a newly established 
department during the general hostile period. The validity ofhypothesis la 
is indicated by the continuous downward CB growth from 1991/92-1994/95. 
(Table4.1.2.2) 
TABLE 4 .1 .2 .2 ANNUAL C B GROWTH RATE OF THE P D 
FROM 1 9 8 9 / 9 0 TO 1 9 9 4 / 9 5 
Financial HK$ '000 Annual CB Financial Years HK$ '000 Annual CB 
Years Growth % Growth % 
1 9 8 9 / 9 0 2 4 3 0 3 - 1 9 9 2 / 9 3 1 8 6 7 5 3 1 5 . 5 
1 9 9 0 / 9 1 1 2 1 9 2 3 4 0 1 . 7 1 9 9 3 / 9 4 2 0 9 2 0 9 1 2 . 0 
1 9 9 1 / 9 2 1 6 4 1 4 1 3 4 . 6 1 9 9 4 / 9 5 2 2 7 2 9 8 8 . 6 
Average CB Growth Rate in the General Hostile Period +70.6 




4.1.3 Budget Patterns of the Delivery / Trading Agency - HA & HD 
In the case of HA&HD, hypothesis la is verified in that its annual 
average CB growth rate in the general hostile period (36.7%) is lower than the 
one in the general non-hostile period (9.8%) as shown in Table 4.1.3A. 
TABLE 4 . 1 . 3 A ANNUAL C B GROWTH RATE OF 
THE H A & H D FROM 1 9 7 3 / 7 4 TO 1 9 9 4 / 9 5 
Financial Years HK$ '000 Annual CB Financial Years HK$ '000 Annual CB 
Growth % Growth % 
1973/74 244.6 - 1982/83 4090.6 28.3 
1974/75 370.0 51.3 1983/84 4461.0 9 1 
1975/76 426.0 15.1 1984/85 4364.0 -2.2 
1976/77 508.6 19.4 1985/86 4613.7 5 7 
1977/78 794.7 56.3 1986/87 5411.3 173 
�1978/79 1554.7 95.3 1987/88 6715.7 24 1 
1979/80 2313.1 48.8 1988/89 8369.8 24.6 
1980/81 3617.1 56.4 1989/90 10396.2 24 2 
1 9 8 1 / 8 2 3 1 8 7 . 2 - 1 1 . 9 1990/91 14867.3 4 3 . 0 
1991/92 9578.5 -35.6 
1992/93 6662.1 -30.4 
1993/94 9183.9 37.8 
1994/95 7444.9 -18.9 
Average CB Growth Rate 36.7 Average CB Growth Rate 9.8 
/«the General Non-Hostile Period in the General Hostile Period 
from 1973/74 to 1981/82 from 1983/84 to 1994/95 
Source: Hong Kong Housing Authority (Various Years.) 
Notes: 
1. The above data was compiled from the general administration expenses of the HA & HD, HOS, PRH 
and squatter provisions. 
^^2i^SI1^2^^S^^2i l l2^^2i iUi^iSl l2i2J^^SSi^^2S^i l2^^^^iUS^SSi^^^_ 
TABLE 4 . 1 . 3 B AVERAGE ANNUAL C B GROWTH RATE OF THE H A & H D 
IN THE P)ENTIFIED NON-HOSTILE AND HOSTILE PERIODS 
Non-hostile Periods Average Annual CB Hostile Periods Average AnnuarCB 
Growth Rate (%) Growth Rate (%) 
1973/74-1974/75 51.3 1975/76-1976/77 17.3 
1977/78-1981/82 49.0 1982/83-1983/84 18.7 
1984/85-1987/88 11.2 1988/89-1993/94 10.6 
- 1994/95 ^2 i2 
^21^i;^£iJi!l£^^£H^^l£«£m^gEigj^!ggLXable 4.1.3A. 
The validity ofHypothesis lb in HA&HD is manifested in the higher annual 
average CB growth of the HA&HD in the identified non-hostile periods than 
in the identified hostile periods. As shown in Table 4.1.3B, the annual 
average CB growth rate ofHA & HD: 
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(a) in 1975/76-1976-77 (17.3%) is smaller than it is in 1973/74-1974/75 
(51.3%); 
(b) in 1982/83-1983/84 (18.7%) is smaller than it is in 1977/78-1980/81 
(49.0%); 
(c) in 1988/89-1993/94 (10.6%) is smaller than it is in 1984/85-1987/88 
(11.2%) 
(d) in 1994/95 (-18.9%) is smaller than it is in 1988/89-1993/94 (10.6%). 
Similar to case of LD and TDD, Hypotheses la and lb are not only to 
be statistically valid, but also are contextually valid in the case of HA & 
HD. According to Interviewee D, the general CB downturn ofthe HA & 
HD in the general hostile period seemed highly likely to be the result of 
manipulation by the policy actors in times of financial stringency. The 
policy actors had tightened the funding appropriation and the amount of land 
supply to HA & HD in the general financially stringent period. As a result, 
the colonial government could lessen its financial commitment on public 
housing provision and hence help ease the financial burden of the colonial 
government while the HA & HD was dumped into a general hostile period of 
budgeting. 
By examining the annual reports of the HA & HD, the downward CB 
growth of the HA & HD in 1975/76-1976/77 seemed to be caused by the 
aftermath of 1973 oil crisis. The 1973 oil crisis induced the policy actors to 
postpone the implementation of the public works projects and hence the 
deferral ofbudget appropriation of public housing projects to the HA & HD. 
As a result, the CB ofHA & HD was lowered during 1975/76-1976/77. 
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The CB downward growth in 1981/82-1983/84 seemed to be the 
outcome of local property market downturn and political uncertainty 
generated by sovereignty transfer. The downturn of the local property 
market and the issue of sovereignty transfer had made the HA slow down the 
construction schedule of its House Ownership Scheme (hereafter called HOS). 
It consequently led to the dropping of the Development Loan Fund from the 
Transfer to Fund of the colonial government and hence a downward CB 
growth in the concerned period. 
For the downward CB growth in 1988/89-1993/94 and 1994/95, it 
seemed to be caused by the privatization of the HA & HD since the late 1980s. 
The privatization operationally refers to the double rent policy, enlarging the 
weighting of HOS among the total number of public housing and initiating 
the Private Sector Participation Scheme. These privatization efforts made 
the HA & HD lower its actual expenses on the public housing construction 
projects as part of the costing was compensated by the sales of public housing. 
As shown in the 1990/91 and the 1992/93 annual reports ofHA, the HA was 
able to eam net income ofHK$0.1 billion and HK$10 billion in 1989/90 and 
1991/92 respectively. In short, the lower cost of operation of the public 
housing projects seemed to have lowered the CB growth ofthe HA & HD. 
The validity of Hypotheses la and lb in HA & HD is buttressed by the 
similarity of the budget pattem of the HA & HD and the Hospital Service 
Department and the Hospital Authority. 
95 
As shown in Table 4.1.3C, the Hospital Service Department and the 
Hospital Authority had experienced successive downward negative CB 
growth and continuous CB decrease in the 1990s respectively. 
Table 4.1.3C Annual CB Growth Rate of 
the Hospital Service Department flNTewly-Established Department) & 
the Hospital Authority ^DeliveryyTrading Agency) 
Financial Years HK$ '000 Annual CB HK$ '000 Annual C B “ 
Growth % Growth % 
Hospital Services Department Hospital A uthority 
1989/90 3344590 - N/A N/A 
1990/91 4315166 29.0 25040 -
1991/92 3308950 -23.2 3597796 14268.7 
1992/93 126624 -96.2 11742662 226.4 
1993/94 88835 ^29^ 13817935 17.7 
Sources: 
1. ‘Annual Report of the Account General ‘ by Hong Kong Government, Treasury Branch. (Various 
Years(c).); 
2. Hospital Authority (Various Years) 
^ j 2 i i 2 £ ^ i i ^ ^ i ^ ^ l i i ^ l 2 2 ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ H ^ _ ^ ^ _ M M _ 
Both the HA and the Hospital Authority also shared the experience in 
being made to operate with market principles. The HA was changed to self-
financed operation mode while the Hospital Authority introduced the user-pay 
policy in the provision of medical services. 
Based on the validity of Hypotheses la and lb in the delivery, regulatory 
and the delivery & trading agencies, examination ofHypothesis 2 can be done 
by comparing their annual average CB growth difference in the general non-
hostile period and the general hostile period. As the annual average CB 
growth difference in the general non-hostile period and the general hostile 
period of the HA & HD (13.7%) is larger than those ofthe LD (1.3%) and the 
TDD (10.8%) are, Hypothesis 2 is verified preliminarily. 
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4.2 BUDGET PATTERNS OF THE TAXEVG AGENCIES 
FB，IRD, R&V，TR AND A D 
For Hypothesis 3, the five taxing agencies had also been subjected to a 
CB downward pressure in the general period, as they had lower average CB 
growth rate in general hostile period than they were in the general hostile 
period. Referring to Tables 4.2A-E: 
(a) the annual average CB growth rate of the FB in the general hostile period 
(16.1%) was lower than it was in the general non-hostile period (11.5%) 
by4.6%. 
(b) the annual average CB growth rate of the IRD in the general hostile 
period (18.4%) was lower than it was in the general non-hostile period 
(14.6%) by 4.6%. 
(c) the annual average CB growth rate of the R&V in the general hostile 
period (20.1%) was lower than it was in the general non-hostile period 
(7.1%) by3.8%. 
(d) the annual average CB growth rate of the TR in the general hostile 
period (22.1%) was lower than it was in the general non-hostile period 
(13.5%) by 8.6%. 
(e) the annual average CB growth rate of the AD in the general hostile 
period (22.0%) was lower than it was in the general non-hostile period 
(13.4%) by 8.6%. 
TABLE 4.2A ANNUAL GB GROWTH RATE OF THE FB 
F R O M 1 9 7 3 / 7 4 T O 1 9 9 4 / 9 5 
Financial Years HK$ '000 Annual C B Financial Years HK$ '000 Annual CB 
Growth % Growth % 
1973/74 570 - 1982/83 1850 -10.2 
1974/75 660 13.6 1983/84 2510 35.7 
1975/76 750 12.0 1984/85 3340 33.1 
1976/77 730 -2.7 1985/86 4110 23.1 
1977/78 850 16.4 1986/87 4030 -1.9 
1978/79 1030 21.2 1987/88 4900 21.6 
1979/80 1140 10.7 1988/89 6120 24.9 
1980/81 1840 61.4 1989/90 6680 9 2 
1981/82 2060 12.0 1990/91 7290 9.1 
1991/92 8080 10.8 
1992/93 9180 13.6 
1993/94 9300 1.3 
1994/95 7390 -20.5 
Average CB Growth Rate 16.1 Average CB Growth Rate 11.5 
in the General Non-Hostile Period in the General Hostile Period 
1973/74tol981/82 1982/83 to 1994/95 
Source: 'Estimates. ’ by Hong Kong Government. (Various Years(d)) 
Note: With the partial release of budget items of the FB from 1973/74 to 1979/80，adjusting ratio (13.6% of the total 
expenses of Government Secretariat) has been used after cross-checking the weighting of the FB among the expenses 
among the Government Secretariat. 
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TABLE 4.2B ANNUAL CB GROWTH RATE OF THE ERD 
FROM 1 9 7 3 / 7 4 TO 1 9 9 4 / 9 5 
Financial Years HK$ '000 Annual C B ~ F i n a n c i a l Years HK$ '000 Annual CB 
Growth % Growth % 
1973/74 27652 - 1982/83 178998 24.8 
1974/75 30155 9.1 1983/84 187523 4.8 
1975/76 33513 9.9 1984/85 215527 14.9 
1976/77 43185 28.9 1985/86 254992 18.3 
1977/78 50908 17.9 1986/87 296528 16.3 
1978/79 60828 19.5 1987/88 318757 7.5 
1979/80 76646 26.0 1988/89 355378 11.5 
1980/81 103217 34.7 1989/90 428194 20.5 
1981/82 143441 39.0 1990/91 553469 29.3 
1991/92 609895 10.2 
1992/93 689447 13.0 
1993/94 748638 9.1 
1994/95 244832 6.1 
Average CB Growth Rate 18.4 Average CB Growth Rate 14.6 
in the General Non-Hostile Period in the General Hostile Period 
1973/74 to 1981/82 1983/84 to 1994/95 
Source: 
‘Annual Report ofthe Account General'hy Hong Kong Government, Treasury Branch. (Various Years(c)) 
Notes 
Not eveo^ financial year the IRD acquired the Non-CB Budget, except the following years: 1977/78 for HK$ 
169.9; 1979/80 for HK$ 2266.4; 1980/81 for HK$ 4551.7 & 1982/83 for HK$ 8000 for which are also 
referred to entertainment expenses. 
TABLE 4,2C ANNUAL CB GROWTH RATE OF THE R & V 
FROM 1 9 7 3 / 7 4 TO 1 9 9 4 / 9 5 
Financial Years HK$ '000 Annual CB Financial Years HK$ '000 Annual CB 
Growth % Growth % 
1973/74 7374 - 1982/83 48346 22.1 
1974/75 10377 40.7 1983/84 54091 11 9 
1975/76 11214 8.1 1984/85 59835 10 7 
1976/77 14400 28.5 1985/86 66663 11 4 
1977/78 15895 10.4 1986/87 78300 17 5 
1978/79 19033 19.7 1987/88 85529 9 2 
1978/80 22693 19.2 1988/89 91077 6 5 
1980/81 30385 33.9 1989/90 104680 14 9 
1981/82 39596 30.3 1990/91 121882 16.4 
1991/92 136928 12.3 
1992/93 151051 10.3 
1993/94 169763 12.4 
1994/95 191980 13.1 
Average CB Growth Rate 20.1 Average CB Growth Rate 13.0 
m the General Non-Hostile Period in the General Hostile Period 
from 1973/74 to 1981/82 1982/83 to 1994/95 
Source: ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ " ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ " ~ ~ ^ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ " 
‘—Report ofthe Account General'hy Hong Kong Government, Treasury Branch. (Various Years(c)) 
Note: 
Non-CB come from entertainment expenses: 1977/78 for HK$ 2000 (Rent); 1978/79 for HK$ 2894 29. 
1979/80 for HK$1900.6; 1980/81 for HK$ 2897.58; 1981/82 for HK$ 5000; 1982/83 for HK$ 5000 
(Entertainment). 
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TABLE 4 . 2 D ANNUAL C B GROWTH RATE OF THE T R 
FROM 1973/74 TO 1994/95 
Financial Years HK$ '000 Annual CB"~Financial Years HK$ '000 Annual CB 
Growth % Growth % 
1 9 7 3 / 7 4 9 8 0 8 - 1 9 8 2 / 8 3 5 9 4 8 3 2 1 . 9 
1 9 7 4 / 7 5 1 1 3 1 0 1 4 . 2 1 9 8 3 / 8 4 6 3 5 4 8 6 . 8 
1 9 7 5 / 7 6 1 1 1 8 4 - 1 . 1 1 9 8 4 / 8 5 6 7 0 1 0 5 . 4 
1 9 7 6 / 7 7 1 3 6 8 1 2 2 . 3 1 9 8 5 / 8 6 7 3 0 8 7 9 . 1 
1 9 7 7 / 7 8 1 8 4 1 4 3 2 . 8 1 9 8 6 / 8 7 8 4 3 8 7 1 5 . 5 
1 9 7 8 / 7 9 1 9 9 5 5 8 . 4 1 9 8 7 / 8 8 9 3 2 8 6 1 0 . 5 
1 9 7 9 / 8 0 2 3 0 2 4 1 5 . 4 1 9 8 8 / 8 9 1 0 7 8 4 9 1 5 . 6 
1 9 8 0 / 8 1 3 0 5 6 2 3 2 . 7 1 9 8 9 / 9 0 1 3 5 8 0 4 2 5 . 9 
1 9 8 1 / 8 2 4 8 7 8 6 5 2 . 0 1 9 9 0 / 9 1 1 8 1 1 3 6 3 3 . 4 
1 9 9 1 / 9 2 1 8 5 0 3 0 2 . 1 
1 9 9 2 / 9 3 2 0 6 5 2 0 1 1 . 5 
1 9 9 3 / 9 4 2 3 0 6 8 6 1 1 . 7 
1 9 9 4 / 9 5 2 4 4 8 3 2 6 . 1 
Average CB Growth Rate 22.1 Average CB Growth Rate 13.5 
in the General Non-Hostile Period in the General Hostile Period 
from 1973/74 to 1981/82 from 1982/83 to 1994/95 
Source: 'Annual Report of the Account General' by Hong Kong Government, Treasury Branch. (Various 
Years(c)) 
TABLE 4 . 2 E ANNUAL C B GROWTH RATE OF THE A D 
FROM 1973/74 TO 1994/95 
iii"iitiiitiini"iMiiiiSii^ iiiii^ iiBiMi^^^ i^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^alK^-<;^ i;-;i-ii,i-__;<i-;i<j-i___i-i;:i_;^__^ _^__-__:__:_i_L:i2i__::__i_i_:_i___l_i:ZiLi:i:ij.ij！’ .::.•.: .>-；' ' 'H：.:.:. ‘'-¾. •‘•'. .•:.:••. ‘ '• ,:.:.¾¾.¾];^.¾: 
Financial Years HK$ '000 Annual CB Financial Years HK$ '000 Annual CB 
Growth % Growth % 
1 9 7 3 / 7 4 3 4 7 4 - 1 9 8 2 / 8 3 2 0 3 8 7 2 2 . 6 
1 9 7 4 / 7 5 4 0 9 1 1 7 . 8 1 9 8 3 / 8 4 2 3 3 4 1 1 4 . 5 
1 9 7 5 / 7 6 4 3 5 6 6 . 5 1 9 8 4 / 8 5 2 6 8 9 7 1 5 . 2 
1 9 7 6 / 7 7 5 2 9 6 2 1 . 6 1 9 8 5 / 8 6 3 0 1 4 1 1 2 . 1 
1 9 7 7 / 7 8 6 3 4 4 1 9 . 8 1 9 8 6 / 8 7 3 3 7 8 1 1 2 . 1 
1 9 7 8 / 7 9 7 5 6 7 1 9 . 3 1 9 8 7 / 8 8 3 6 3 8 7 7 . 7 
1 9 7 9 / 8 0 8 8 9 6 1 7 . 6 1 9 8 8 / 8 9 4 0 6 2 8 1 1 . 7 
1 9 8 0 / 8 1 1 2 4 9 9 4 0 . 5 1 9 8 9 / 9 0 4 7 0 1 4 1 5 7 
1 9 8 1 / 8 2 1 6 6 2 7 3 3 . 0 1 9 9 0 / 9 1 5 0 6 2 3 7 . 7 
1 9 9 1 / 9 2 6 3 6 0 2 1 9 . 6 
1 9 9 2 / 9 3 7 3 7 4 1 1 5 . 9 
1 9 9 3 / 9 4 8 0 1 7 8 8 . 7 
1 9 9 4 / 9 5 8 8 6 4 8 1 0 . 6 
Average CB Growth Rate 22.0 Average CB Growth Rate 13.4 
/« the General Non-Hostile Period in the General Hostile Period 




For Hypothesis 3，the five taxing agencies underwent lesser downward 
CB growth in the general hostile period, as indicated by their lower CB 
decrease in the general hostile period as compared with the LD, the TDD and 
HA & HD. Recalling the sections on the LD, the TDD and the HA & HD, 
their average annual CB growth rate in the general hostile period had decreased 
by 11.0%, 13.7% and 26.9% respectively. However, those of the five taxing 
agencies had never decreased by more than 9%. The annual average CB 
growth rate for the FB, the IRD, the R&V, the TR and the AD had decreased 
by 4.6%, 3.6%, 7.1%, 8.6% and 8.6% respectively. 
The lesser downward CB growth of the taxing agencies is caused by CB 
increase in the identified hostile periods. As shown in Table 4.2F, 
T A B L E 4 . 2 F AVERAGE ANNUAL C B GROWTH R A T E OF THE ¥ W E TAXEVG 
AGENCIES m THE IDENTIFIED NON-HOSTILE PERIODS AND HOSTILE PERIODS 
Average Annual CB Growth Rate 
F^^ mD^ R&V^  TR^  AD^  
^ 
1 ^ 1973/74-1974/75 13.6 9.1 40.7 14.2 17.8 
^ I 1977/78-1981/82 24.3 27.4 22.7 28.3 26.0 
I ®-
^ 1984/85-1987/88 19.0. 14.3 12.2 10.1 11.8 
^ 1975/76-1976/77 4.7 19.4 18.3 10.6 14.0 
I 1982/83-1983/84 12.8 14.8 17.0 14.4 18 6 ft, 
^ 1988/89-1993/94 20.5 15.6 12.1 16.7 13 2 
S 
=^  1994/95 -20.5 6.1 13.1 6.1 10.6 
Notes 
1. Data o fFB is adapted from Table 4.3A. 4. Data ofTR is adapted from Table 4.3D. 
2. Data ofIRD is adapted from Table 4.3B. 5. Data ofAD is adapted from Table 4 3E 
2 ^ _ D a t a _ o f R & V j s ^ a p t e d from Table 4.3C. 
the annual average CB growth rate of the five taxing agencies did not fall in 
the hostile period of 1988/89 to 1993/94 when compared with the non-
hostile period ofl984/85-1987/88. 
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Examining the CB contents of these taxing agencies, the lower 
downward CB growth of the taxing agencies were inherently caused by the 
efforts of the policy actors to enhance the revenue extraction capacity of the 
five taxing agencies in the general hostile period. These efforts included 
computerization and automation of their offices in general for advancing the 
government revenue collection capacity. The concrete computerization 
and automation measures in the FB in the general hostile period included: 
(a) Initiating an ‘value for money' study in 1985 (Hong Kong 
Government, Various Years - 1986); 
(b) Introducing a data sharing system in 1987/88 to 1988/89 so as to 
lower the financial administration and potential wastage of resources 
for the colonial government 
(c) Employing an Overall Financial Adviser in the 1991/92 (Hong Kong 
Government, Various Years - 1992); 
(d) Introducing a new cost saving system in 1991/92 and 1992/93 (Hong 
Kong Government, Audit Department, Various Years - 1993; Hong 
Kong Government, Public Accounts Committee, Various years -
1993 & 1996); 
(e) Advancing its data sharing system and general computer system in 
1995. (Hong Kong Government, Finance Branch, Various Years(d)-
1996) 
The computerization and automation ofthe IRD were: 
(a) Advancing the Integrated Date Base System; 
(b) Upgrading the accounting software and hardware; 
(c) Initiating long term computerization of tax collection system by 
purchasing the ‘Image / Microfilming Processing System，and the 
microcomputer based system with bar-code technology. 
As for the TR, its office automation measures refer to the introduction of 
a computer based information system, LAFIS, for which had been described as 
capable of increasing the resources utilization efficiency of the CWRF of 
various government departments^^ and the colonial government as a whole. 
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(Hong Kong Government, Treasury, Various Years - 1985) Also, this 
favourable budgeting impact spilled over to the AD and consequently 
facilitated the AD (as well as the other four taxing agencies) to acquire a 
relatively prosperous CB growth in the general hostile period. (Hong Kong 
Government, Treasury, Various Years - 1993) 
The lower CB downward growth in the general hostile period of the 
R&V was not just predominantly contributed by its automation and 
computerization^^. Referring to the internal circulated newsletter of R&V 
titled 'R&V News '^^, its lower CB downward growth was also contributed by 
the expansion of personal emoluments in 1984/85 -1986/87^^ and in the 1990s. 
The expansion of personal emoluments in 1984/85 -1986/87 seemed very like 
to be a result of new responsibilities of the R&V, namely the collection of 
estate duty and stamp duty as they were originally responsible by the IRD. 
The expansion in the 1990s seemed to be a result of the establishment of a 
special division to handle the collection of rates, estate duty, stamp duty, as 
well as land rent that caused by the PADS. 
The above demonstration of the validity of Hypothesis 3 is buttressed by 
the similarity of the CB patterns between the five taxing agencies as the 
correlation coefficient value^^ of each study taxing agency with the typical 
taxing agency, the IRD are also higher than 0.5. The correlation coefficient 
of the IRD and FB is +0.6; the IRD and the R&V is +0.6; the IRD and the TR 
is +0.8 while the IRD and the AD is +0.7. 
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4.3 BUDGET PATTERNS OF THE TRANSFER & REGULATORY AGENCIES, 
THE SERVXCEVG AGENCY AND THE TRADEVG AGENCY 
4.3.1 Budget Patterns for the Regulatory / Transfer Agencies -
PELB & WB, TB and HB 
Hypothesis 4 is not applicable to the PELB & WB as it was not established till 
1982/83. The validity of Hypothesis 4 in TR is indicated by the zero CB 
growth in 1981/82. (Table 4.3.1B) The validity of Hypothesis 4 of HB is 
indicated by the zero CB growth in almost the whole general non-hostile 
period, except for years of 1978/79 and 1980/81. (Table 4.3.1C) 
The lesser downward CB development of the PELD&\VB and the TB than the 
HB (Hypothesis 5) is shown in the continuation ofthe PELB&WB and the TB 
through the whole general hostile period and the suspension of the HB in more 
than half of the general hostile period. (Table 4.3.1A-C) 
TABLE 4.3.1C ANNUAL CB GROWTH RATE OF THE PELB & W B 
FTROM 1973/74 TO 1994/95 
Financial Years HK$ '000 Annual CB Financial Years HK$ '000 Annual CB 
Growth % Growth % 
1 9 7 3 / 7 4 - - 1 9 8 2 / 8 3 3 3 3 0 2 -
1 9 7 4 / 7 5 - - 1 9 8 3 / 8 4 3 4 9 2 3 4 . 9 
1 9 7 5 / 7 6 - - 1 9 8 4 / 8 5 3 7 2 7 4 6 . 7 
1 9 7 6 / 7 7 - - 1 9 8 5 / 8 6 4 0 4 0 5 8 . 4 
1 9 7 7 / 7 8 - - 1 9 8 6 / 8 7 3 4 1 9 6 - 1 5 . 4 
1 9 7 8 / 7 9 - - 1 9 8 7 / 8 8 3 7 7 0 1 1 0 . 2 
1 9 7 9 / 8 0 - - 1 9 8 8 / 8 9 4 5 5 4 3 2 0 . 8 
1 9 8 0 / 8 1 - - 1 9 8 9 / 9 0 5 9 8 0 5 3 1 . 3 
1 9 8 1 / 8 2 - - 1 9 9 0 / 9 1 7 8 4 8 0 3 1 . 2 
1 9 9 1 / 9 2 1 0 2 9 8 9 3 1 . 2 
1 9 9 2 / 9 3 1 0 6 5 4 6 3 . 5 
1 9 9 3 / 9 4 2 3 9 0 0 6 1 2 4 . 3 
1 9 9 4 / 9 5 2 5 2 8 0 1 5 ^ 
Source: 'Estimates. ‘ by Hong Kong Government. (Various Years(d)) 
Notes: 
The Non-CB in 1982/83 was HK$ 1910718.05 while the Non-CB in 1983/84 was HK$ 7748153.67. 
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Table 4.3.1B Annual CB Growth Rate of the TB 
from the 1973/74 to 1994/95 
Financial Years H K $ million Annual C B Financial Years H K $ million Annual C B 
Growth % Growth % 
1 9 7 3 / 7 4 - - 1 9 8 2 / 8 3 4 7 0 0 0 . 0 
1 9 7 4 / 7 5 - - 1 9 8 3 / 8 4 7 9 0 0 6 8 . 0 
1 9 7 5 / 7 6 - - 1 9 8 4 / 8 5 7 5 0 0 - 5 . 0 
1 9 7 6 / 7 7 - - 1 9 8 5 / 8 6 8 8 0 0 1 7 . 3 
1 9 7 7 / 7 8 - - 1 9 8 6 / 8 7 1 0 3 0 0 1 7 . 0 
1 9 7 8 / 7 9 - - 1 9 8 7 / 8 8 1 1 3 0 0 9 . 7 
1 9 7 9 / 8 0 - - 1 9 8 8 / 8 9 1 5 1 0 0 3 3 . 6 
1 9 8 0 / 8 1 4 7 0 0 - 1 9 8 9 / 9 0 1 5 4 0 0 2 . 0 
1 9 8 1 / 8 2 4 7 0 0 0 . 0 1 9 9 0 / 9 1 2 2 0 0 0 4 2 . 9 
1 9 9 1 / 9 2 2 8 4 0 0 2 9 . 1 
1 9 9 2 / 9 3 3 3 9 0 0 1 9 . 4 
1 9 9 3 / 9 4 2 9 7 0 0 - 1 2 . 4 
1 9 9 4 / 9 5 2 7 6 0 0 - 7 . 0 
Source: 'Estimates. ‘ by Hong Kong Government, (Various Years(d)). 
Note: 
Regarding individual budget account of the FB which had not been released from 1973/74 to 1979/80, adjusting ratio 
(3.5% of the total expenses of Government Secretariat) has been used after cross-checking the weighting of the FB 
among the Government Secretariat of the whole study period. 
TABLE 4.3.1C ANNUAL CB GROWTH RATE OF THE H B 
FROM 1973/74 TO 1994/95 
Financial Years H K $ '000 Annual C B Financial Years H K $ '000 Annual C B 
Growth % Growth % 
1 9 7 3 / 7 4 2 0 0 0 . 0 1 9 8 2 / 8 3 7 0 0 0 . 0 
1 9 7 4 / 7 5 2 0 0 0 . 0 1 9 8 3 / 8 4 1 5 0 0 1 1 4 . 3 
1 9 7 5 / 7 6 2 0 0 0 . 0 1 9 8 4 / 8 5 1 6 0 0 6 . 7 
1 9 7 6 / 7 7 3 0 0 0 . 5 1 9 8 5 / 8 6 2 2 0 0 3 7 . 5 
1 9 7 7 / 7 8 3 0 0 0 . 5 1 9 8 6 / 8 7 2 8 0 0 2 7 . 3 
1 9 7 8 / 7 9 4 0 0 3 3 . 3 1 9 8 7 / 8 8 • # # 
1 9 7 9 / 8 0 4 0 0 0 . 0 1 9 8 8 / 8 9 # # # # 
1 9 8 0 / 8 1 7 0 0 7 5 . 0 1 9 8 9 / 9 0 # # # # 
1 9 8 1 / 8 2 7 0 0 0 . 0 1 9 9 0 / 9 1 # # # # 
1 9 9 1 / 9 2 # # # # 
1 9 9 2 / 9 3 # # # # 
1 9 9 3 / 9 4 # # # # 
1 9 9 4 / 9 5 5 ^ -
Source: 'Estimates. ’ by Hong Kong Government (Various Years(d).) 
Note: 
1. The HB had been suspended from 1987/88 to 1993/94 and it was represented by the sign ‘## ,. 
2. The HB had been re-established in 1994/95. 
3. Regarding individual budget account of the FB which had not been released from 1973/74 to 1979/80, 
adjusting ratio (0.5% of the total expenses of Government Secretariat) has been used after crosschecking the 
^^^^^j|[jjjjjl^^^jj^^^^jj2Ji^i^2iSiJ2SSlS£2ii2^ii!l^!l2lSi£liii£i2^™™i^^«B^^™i^^^ 
After examining the budget breakdown of the PELB & WB and the TB, their 
lower downward CB growth, on one hand, it seemed to have caused by their 
increasing planning and coordinating role in the infrastructure projects, such as 
the Metroplan, the Territorial Development Plan, the Route 3 and the PADS. 
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On the other hand, referring to the annual reports of the HA, the cause for the 
lower downward CB growth of the PELB & WB and the TB seemed to be 
caused by the reinstitutionalization of the HB. HB's role of housing policy 
co-ordination was exported to the HA from 1987/88 to 1993/94 and hence 
brought about the suspension of the HB and the lower CB growth of the 
PELB&WB and TB. 
Different from the fore-mentioned agency types, the validity of 
Hypotheses 4 and 5 are not buttressed when comparing the three transfer 
/regulatory agencies with the typical transfer/regulatory agency, namely the 
University Grant Committee, (hereafter called UGC) This is because the 
UGC is largely a regulatory agency while the three study transfer/regulatory 
agencies are with stronger role in budget co-ordination. In fact, the UGC did 
not experience a lower downward CB growth in the general hostile period. 
Rather, its CB had dropped by 9.3% in the general hostile period (26.4%) 
compared with its general non-hostile period (17.2%). (Table 4.3.1D) 
Table 4.3.1D Annual CB Growth Rate of 
the University Grant Committee from 1974/75 to 1993/94 
Financial Years HK$ '000 Annual CB Financial Years HK$ '000 Annual CB 
Growth % Growth % 
1 9 8 2 / 8 3 5 3 2 2 8 0 . 5 
1 9 7 4 / 7 5 5 1 1 - 1 9 8 3 / 8 4 5 8 5 6 6 . 3 
1 9 7 5 / 7 6 5 3 2 4 . 1 1 9 8 4 / 8 5 6 0 8 5 3 9 
1 9 7 6 / 7 7 6 2 7 1 7 . 9 1 9 8 5 / 8 6 6 1 9 5 1.8 
1 9 7 7 / 7 8 7 1 7 1 4 . 4 1 9 8 6 / 8 7 7 3 2 4 1 8 . 2 
1 9 7 8 / 7 9 8 3 6 1 6 . 6 1 9 8 7 / 8 8 8 9 3 6 2 2 . 0 
1 9 7 9 / 8 0 1 1 5 3 3 7 . 9 1 9 8 8 / 8 9 6 0 9 4 - 3 1 8 
1 9 8 0 / 8 1 1 9 6 3 7 0 . 3 1 9 8 9 / 9 0 6 3 4 1 4 . 1 
1 9 8 1 / 8 2 2 9 4 9 5 0 . 2 1 9 9 0 / 9 1 7 7 6 3 2 2 . 4 
1 9 9 1 / 9 2 1 0 1 2 2 3 0 . 4 
1 9 9 2 / 9 3 1 1 4 8 6 1 3 . 5 
1 9 9 3 / 9 4 1 5 4 8 1 3 4 . 8 
Average CB Growth Rate 26.4 Average CB Growth Rate 17.2 
in the General Non-Hostile Period in the General Hostile Period 
1974/75tol981/82 1982/83tol993/94 
^2i^2^^5i2J2^^^^^j21i^2i i^2S2i iSJi^i^i2i^S^^2i^^M^^Bi^^^^^^i^^^^^^^^ 
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4.3.2 Budget Patterns of the Servicing Agency - HRD 
The validity of Hypothesis 6 is manifested in the similarity between 
the CB patterns of the HRD and the selected land and housing departments. 
As the functional roles of the HRD were to provide the services of lighting, 
tunnels, traffic controls system, etc, all the selected land and housing 
administrative departments and therefore clients for HRD for land 
resumption, housing projects and infrastructure development would also 
need require its service. As a result, the CB growth of the HRD had also 
experienced similar CB growth pattem as did by the outlined land and 
housing departments. The first correspondence of the CB growth of them is 
made in terms of as the lower annual average CB growth of the HRD in the 
general hostile period (12.9%) than it was the general non-hostile period 
(23.8%) by 10.9%. (Table 4.3.2A) 
TABLE 4 . 3 . 2 A ANNUAL C B GROWTH RATE OF THE H R D 
FROM 1 9 7 3 / 7 4 TO 1 9 9 4 / 9 5 
Financial Years HK$ '000 Annual CB Financial Years HK$ '000 Annual CB 
Growth % Growth % 
1 9 7 3 / 7 4 2 6 9 6 9 - 1 9 8 2 / 8 3 # # # # 
1 9 7 4 / 7 5 4 8 2 3 9 7 8 . 7 1 9 8 3 / 8 4 # # • 
1 9 7 5 / 7 6 5 9 0 9 7 2 2 . . 3 1 9 8 4 / 8 5 # # # # 
1 9 7 6 / 7 7 4 5 5 1 8 - 2 3 . 0 1 9 8 5 / 8 6 # # # # 
1 9 7 7 / 7 8 6 7 4 8 6 4 8 . 3 1 9 8 6 / 8 7 3 8 2 2 9 2 -
1 9 7 8 / 7 9 8 3 3 5 0 2 3 . 6 1 9 8 7 / 8 8 4 6 3 6 0 1 2 1 . 3 
1 9 7 9 / 8 0 1 0 7 5 1 1 2 9 . 0 1 9 8 8 / 8 9 5 6 7 0 1 5 2 2 . 3 
1 9 8 0 / 8 1 1 5 4 1 0 3 4 3 . 3 1 9 8 9 / 9 0 6 4 5 8 9 8 1 3 . 9 
1 9 8 1 / 8 2 2 2 6 4 5 - 8 5 . 3 1 9 9 0 / 9 1 7 8 9 4 5 3 2 2 . 2 
1 9 9 1 / 9 2 8 8 9 4 2 1 1 2 . 7 
1 9 9 2 / 9 3 1 0 0 7 7 9 8 1 3 . 3 
1 9 9 3 / 9 4 1 1 1 8 5 8 5 1 1 . 0 
1 9 9 4 / 9 5 1 1 0 1 0 9 5 - 0 . 2 
Average CB Growth Rate 23.8 Average CB Growth Rate 12.9 
in the General Non-Hostile Period in the General Hostile Period 
1973/74 to 1981/82 1982/83 to 1994/95 
Source: 
'^nnual Report ofthe Account General ‘ b>^  Hong Kong Government. Treasury Branch. (Various Years(c)) 
Notes: ‘ 
1. In 1973/74，the HRD was operated as a division of the Public Works Department. The HRD was not formally 
established until 1986/87. Its role was shared by other departmemal agencies from 1982/83 to 1985/86 and 
which is represented by t h e � # # , . 一 
2. Item ofpersonal emolument do not include in the budget of non-hostile period as it is only a division o f t h e Public 
Works Department. 
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The second correspondence is in annual average CB growth rate of the 
HRD, which was smaller in all the identified hostile periods than all the 
identified non-hostile periods. (Table 4.3.2B) 
TABLE 4.3.2B AVERAGE ANNUAL C B GROWTH RATE OF THE HRD 
IN THE fl)ENTiriED NON>HOSTILE AND HOSTILE PERIODS 
Non-hostile Periods Average Annual CB Hostile Periods Average Annual 
Growth Rate (%) CB Growth Rate 
(%) 
1973/74-1974/75 78.7 1975/76-1976/77 -3 
1977/78-1980/81 11.8 1982/83-1983/84 N/A 
1984/85-1987/88 21.3 1988/89-1993/94 15.9 
1994/95 -0.2 
^2jj^^^^|j^^^2i^^s^^^[j|^^^g^^^^2^^^^j^^^^^^^^^^^^iiiiii^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ 
Similar to the case of the transfer/regulatory agency, the validity of Hypothesis 
6 cannot be strengthened by comparing the CB patterns of the HRD with the 
typical servicing agency, namely the Government Supplies Department. This is 
because the client departments of the Government Supplies Department were 
all the departments of the colonial bureaucracy while those of the HRD were 
only one of the sectors of the colonial bureaucracy. 
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4.3.3 Budget Patterns of the Trading Agency - LDC 
Given the market environment of the LDC, such as the number of 
redevelopment projects, was institutionally constituted by the LDC 
ordinance, the CB patterns should be positively correlated to the approved 
number of redevelopment projects by the policy actors if the Hypothesis 7 
is valid. By examining the annual reports of the LDC, its zigzag CB 
patterns (Table 4.3.3A and Figure C) and implementation of 
redevelopment projects are found to be positively correlated and therefore 
validates Hypothesis 7. 
TABLE 4 . 3 3 A ANNUAL C B GROWTH RATE FOR THE L D C 
FROM 1987/88 TO 1994/95 
S 5 Non-CB 
HK$ '000 Annual C B ~ ~ " H K $ '000 Annual CB 
Growth % Growth % 
1 9 8 7 / 1 9 8 8 6 4 2 3 - 2 0 -
1 9 8 8 / 1 9 8 9 1 0 2 9 9 8 + 1 5 0 3 . 6 2 1 5 + 9 7 5 . 0 
1 9 8 9 / 1 9 9 0 6 0 1 3 9 0 + 4 8 3 . 9 3 4 9 + 6 2 . 3 
1 9 9 0 / 1 9 9 1 2 1 2 6 9 - 9 6 . 5 6 5 - 8 1 . 4 
1 9 9 1 / 1 9 9 2 1 6 2 9 9 0 + 6 6 6 . 3 2 4 0 + 2 6 9 . 2 
1 9 9 2 / 1 9 9 3 4 7 2 7 3 - 7 1 . 0 2 7 5 + 1 4 . 6 
1 9 9 3 / 1 9 9 4 2 4 2 0 3 6 + 4 1 2 . 0 2 9 4 + 6 . 9 
1 9 9 4 / 1 9 9 5 2 2 2 9 3 ^ ^ + 3 4 . 0 
Source: Land Development Corporation. (Various Years) 
NotejJ[he LDC was not established until 10 December 1987. 
Figure C Annual CB Growth Rate ofthe LDC from 1987/88 to 1994/95 
1600r^^^ ‘ “““ ^ Z ^ 
^ r ^ 一 
1400^-^^_ / \ \ "^ “^  一 -
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Referring to the LDC Annual Report 1991, the huge CB growth in 
1988/89 (1503.6%) seemed to be an outcome of eight redevelopment 
sites70. (Land Development Corporation, Various Years - 1989 & 1991) 
The high CB growth ofLDC in 1989/90 might probably be caused by the 
deferral of three out of the eight redevelopment projects. These three 
deferred projects included the projects of ‘Sai Yeung Choi Street', ‘Li Chit 
Street，and the 'Yuanne Lane,. (LDC, Various Years - 1990) 
In regard to the relatively slower CB growth of the LDC in the 
1990/91 (-96.5%), it seemed to be caused by the absence of any new LDC 
redevelopment projects. LDC,s CB increase in 1991/92 (666.3%) 
seemed very likely to be caused by the introduction of new redevelopment 
projects such as the redevelopment projects of ‘Nathan Road and Dundas 
Street', ‘Wing Lok Street', 'Jubliee Street / Queen's Road Central' and 
‘Argyle Streety' Shanghai Street'. 
The CB downturn of LDC in 1992/93 (-71.0%), it seemed to be 
caused by absence of new redevelopment projects. The LDC's CB 
uptum in 1993/94 (412.0%) seemed to be an outcome of the introduction 
of four new development projects, including the projects of 'Thomson 
Road / Henessary Road in Wan Chai', 'Shiu Wo Street in Tsuen Wan', 
‘Boulderly Street and Gillies Street in Hong Kong'. The relatively 
slower CB growth in 1994/95 (-90.8%) was likely to be caused by the 
absence ofnew redevelopment projects again. (LDC, 1995) 
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Although the LDC had been constituted to cater the needs of 
redevelopment projects of the urban area, in which the number and the 
types of redevelopment projects had also been constituted by the policy 
actors through the LDC ordinance, the LDC still acquired relative 
autonomy in handling its CB. The relative autonomy of the LDC is 
manifested in the quality difference of its re-housing sites and sites for 
market sale where the LDC had put more investment on sites for market 
sales. LDC's re-housing sites and sites for market sales are summarized 
in Table 4.3.3B^^ 
Table 4.3.3B Rehousing Sites and Sites for Market Sales by LDC 
Rehousing sites Sites for Market Sales 
~ " • ~ ~ K u i Yan Court (居仁閣), • TaiYuenCourt(^^/：^,^) 
3, Kui Yan Lane, ^ & ^ 
Sai Ying Pun • ^i Chit Garden (李節花園） 
• 864&^10%6犷,（碧發臺） • KoNgaCour t(高雅閣） 
Bedford Road, Tai Kok Tsui 、 ， 、 ， � 
• 丫3卩丫66 0^代（衍怕閣） 
• LaiChuBuilding(麗珠大廈） 
163-165, Lai Chi Kok Road 
Shum Shui Po 
^2j^^^^^j^2^^^j2£2j^2^2£22iSii2£ii^Si21i^^^S^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^™ 
In general the quality of the re-housing sites are poorer than those for 
market sales in terms of ‘location or surrounding environment', 'security 
and management' and as well as ‘finishing,. 
According to confidential appraisal reports of the LDC projects which 
were released by Interviewee F, typical examples of the poorly located re-
housing sites were Bedford Tower, Kui Yan Court and Lai Chu Building. 
Being appraised by the R&V, the Bedford Tower was rounded and was 
bounded by public lavatory and situated in industrial area respectively, 
especially for the first and the second floor. For the Kui Yan Court and 
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the Lai Chu Building, they were in inferior location with poor transport, i.e. 
being far away from MTR station. Examples of typical sites allocated for 
market sale were Li Chit Garden and Ko Nga Court. Both of them were 
also commented as ‘good accessibility', ‘well served of public transport' 
and ‘convenient’ by the R&V. Furthermore, the Ko Nga Court was 
appraised to be located on a sloping site with quiet surrounding as those of 
upper class housing. (Chu, 1997e) 
According to the confidential appraisal reports of the LDC projects, a 
typical example of the poorer security and management of the re-housing 
sites would be Kui Yan Court. This is because its CCTV was 
malfunctioned while it was under site inspection by the R&V whereas 
such incident had not been happened in the sales sites, the CCTV system 
and the intercommunication system were found to be functioning perfectly 
during inspection. 
The finishing of all the re-housing sites were found to be inferior 
when compared with those for market sale. This is because the R&V's 
appraisals reports show us that the internal finishing of all the re-housing 
sites were only decorated with emulsion printing wall while all the market 
sales were decorated with plastered walls. Similar incident could also be 
found in the decoration of entrance hall. All the entrance halls of all 
rehousing sites were not be equipped with air-conditioning and false 
ceiling decoration whereas as for sites for sales, both facilities were 
provided. (Chu, 1997e) 
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The validity of Hypothesis 7 is also proved by the similarity and the 
dissimilarity in CB pattem between the LDC and the typical 
delivery/trading agency, i.e. the Hong Kong Productivity Council. Their 
similarity is manifested on their CB patterns were all dissimilar to other 
land and housing administrative departments that were not operating in 
market principles. The dissimilarity is manifested the Hong Kong 
Productivity Council did not experience so many CB uptums and 
downturns in the whole study period as did by the LDC or a downward CB 
growth in the general non-hostile period. (Table 4.3.3C) Their difference 
CB patterns somehow reflect that they were operating in different market 
environment. 
TABLE 4 . 3 . 3 C ANNUAL C B GROWTH RATE OF 
THE HONG KONG PRODUCTIVITY COUNCIL FROM 1 9 7 3 / 7 4 TG 1 9 9 3 / 9 4 
Financial Years HK$ '000 % Growth Financial Years HK$ '000 % Growth 
1 9 7 3 / 7 4 4 2 5 0 - 1 9 8 2 / 8 3 2 2 2 7 6 2 8 . 9 
1 9 7 4 / 7 5 4 6 4 9 9 . 4 1 9 8 3 / 8 4 3 0 1 1 9 3 5 . 2 
1 9 7 5 / 7 6 5 2 0 7 1 2 . 0 1 9 8 4 / 8 5 3 3 2 6 4 1 0 . 4 
1 9 7 6 / 7 7 5 2 6 8 1.2 1 9 8 5 / 8 6 3 9 0 5 3 1 7 . 4 
1 9 7 7 / 7 8 6 5 5 1 2 4 . 4 1 9 8 6 / 8 7 4 8 4 7 9 2 4 . 1 
1 9 7 8 / 7 9 7 2 7 8 1 1 . 1 1 9 8 7 / 8 8 6 4 3 0 4 3 2 . 6 
1 9 7 9 / 8 0 8 9 6 9 1 9 . 4 1 9 8 8 / 8 9 7 5 2 8 4 1 7 . 1 
1 9 8 0 / 8 1 1 7 8 9 3 1 0 5 . 9 1 9 8 9 / 9 0 1 0 6 3 2 4 4 1 . 2 
1 9 8 1 / 8 2 1 7 2 9 7 - 3 . 4 1 9 9 0 / 9 1 1 2 6 4 0 0 1 8 . 9 
1 9 9 1 / 9 2 1 5 6 9 9 7 2 4 . 2 
1 9 9 2 / 9 3 1 9 5 3 5 8 2 4 . 4 
1 9 9 3 / 9 4 2 2 4 6 6 2 1 5 . 5 
Average CB Growth Rate 20.0 Average CB Growth Rate 22.3 
in the General Non-Hostile Period in the General Hostile Period 
1973/74 to 1981/82 1982/83 to 1993/94 
2^^ ££j^ 2^^ g^J£2£g^ £2^ ^^ £^ |^ ;|^ ;_^ 2^ ^^ £^ ^^ _Q^ j^2Hg_Zg^ g}^ _. 
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Notes 
64 Details can be referred to (Hong Kong Government, Lands and Works Branch, 1991; 
1991a&1991b; Shui On Group. 1993b; 1993c). 
65 Building upon the LAFIS, the TR had further developed the departmental costing 
system, introducing the trading fund to various government departments from 1991/92 
onwards. 
66 According to Interviewee F, one should not argue the formal appropriation of the R&V 
computerization had been said to be in 1993 and so the computerization could hardly 
be served as the budget content for the CB growth of R&V in the early 1990s. It is 
because the action of computerization had been started for three to four years (late 
1980s) before the actual appropriation whereby the computer main frame was put at 
the go-down of the R&V according to the insider of the R&V. (Hong Kong 
Government, Rating and Valuation Department, Various Years(a) - 1993 (2); Hong 
Kong Government, Rating and Valuation Department, Various Years - 1993; Chu, 
1997e) 
67 The R & V News is a newsletter in the R&V. It is complied by the periodical 
meeting of division heads of the R&V. All its main issues or activities will also 
reported in the newsletter. (Chu, 1997e) 
68 Corresponding statement of the newsletter are: "The department [the R&V] will be 
responsible for estate and stamp duty valuation in repeats of premises in the district of 
Tai Po and Sha Tin. The department is already responsible for such valuation in Sai 
Kung district and it is intended to tale over responsibility from the Lands Department 
in respect of premises in North and Yuen Long district." (Hong Kong Government, 
Rating and Valuation Department, Various Years(a) - 1984(1), p. 3) "the department 
has been deferred to take over the stamp duty and estate duty until October / 
November 1984. ” (Hong Kong Government, Rating and Valuation Department, 
Various Years(a) - 1984(2), p. 4) "Since 1 June 1986, the department [the R&V] has 
taken over from the Buildings and Lands Department the stamp duty and estate duty 
valuations in respect of premises situated in the Island District. Those in Tsuen Wan, 
Kwai Chung, Tsing Yi and Tuen Mun will be taken over later in the year. It is 
intended that the department will assume to take up all stamp duty and estate duty 
work in the while territory by January 1987.” (Hong Kong Government, Rating and 
Valuation Department, Various Years(a) - 1986(2), p. 3) “Since 1st March 1987, the 
department has assumed responsibility for all stamp duty and estate duty valuations 
throughout the territory." (Hong Kong Government, Rating and Valuation Department, 
Various Years(a) - 1987(1), p. 4) "Planning has commenced for a general revaluation 
to be effective in 1 April 1988. It is likely that extensive use will be made by 
computer assisted mass appraisal techniques for this review and our Rating Adviser A, 
Ross Stevenson, will be working together with the Government Data Processing 
Manager on further developing our computer facilities for this purpose." (Hong Kong 
Government, Rating and Valuation Department, Various Years(a) - 1985(2), p. 1) 
69 Correlation coefficient is originally used to examine the extent of two variables ‘look 
like，. Here it have been borrowed its statistical rationale to examine the budget 
pattem similarity between departments. The similarity refers to department's 
resemblance ofdownward development of their annual average CB growth and lighter 
reduction of CB in the general hostile period. The coefficient ranges from -1 to +1. 
Ifthe value ofthe coefficient is closer to one, the higher would be their similarity and 
vice versa. A measure of one indicates a perfect similarity. (Healey, 1995, p. 315) 
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7° The involved private sector companies were Sun Hung Kai Properties, Cheung Kong 
(Holdings) Ltd., The Great Eagle Co. Ltd. and New World Development Co Ltd. 
The eight project- sites are: (1) 'Queen's Road, Central and Jubliee Street', (2) ‘Wing 
Lok Street and Queen's Road, Central', (3) 'Argyle Street and Shanghai Street, Mong 
Kok,, (4) 'Waterloo Street and Yuanne Lane, Yau Ma Tei,, (5) 'Sai Yeung Choi 
Street South, Mong Kok', (6) ‘Li Chit Street, Wan Chai,, (7) Third Street, Sai Ying 
Pun，，as well as (8) 'Westem Market，. 
71 The commercial and office projects - the 466, Des Voeux Road West, Queen's Road 
Central, and Westem Market are excluded. 
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CHAPTER FlVE:: 
CONCLUSION & DISCUSSION 
Scholarly works on public budgeting in Hong Kong have mostly 
approached the topic from a technical and economic point of view. The political 
aspect of budgeting has been largely neglected. On the other hand, the prevalent 
approaches to budgeting are either based on incrementalism or the economic 
approaches. This thesis attempted to contribute to budgeting studies in general 
and in Hong Kong in particular by adopting the institutional approach to study the 
politics ofbudgeting in Hong Kong. 
An attempt has been made to derive a model of public budgeting of the 
colonial government. The model is built upon the historical institutional 
approach and the thesis of ‘multi-level, interlinked institutions'. The principal 
argument of the model is that the budgets of the colonial government from the 
1970s to the 1990s were the outcome of complex interaction of macro-structural 
context, institutional factors and bureaucratic interests. The budgetary process 
involves two levels of institutions, namely the policy making level and the 
administrative level, with the budgetary authorities of the latter level being 
subordinated to the former one. 
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Constrained by the limited availability of time and resources and non-
accessibility of certain confidential colonial government information, this study has 
been confined to the case study of the land and housing domain during the 1970s-
1990s. Moreover, the concrete mechanism of interaction and negotiation among 
concerned officials and the effect of the changes in budgetary guidelines over the years 
are beyond the scope of the thesis. Instead the study concentrates on establishing 
two correlations: 1) the correlations between economic fluctations and the supply of 
crown land and the proportion of indirect taxations in making up the total revenue; 2) 
the correlations between the public finance policy of the policy actors and the 
resulting budget patterns of various departments. 
The present study finds that the policy actors of the first level institutions had 
manipulated the supply of crown land and had augmented the government revenue 
extraction role of indirect tax, fees & charges when the economy was in downturns 
and the colonial government was in financial stringency. These findings, as a result, 
demonstrate a negative correlation between economic growth and the preservation 
effort of the policy actors of the colonial government. Such a strong negative 
correlation then establishes a prima facie case for the validity of the claim that the 
public budgets of the colonial government in the past two decades were shaped by 
some conservative institutional practices. 
The analysis of the second level institutions explicate that ability of the senior 
bureaucrats in the second level institutions to increase their CB are negatively 
correlated to the effort of the financial oversight of the policy actors of the first level 
institutions, which in tum was related to the economic uptums and downturns. 
Owing to the particular methods of the policy actors in manipulating their revenue 
sources, i.e. through land sales and indirect tax, different types of agencies thus 
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display different patterns of budgetary changes over time, mostly due to their 
different role in the policy actors' strategies of revenue extraction. The findings of 
the budget patterns of different agencies did confirm the presence of such 
correlations. 
Not totally in line with incrementalism, the above findings purport that the 
seminar bureaucrats in both the policy making level and the administrative level 
possess relative autonomy in handling budget matters. The public budgets ofthe 
colonial government were not simply continuations of the past with minimal 
modification, but were subjected to manipulation for maintaining the financial 
viability of the colonial government. The adherence of low tax regime, 
enhancing the role of indirect tax and fees & charges of the policy actors and the 
CB push-up activity of the senior bureaucrats in different administrative 
departments that respectively outlined in chapters three and four serve as 
preliminaryjustifications on this argument. 
Grounded on the research findings, Nickanen's budget-maximization thesis 
seems to require the incorporation of the concept of institutions into analysis. 
This is because bureaucrats are never free from institutional constraints, such as 
budgetary guidelines and budget-making procedures. Also, these constraints are 
historically specific. In the case of Hong Kong, institutional constraints in the 
past two decades seemed to have emerged from particular economic structure 
which evolved since the early days of colonial rule. (See Chapter Two for details) 
In addition to the incorporation of the concept of 'institutions', the concept 
of ‘institutions level, also needs to be taken into account as bureaucratic 
behaviour at different levels of the government seemed to be different from each 
117 
other. The research findings ofthis study preliminarily indicate that bureaucrats 
who are at the apex of the government bureaucracy might not focus on budget 
maximizing activities as did by the senior bureaucrats in the administrative level. 
In other words, assuming that bureaucrats are all budget maximizers seems to 
oversimplify the actual operation of a government bureaucracy. The behaviour 
of government bureaucrats' may very probably be shaped by their particular 
working contexts and therefore acquired different behaviours towards public 
budget. If the findings of this study is true, the difference in budget-making 
behaviour in different levels of government then preliminarily explicate that 
bureaucrats' behaviour need not to be utility-driven, but more often driven by the 
administrative rationale of 'trouble avoidance'. 
All in all, this study represents an attempt to apply the historical 
institutionalist approach and the thesis of 'multi-level interlinked institutions' in 
studying the public budgeting politics of Hong Kong. The explanatory model 
somehow serves as an alternative perspective in viewing the public budgeting of 
Hong Kong, in which some of the insufficiencies that are embodied in 
incrementalism and those budgetary theories which are oriented in economic 
theories are eased preliminarily. Applying it in the study of public budgeting 
politics of in Hong Kong can somehow said to be unconventional and original. 
However, there are a number of limitations. The first limitation lies in the 
limited amount of background researches. The limited background researches 
available as references restrict the possible scope of the study of the model to 
exclude: (1) the concrete mechanism of interaction and negotiation among the 
concerned officials; (2) the effect of changes in budgetary guidelines over the 
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years; (3) how exactly the administration rationale of trouble avoidance affect the 
concerned government officials in budget-making. Thus, bringing all these parts 
ofthe model back into the analysis in the future is a must. 
The second limitation of the present study lies in the non-accessibility of 
some confidential government information. The non-accessibility of certain 
government information, such as the budgetary guidelines of the colonial 
government and documents, that should have recorded the reasons of why the 
colonial government or administrative departments would have a particular 
priority of public expenses. These have caused the study to rely on indirect 
indicators and secondary data. No doubt this would have affected the reliability 
of the study considerably. Despite the fact that the study has already used 
interview data to strengthen the reliability of the findings, the unavailability of 
interviewees in relevant administrative agencies, such as the HRD, the TR, the FB 
and the IRD, has again restricted the reliability of the present study. In order to 
enhance the reliability, a more comprehensive selection of interviewees is needed 
in the future. 
D u e to the non-access ib i l i ty o f s o m e g o v e r n m e n t i n f o r m a t i o n , the s tudy has 
been c o n f i n e d to e x a m i n e the ins t i tu t ions level o f pol icy m a k i n g level and 
admin i s t r a t i ve level . For his tor ical ins t i tu t ional i s t s , there m u s t be o ther 
ins t i tu t ional levels w h i c h fall b e t w e e n the pol icy m a k i n g level and the 
admin i s t r a t i ve level , such as the in l ra -d iv i s ions o f an admin i s t r a t i ve d e p a r t m e n t . 
T h e r e f o r e , a genera l mode l of publ ic b u d g e t i n g wi th m o r e ins t i tu t ional levels is 
needed in o rder to ach ieve a m o r e c o m p r e h e n s i v e p ic ture of publ ic b u d g e t i n g 
pol i t ics o f H o n g K o n g . 
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Although the land and housing domain had contributed a significant portion 
of government revenue, some readers of this dissertation may challenge the 
validity by confining the present study in the land and housing domain of the 
colonial government, (See Section 1.4 for details). It is true that the findings of 
this study cannot represent the behaviour of all government bureaucrats in the 
colonial legacy. Thus, drawing other sectors of government revenue into the 





I N T E R V n : W E E S RANK BELONGED DEPARTMENTS 
A N/A Former chairman of the 
Finance Committee of the 
Hong Kong Legislative 
Council 
B Senior Lands Officer Lands Department 
C Senior Administrative Officer Housing Branch 
D Senior Information Officer Housing Department 
E Senior Executive Officer Housing Authority 
F Senior Executive Officer Rating and Valuation 
Department 
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APFENPDCII ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
FOR THE LAND AND HOUSING ADMINISTRA TIVE BEFARTMENTS 
The Chinese University of Hong Kong 
Department of Government & Public Administration 
This interview aims to research the behaviour of Hong Kong Civil Servant. The interview 
will be recorded by tape where all the information of the interviewee(s) will be kept 
confidential and it will only be used for academic research purpose. 
Chu Yan-kit 
(Interviewer, MPhi l student at C U H K ) 
1. What is y o u r j o b duty in your department? Any special projects recently? 
2. Somebody think that administrative departments have autonomy on how government 
policy should be implemented. What do you think? 
3. May you describe the estimate draft ing procedures of your department? 
4. Would you give a brief introduction of the administration structure of your department 
and its inter-related government agencies, e.g. the Town Planning Department, Building 
Department, Housing Branch, Lands and Works Branch, Finance Branch etc. 
5. Some say that government departments will exaggerate their department budget or part 
of their budget so that they can enjoy a higher flexibility and security of department 
management in terms of money and resource usage? What do you think? 
6. Are there any clues that you may look for about what might be acceptable to the 
Finance Branch? If yes, what are the clues? 
7. How do your department allocate the priorities among programmes? 
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APPENDDClII; ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR THE FmiNCE COMMITTEE OF THE lEGCO 
The Chinese University of Hong Kong 
Department of Government & Public Administration 
This interview aims to research the behaviour of Hong Kong Civil Servant. The interview 
will be recorded by tape where all the information of the interviewee(s) will be kept 
confidential and it will only be used for academic research purpose. 
Chu Yan-kit 
(Interviewer, MPhi l student at C U H K ) 
1. What is your j o b duty in the Finance Commit tee previously? Do you come across 
some special projects? 
2. What do you think of your job duty in the Finance Committee? How do you 
tackle your j ob in general? 
3. Somebody think that administrative departments have the autonomy on how 
government policy should be implemented. What do you think? 
4. May you describe the budget draft ing procedures of the committee? 
5. What do you think about the relations between the committee and various 
administrative departments and the relations of the departments and the policy 
branches? 
6. Some scholars say that public housing provision of Hong Kong Government tend to 
favour the businessmen and to subordinate the interest of the citizens in terms of 
decision making of community affairs, population density and recreational space. 
What do you think? 
7. What do you think about the relations of your department and the Housing Authority 
and Hong Kong Housing Association? 
8. Some say that government departments will exaggerate their department budget so that 
they can enjoy a higher flexibility and security of department management in terms of 
money and resource usage? What do you think? 
9. Do the Committee usually cut funding requests, or give more than expected or approve 
the exact amount they need? 
10. Does the Committee tend to give favourable consideration to acquisition of very 
sophisticated technical equipment? 
11. How do you /your branch /your Committee set up the priority among different 
programmes? 
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Appendix IV: ^ _ ^ ^ ^ _ _ > ^ ^ _ _ _ -
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR THE HOUSING BRANCH 
The Chinese University of Hong Kong 
Department of Government & Public Administration 
This interview aims to research the behaviour of Hong Kong Civil Servant. The interview 
will be recorded by tape where all the information of the interviewee(s) will be kept 
confidential and it will only be used for academic research purpose. 
Chu Yan-kit 
(M Interviewer, M.Phil student at CUHK) 
1. How is the formulation of the LTHS 1997 determined? 
2. Have the standards and principles of the LTHS been kept unchanged in the past two 
decades? 
3. LTHS consists of a number of aspects, namely private sector housing, public sector 
housing, urban renewal, land and planning. Also, it seems involve many agencies of 
the colonial government? Would you tell me (i) what are they & (ii) their particular 
roles in it? 
4. The LTHS is subjected to the change with housing demand. How would the HA 
coordinate its role among under the policy branch of the colonial government and the 
private sector? 
5. The government has been increasingly enticing the private sector's participation in 
either the public sector housing, like HOS, PSPS. Could you tell me what exactly the 
role of the private sector in the mentioned project items? 
6. May you describe the budget drafting procedures of your branch and how it is related 
to the other policy branches and various administrative departments of the colonial 
government? 
7. How does your branch set up the priority of different programmes? 
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